A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.

Ageing and thought suppression performance: Its relationship with working memory capacity,habitual thought suppression and mindfulness

A study investigated how the ability to suppress thoughts in the laboratory was affected by type of thought suppressed (positive, negative, neutral), participants’ age and working memory capacity (WMC). Linked variables (Use of thought suppression, social desirability, and mindfulness) were measured to assess whether they modified susceptibility to thought intrusion.Younger, middle aged and older adults suppressed three different valenced thoughts in a counterbalanced order for 5-min per thought. Participants then completed a WMC task and questionnaire measures of the linked variables.Valence had no effect on intrusions. WMC was positively related to intrusions; higher WMC corresponded to greater intrusions. Age was negatively related to intrusions; with increasing age intrusions decreased. Hierarchical regression showed only age and backward digit span (WMC) significantly predicted intrusions. The relationship between WMC and intrusions was not moderated by age. WMC and age both independently predict level of intrusion, and no synergistic effect was found.     

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.     

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.     

实践智慧在二十一世纪(下)

这是一篇文章的第二部分,这篇文章概述了一个词汇表,从而发展出一个建设性的prudence(实践智慧)概念,以用来应对政治行动者以及社会理论所面临的那些问题。明智(审慎)的行为要求规范的、计虑的和施行的(实践智慧)这些形态的相互协调。这一部分将考察,这些要求如何可能在行为者、观众和后现代思想之中形成一个有机的结合。实践智慧可以通过节状自我、公共商讨以及对prudence历史上的教育学和哲学诸阶段的详尽论述来得到理解。     

Minimal Empiricism Without Dogmas

John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.

Investigation of the indulgence cycles hypothesis of suppression on experimentally induced visual intrusions in dysphoria

Within the thought control literature, Wegner [(1989). White bears and other unwanted thoughts: Suppression, obsession, and the psychology of mental control. New York, NY, USA: Penguin Press.] referred to the combined initial suppression and expression phases of thought control as an indulgence cycle which results in the rebound effect typically observed in suppression studies. According to Ironic Process Theory [Wegner, (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34-52.], this rebound leads to further attempts to suppress that are difficult due to the target thought's hyperaccessibility, resulting in a secondary rebound effect owing to a positive feedback system of indulgence cycles. The current study investigated (i) the effects of repeated suppression and opportunities for expression by using a method to index the frequency, duration, and associated levels of distress of an experimentally induced visual intrusion, and (ii) whether any observed effects were differentially linked to depressive symptomatology in an analogue sample of low and high dysphoric participants. Results supported a secondary rebound effect in those participants most successful at suppressing target intrusions. The findings offer an important extension to the emerging literature on the management of intrusive memories in depression.     

Suppression-induced hyperaccessibility of thoughts in abstinent alcoholics: a preliminary investigation

Abstinent alcoholics were compared to a non-alcoholic control group on a modified Stroop color-naming task. Alcoholics took significantly longer to name the color of the word "alcohol" than to name the color of non-alcohol words (i.e., they showed an interference effect) after they had first tried to suppress thoughts of alcohol. Alcoholics who had freely expressed thoughts about alcohol prior to the Stroop did not show such interference. Control participants who had suppressed thoughts of alcohol showed no interference effect. The results overall suggest that when alcoholics try to suppress thoughts of alcohol, these thoughts may become hyperaccessible immediately afterward.     

Why did the white bear return? Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and attributions for unsuccessful thought suppression

The current study examined the nature and consequences of attributions about unsuccessful thought suppression. Undergraduate students with either high (n=67) or low (n=59) levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms rated attributions to explain their unsuccessful thought suppression attempts. We expected that self-blaming attributions and attributions ascribing importance to unwanted thoughts would predict more distress and greater recurrence of thoughts during time spent monitoring or suppressing unwanted thoughts. Further, we expected that these attributions would mediate the relationship between obsessive–compulsive symptom levels and the negative thought suppression outcomes (distress and thought recurrence). Structural equation models largely confirmed the hypotheses, suggesting that attributions may be an important factor in explaining the consequences of thought suppression. Implications are discussed for cognitive theories of obsessive–compulsive disorder and thought suppression.