Perception of Time and Causation Through the Kinesthesia of Intentional Action

Perception is an intentional action through space in time by which the finite brain explores the infinite world. By acting, the brain thrusts its body into the future space–time of the world while predicting the sensory consequences. Through perceiving its actions and their results, it remembers its predictions, its actions, and their consequences. To perform these operations the brain, through chaotic dynamics, constructs and uses finite perceptual matrices of space–time and infers causation. Perceived time differs from world time in ways that are determined by the neural mechanisms of intentionality. In particular, perception of the self in action, through the mechanism of preafference, gives structure and content to the concepts of continuity, contiguity, duration, temporal order, cause, and effect. We expand our perceptual scales beyond kinesthesia by converting time into space by use of clocks and calendars. Remembered time differs from perceived time in being dependent on awareness, which makes it episodic, fragmentary, and subject to large variations in rates of time lapse in the flow of meanings. The attribution of causal agency to objects and events in the world results from the experience of temporal sequencing in the action–perception cycle: “I act” [cause] “I feel” [effect] during Piaget’s somatomotor phase in early human development.

A non-Bergsonian Bachelard

In this essay, Perraudin sets out to contrast the competing philosophies of time and imagination of two major French thinkers of the twentieth century: Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). Despite Bachelard’s polemical approach vis-à-vis philosophical tradition in his works on epistemology and poetics, his accounts of time and imagination have been shown by several critics to be significantly influenced and inspired by his predecessor. Perraudin nonetheless argues that Bachelard’s critique of Bergson’s theory of continuous temporality opens the way—through the subtle dialectics of his “philosophy of no”—to more prolific, and as yet untapped, therapeutic possibilities in our understanding of time and imagination than Bergson’s accounts of continuum of the élan vital had managed to reveal. This translated text is a revised version of Jean Francois Perraudin’s “Un Bachelard Non-Bergsonien,” published in Gaston Bachelard: Du rêveur ironiste au pédagogue inspiré (Gaston Bachelard: From Ironic Dreamer to Inspired Educator). Ed. Jean Libis. Dijon: Centre Regional de Documentation Pédagogique, 1984, pp. 61–76. Passages cited from Bergson’s and Bachelard’s works are here drawn from published English translations (with an occasional amendment noted, and key French phrases inserted parenthetically). In the case of citations from French texts not yet available in English, all translations are mine. Translated by Eileen Rizo-Patron Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture Program, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA e-mail: erizopatron@stny.rr.com

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When is one head better than two? Interdependent information in group decision making

Research on information exchange in group decision making has frequently assumed that information items have independent meanings. Relaxing this assumption raises new issues and presents new possibilities. In the experiment presented here, dyads worked on hidden profile decision tasks in which pairs of unshared information items had interdependent meanings. Dyad decisions were more likely to be accurate when each pair of interdependent items was allocated to a single member (a “connected” hidden profile) than when each pair of interdependent items was separated between the two members (a “disconnected” hidden profile). These information distributions influenced the degree to which dyads considered unshared information. Cognitive load was manipulated, and it impaired decision makers’ ability to identify connections among interdependent information items. The differentiated distribution of information inherent in transactive memory systems moderated the negative effects of cognitive load on dyad decisions.     

The COST of explicit memory

Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time – a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include, (1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, (2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a non-differentiable time contained in Bergson’s theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, (3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, (4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience “stored in the brain.”     

LEARNING TO TIME: A PERSPECTIVE

In the last decades, researchers have proposed a large number of theoretical models of timing. These models make different assumptions concerning how animals learn to time events and how such learning is represented in memory. However, few studies have examined these different assumptions either empirically or conceptually. For knowledge to accumulate, variation in theoretical models must be accompanied by selection of models and model ideas. To that end, we review two timing models, Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET), the dominant model in the field, and the Learning‐to‐Time (LeT) model, one of the few models dealing explicitly with learning. In the first part of this article, we describe how each model works in prototypical concurrent and retrospective timing tasks, identify their structural similarities, and classify their differences concerning temporal learning and memory. In the second part, we review a series of studies that examined these differences and conclude that both the memory structure postulated by SET and the state dynamics postulated by LeT are probably incorrect. In the third part, we propose a hybrid model that may improve on its parents. The hybrid model accounts for the typical findings in fixed‐interval schedules, the peak procedure, mixed fixed interval schedules, simple and double temporal bisection, and temporal generalization tasks. In the fourth and last part, we identify seven challenges that any timing model must meet.     

Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time

Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments.     

Conceptualization and measurement of temporal focus: The subjective experience of the past,present, and future

Temporal focus is the attention individuals devote to thinking about the past, present, and future, and the concept is important because it affects how people incorporate perceptions about past experiences, current situations, and future expectations into their attitudes, cognitions, and behavior. However, temporal focus has not been clearly defined nor situated in a nomological network of constructs. In addition, existing measures of temporal focus suffer from various shortcomings. In this paper, we advance the concept of temporal focus by critically examining its conceptualization, developing a new measure of temporal focus (Temporal Focus Scale; TFS), and evaluating the validity (i.e., construct, convergent, discriminant, nomological, and predictive validity) of the TFS across four studies. We conclude that understanding how individuals focus their attention toward the past, present, and future clarifies their responses to explicit and implicit temporal information, which suggests that a variety of research streams would benefit from incorporating the concept of temporal focus.     

交易双方时间成本不同的博弈分析与实验论证

本文在实验经济学的基础上 ,用心理学的实验法 ,模拟了现实中在买卖交易价格信息不对称的情境下 ,时间压力不同对价格的影响问题。通过 62名被试对 2 0个小商品进行交易的前后两阶段——时间压力分别针对卖方和买方时的价格差异 ,即交易利润分成的差异 ,证实了时间压力对价格交易的显著作用。并使以往实验经济学交易价格封顶 (有最高价 )、交易双方被试相互熟悉以及交易被试个体差异因素没有相对控制等问题得到了改进。     

Twin study of laboratory-induced aggression

The aim of this study was to explore genetic and environmental contributions to laboratory-induced aggressive behavior. On a sample of 478 adult twins (316 monozygotic), the Competitive Reaction Time Task was used for aggression induction. The results showed that the initial, basic level of aggression could be explained by both shared (45%) and nonshared environmental factors (55%), while only nonshared environmental factors (100%) had a significant influence on changes in aggression as provocation increased. Genetic factors had no influence on laboratory-induced aggression. The results highlight the importance of environmental factors in shaping situation-specific aggressive responses to provocation.     

Exerting Self‐Control ≠ Sacrificing Pleasure

Self‐control is a prominent topic in consumer research, where it is often conceptualized as the abstinence from hedonic consumption. We examine whether this conceptualization accurately captures consumers’ experiences of self‐control conflicts/failures in light of seminal self‐control theories in economics and psychology. Rejecting that notion, we argue that self‐control failures are choices in violation of superordinate long‐term goals accompanied by anticipated regret, rather than choices of hedonic over utilitarian consumption. This conceptualization has important methodological, theoretical, and practical implications. Methodologically, it highlights the need for experimental paradigms with higher construct validity. Theoretically, it helps elucidate how self‐control is distinct from impatience and self‐regulation. Practically, it provides a rich set of implications for deducing interventions on the individual and public policy level to help consumers exert self‐control.