The time course of attentional modulation on emotional conflict processing

Cognitive conflict resolution is critical to human survival in a rapidly changing environment. However, emotional conflict processing seems to be particularly important for human interactions. This study examined whether the time course of attentional modulation on emotional conflict processing was different from cognitive conflict processing during a flanker task. Results showed that emotional N200 and P300 effects, similar to colour conflict processing, appeared only during the relevant task. However, the emotional N200 effect preceded the colour N200 effect, indicating that emotional conflict can be identified earlier than cognitive conflict. Additionally, a significant emotional N100 effect revealed that emotional valence differences could be perceived during early processing based on rough aspects of input. The present data suggest that emotional conflict processing is modulated by top-down attention, similar to cognitive conflict processing (reflected by N200 and P300 effects). However, emotional conflict processing seems to have more time advantages during two different processing stages.     

Neuroscience in Pursuit of the Holy: Mysticism, the Brain, and Ultimate Reality

Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg's The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience presents a core theory regarding the neurophysical nature of mystical experience; extensions of this theory, focusing upon near-death experiences and the nature of religion itself; and buttressing arguments proposing that genetically based neurophysical "operators" within the brain compel human beings to think in certain ways. On the basis of this work, the authors pose a "metatheology," suggesting that certain brain operations may underlie all the religions of the world. The core theory, its extensions, and related arguments are discussed in turn, concluding with commentary on the authors' constructive theology.     

Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans’s reflexive model of consciousness

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

The cognitive penetrability of perception: A blocked debate and a tentative solution

Despite the extensive body of psychological findings suggesting that cognition influences perception, the debate between defenders and detractors of the cognitive penetrability of perception persists. While detractors demand more strictness in psychological experiments, proponents consider that empirical studies show that cognitive penetrability occurs. These considerations have led some theorists to propose that the debate has reached a dead end. The issue about where perception ends and cognition begins is, I argue, one of the reasons why the debate is cornered. Another reason is the inability of psychological studies to present uncontroversial interpretations of the results obtained. To dive into other kinds of empirical sources is, therefore, required to clarify the debate. In this paper, I explain where the debate is blocked, and suggest that neuroscientific evidence together with the predictive coding account, might decant the discussion on the side of the penetrability thesis.     

The Nature of Physical Reality

This account of the dynamical theory of chaos leads to a metaphysical picture of a world with an open future, in which the laws of physics are emergent-downward approximations to a more subtle and supple reality and in which there is downward causation through information input as well as upward causation through energy input. Such a metaphysical picture can accommodate both human and divine agency.     

Decrease of prefrontal-posterior EEG coherence: loose control during social-emotional stimulation

In two experiments we aimed to investigate if individual differences in state-dependent decreases or increases of EEG coherence between prefrontal and posterior cortical regions may be indicative of a mechanism modulating the impact social-emotional information has on an individual. Two independent samples were exposed to an emotional stimulation paradigm in which the participants were invited to get involved and sympathize with the persons they were watching (study 1) or listening to (study 2), and who were expressing sadness or anxiety. The two studies yielded consistent results. Higher scores in trait absorption and in the propensity to ruminate were associated with decreased EEG beta coherence during the stimulation, whereas coherence increased in individuals low in absorption or rumination. Coherence changes did not predict to which degree the participants felt infected by the displayed emotions, but in individuals showing decreased prefrontal-posterior coupling during the stimulation, feelings of sadness and anxiety had a greater tendency to persist. The findings suggest that more loose prefrontal-posterior coupling may be related to loosening of control of the prefrontal cortex over incoming social-emotional information and, consequently, to deeper emotional involvement and absorption, whereas increased prefrontal-posterior coupling may be related to strong control, dampening of emotional experience, and not letting oneself become emotionally affected.     

Internal reasons and practical limits on rational deliberation

I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.     

The effects of attention on ear advantages in dichotic listening to words and affects

This study examined the effects of attention on ear advantages using dichotic listening to words and affects, a focused-attention paradigm. We compared the mixed condition, in which attention is switched between the ears in each trial, to the blocked condition, in which attention is directed to one ear for an entire block of trials. Results showed a decreased right ear advantage for word processing only in the mixed condition and an increased left ear advantage for emotion processing in both attention conditions for hits index. The mixed condition showed smaller laterality effects than the blocked condition for words with respect to hits index, while increasing right ear predominance for intrusions. The greater percentage of intrusions in the right ear for the word task and in the mixed condition suggests that the right ear (left hemisphere) is most vulnerable to attention switching. We posit that the attention manipulation has a greater effect on word processing than on emotion processing and propose that ear advantages reflect a combination of the effects of attentional and structural constraints on lateralisation.     

When believing is seeing: The role of predictions in shaping visual perception

The study investigated the influence of predictions on perception—in particular, how strong but erroneous prediction coupled with poor sensory data can trigger misperceptions. Using signal detection, we tested whether predictions induced by a semantic cue change the recognition threshold (criterion) or the subjectively perceived differences between stimuli (sensitivity). In a series of 3 experiments, participants observed pictures of (a) real objects distorted to various extents (targets), (b) noise with elements corresponding to meaningful objects (foils), or (c) nonsense images (noise). Stimuli were preceded either by a semantic cue or by a blank screen with equal probability. Presence of the cue resulted in a more liberal criterion, but only for targets and foils. The cue decreased sensitivity between the distorted targets, but increased sensitivity between the targets and noise—that is, the cue increased between-class differences, but decreased within-class differences. When there was no correspondence between prediction and the sensory input, prediction actually increased the chances of correctly rejecting noise. The influence of the cue was strongest for the moderately distorted targets and foils—when uncertainty related to the bottom-up input was the highest.     

The economics of paradox: a response to armour-garb

‘Those ice cubes melted because by melting total entropy increased and entropy increase has a very high objective chance.’ What role does the chance in this explanation play? I argue that it contributes to the explanation by entailing that the melting was almost necessary, and defend the claim that the fact that some event was almost necessary can, in the right circumstances, constitute a causal explanation of that event.