Escaping the Dark Side of Curiosity

Curiosity as a clinical entity has been a neglected subject in the psychoanalytic literature. Freud never addressed the issue of curiosity systematically. His interest was in trying to account for children's sexual questioning. Nevertheless, hinderance to internal curiosity—this is to say, that which intimidates and abates the appetite for an exploration of one's motives—is part and parcel of psychoanalytic inquiry. And, arguably, there is no greater clinical challenge for the analyst than trying to treat an analysand who appears to lack an interest in the underlying causes of his unhappiness. The problem of impeded self-inquiry is usually exacerbated in people with more serious emotional disturbances. My position here is that in studying the conditions that mitigate against curiosity in a seriously disturbed patient, we gain access to an enlarged version of the curiosity problems of our less disturbed patients. Here I interpret my clinical impressions about problems with curiosity with ideas from the writings of Martin Buber and Albert Camus.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to self-recognition

Recognizing oneself, easy as it appears to be, seems at least to require awareness of one's body and one's actions. To investigate the contribution of these factors to self-recognition, we presented normal subjects with an image of both their own and the experimenter's hand. The hands could make the same, a different or no movement and could be displayed in various orientations. Subjects had to tell whether the indicated hand was theirs or not. The results showed that a congruence between visual signals and signals indicating the position of the body is one component on which self-recognition is based. Recognition of one's actions is another component. Subjects had most difficulty in recognizing their hand when movements were absent. When the two hands made different movements, subjects relied exclusively on the movement cue and recognition was almost perfect. Our findings are in line with pathological alterations in the sense of body and the sense of action.     

Children's predictions of consistency in people's actions

Past research suggests that young children are often reluctant to generalize about people's behavior. Three experiments involving 102 4-5-year-olds, 84 7-8-year-olds, and 107 adults explored the conditions under which inductive inferences about people are made. There was an age-based increase in propensity to predict consistency in psychological/intentional causal relations. Children often predicted change; people would behave differently in the future than they did in the past. Younger children limited predictions of consistency to non-psychological contexts. Older children showed some appreciation of stable motivations (e.g. traits, preferences). The results are consistent with the hypothesis that children's theories of mind emphasize situational influences, with personal influences appearing in middle-childhood.     

Between certainty and uncertainty--observations on psychoanalysis in Russia

'Diversity', the theme of our conference, carries a subversive sub-text in totalitarian societies. This is one of the themes presented as the current revival of psychoanalysis in the more democratic post-Communist Russia is explored. The history of psychoanalysis in Russia is summarized with a focus on its politicization, which led to initial interest in its theory (by way of a misapprehension of its tenets), and then to ultimate suppression of psychoanalytic thinking as an ideology deemed antagonistic to the totalitarian regime. In contrast, features of psychoanalysis and democracy are explored for their mutual affinities. The background of the resourceful new generation of analytic therapists is discussed, especially in regard to their experience of the parallel meanings of the word 'repression' (political, psychological). There is a persistence of some traits in patients and practitioners alike that are referable to past repression, such as the newness of verbal treatments, the inhibition of psychological curiosity, the ambivalent lure of certainty, and the pressure of authoritarian introjects. It is noted that psychoanalysis has its own history of a posture opposed to pluralism and diversity, which deepens the dialogue on the mutual engagement between psychoanalysis and the vicissitudes of its history in Russian culture.     

Treating a Chronically Depressed Adolescent Female Using the Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System of Psychotherapy: A Case Study

A case is presented of an adolescent female with double depression who was treated using the Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System of Psychotherapy (CBASP). CBASP is designed to teach a social problem-solving procedure called Situational Analysis (SA). Generalized treatment effects were measured through monitoring of diagnostic status, two administrations of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent, weekly administrations of the Child Depression Inventory, and acquisition performance ratings on the SA task. The results showed that CBASP appeared to be an effective treatment. The double depressive disorder remitted, and the patient learned to identify behavioral consequences as well as target and attain her interpersonal goals. CBASP can be effective for adolescents, although modifications of the adult form of the therapy may be necessary.