Operational Noology as a new methodology for the study of thought and language: theoretical aspects and possible practical applications

In this article, the author presents a new methodology for the study of two fundamental components of consciousness, that is thought and language. The fundamental presupposition that forms the basis of this methodology is that thought is not simply a passive "reflection" of an external "reality", but also (and especially) something active, i.e. that the fundamental components of thought are sequences of operations, amongst which the ones of attention play a key role. These sequences of elementary mental operations are called mental categories, and are the meanings of all the words that do not seem to indicate something physical (first of all, all the "grammatical" words, that is conjunctions, prepositions, articles, pronouns, fundamental verbs like "to be", "to have" etc., the main adverbs, and, in the large number of languages that have a more or less rich morphology, all morphemes (the ones which indicate cases, in languages that have cases, the number and the gender of nouns and adjectives, moods and tenses of the verb etc.). The author proposes a list of these elementary mental operations and he shows how it is possible, basing ourselves on them, to identify the meanings of these words, which are indispensable for any linguistic expression. The author also mentions a possible short-term practical application of these theories, i.e. a device in order to improve the quality of machine translation. He also formulates the hypothesis that these theories could allow us to look in a new way at the problem of the (partial) artificial reproduction of the human activity of thought and language.     

Long term consequences of suppression of intrusive anxious thoughts and repressive coping

The current experiment employed a thought suppression paradigm to investigate whether repressors (N=40) are more skilled in suppressing positive and anxious autobiographical thoughts than low anxious (N=40), high anxious (N=40), and defensive high anxious (N=40) individuals, both immediately and over a longer time period (i.e., 7 days). Regardless of suppression instructions, repressors reported during their lab visit fewer target thoughts for their most anxious events than participants in the other three groups. However, over a 7 days period, repressors showed the highest number of intrusive thoughts about their anxious autobiographical events. Thus, our results demonstrate that repressive coping might be adaptive in the short run, but counterproductive in the long run.     

Thought suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Social cognition research has indicated that attempts to suppress thoughts can lead to a paradoxical increase in the frequency of that thought. This phenomenon has been a central component of cognitive-behavioural models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); however, research has yet to demonstrate deficient thought suppression ability in OCD patients. We examined whether individuals with OCD (OCs) exhibit a deficit in the ability to suppress thoughts. In Experiment 1, attempted thought suppression led to a paradoxical increase in self-reported thoughts for OCs, but not for nonanxious controls (NACs) or anxious controls (ACs). In order to rule out self-report biases, in Experiment 2 we utilized a lexical decision paradigm that measured priming strength of a target word under thought suppression conditions. Results paralleled those of Experiment 1: OCs showed decreased lexical decision latency of the 'suppressed' thought (thought to reflect either increased priming strength or disrupted processing of nonsuppressed thoughts), thus exhibiting a paradoxical effect of thought suppression. This effect was not seen in NACs or ACs. These findings suggest that deficits in cognitive inhibitory processes may underlie the intrusive, repetitive nature of clinical obsessions.     

Obsessive–compulsive symptoms, white noise and intrusions of self–relevant negative thoughts in a thought suppression paradigm

Forty female students participated in an experiment where they were asked to suppress a negative self-relevant thought. Half the group suppressed in a loud white noise condition (90 decibels) whereas the other half suppressed in a noise condition of much lower intensity (50 decibels). The subjects were divided up into two groups on the basis of their scores on the Obsessive Compulsive Thoughts Checklist (Bouvard, Cottraux, Mollard, Arthus, Lachance, Guerin, Sauteraud & Yao, 1997). It was predicted that 1) Subjects scoring high on obsessive-compulsive symptoms would show more intrusive thoughts 2) Loud noise would increase intrusive thoughts, especially for subjects scoring high on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. As expected subjects who scored high on obsessive-compulsive symptoms showed more intrusive thoughts, but contrary to expectations loud noise did not increase intrusive thoughts. In fact obsessive-compulsive symptoms were related to more intrusions in the condition of noise of less intensity but not in the condition of loud noise. Implications are discussed.     

A comparison of the effects of thought suppression, distraction and concentration

This study compared the effects of suppression, focused-distraction, and concentration on controlling unwanted distressing thoughts, and examined how anxiety levels were associated with the use of each thought-control technique. In the study, college students were told to suppress thoughts about a distressing story, to suppress the same thoughts by focusing on an alternative distraction task, to simply concentrate on that alternative task, or to think about anything without restrictions for 6 minutes. This initial period was followed by a “free-thinking” period to assess the delayed effect of thought-control techniques. The results indicated that focused-distraction and concentration led to fewer intrusions of target thoughts than suppression, and concentration in turn resulted in fewer target intrusions than focused-distraction during the initial period. Participants in the focused-distraction and concentration condition also tended to report lower anxiety during the initial period than those who were told to suppress thoughts.     

Simulated thought insertion: Influencing the sense of agency using deception and magic

In order to study the feeling of control over decisions, we told 60 participants that a neuroimaging machine could read and influence their thoughts. While inside a mock brain scanner, participants chose arbitrary numbers in two similar tasks. In the Mind-Reading Task, the scanner appeared to guess the participants’ numbers; in the Mind-Influencing Task, it appeared to influence their choice of numbers. We predicted that participants would feel less voluntary control over their decisions when they believed that the scanner was influencing their choices. As predicted, participants felt less control and made slower decisions in the Mind-Influencing Task compared to the Mind-Reading Task. A second study replicated these findings. Participants’ experience of the ostensible influence varied, with some reporting an unknown source directing them towards specific numbers. This simulated thought insertion paradigm can therefore influence feelings of voluntary control and may help model symptoms of mental disorders.     

Does post-event cognitive load undermine thought suppression and increase intrusive memories after exposure to an analogue stressor?

Ironic process theory has been used in part to explain the phenomenon of intrusive memories in various disorders including post-traumatic stress disorder. How thought suppression interacts with other cognitive processes believed to be instrumental in the development of traumatic intrusive memory was tested. In an analogue design 120 participants were randomised to five conditions, four of which also required participants to attempt to suppress intrusive memories after viewing a film of traumatic content. Participants in three conditions were also required to perform concurrent tasks that acted as a cognitive load during suppression. Intrusive memories were recorded during the experimental phase and at 1-week follow-up. Contrary to predictions, post-film processing did not undermine suppression success. There was some suggestion that post-film processing resulted in those participants experiencing intrusions of shorter duration than the no-suppression control group in two 5-minute intrusion monitoring intervals at the initial and follow-up phase of the experiment, but this was not reflected in a 1-week diary measure of intrusions. All experimental groups performed in a similar fashion in terms of memory testing of the film's content. The findings are discussed in the context of ironic process theory and cognitive models of post-traumatic stress.     

Intellectual Tennis without a Net? Thought Experiments and Theology

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between thought experiments and theology in three respects. First, it explores the theological dimension of Newton's famous bucket experiment. Second, it looks at the role of the biblical narrative of Adam's Fall in discussions that resulted in the foundations of modern science. Finally, the paper argues that there are at least two classes of thought experiments in medieval thought that depend for their existence on theological assumptions.