Creativity from Start to Finish: A “Straight-A” Model of Creative Process and Its Relation to Intelligence

This article describes a “straight-A” model of the creative process. It characterizes the creative process in five overlapping phases, with the variables most affecting those phases characterized as: (1) activators, (2) abilities, (3) amplifiers, (4) appeal to audience, and (5) assessment by audience. The creative process does not complete itself often, in part because all five phases rarely work in the right direction. For example, at Phase 1, there are deactivators as well as activators and at Phase 3, there are attenuators of creativity as well as amplifiers. I further discuss in the article the implications of the model for the relation between creativity and intelligence. In particular, whereas aspects of intelligence (according to the triarchic theory of successful intelligence) involve some degree overlap among creative, analytical, and practical skills, true creativity involves a true conjunction of these skills and is therefore much rarer.     

Preference or ability: Exploring the relations between risk preference,personality, and cognitive abilities

Key issues in the behavioral sciences are if there exist stable risk preferences that generalize across domains and if these are best measured by revealed risk preference (RRP) in behavioral decision tasks or by surveys eliciting stated risk preference (SRP). We applied network analysis to data from a representative Swedish sample to investigate the relations between RRP, SRP, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities, using in total over 70 measurements. The results showed that different measures of RRP were poorly intercorrelated and formed a community together with measures of numerical and cognitive abilities. Measures of SRP were weakly correlated with measures of RRP and identified in a distinctly separate community, along with personality characteristics and gender. The ensuing analyses provided support for a model suggesting that RRPs are contaminated by demands on numerical and cognitive abilities. RRPs may thus suffer from poor construct validity, whereas SRPs may better capture people's everyday risk preferences because they are related to more stable traits.     

On an Unidentified Fixed-Effects Three-Parameter Logistic Model

For the fixed-effects three-parameter logistic model in item response theory, the necessary and sufficient condition of the model identification is presented synthesizing known results. An optimal transformation of parameters for model identification in Maris's unidentified case to remove or reduce the skewness of abilities is shown. In many cases, the vanishing skewnesses are obtained in the possible range of transformation for parameters with some improvements in the test response and information functions.     

语言能力的老化机制：语言特异性与非特异性因素的共同作用

语言能力的衰退是由于一般认知能力衰退引起的, 还是由于语言加工系统的衰退引起的, 抑或是两者的共同作用?研究中测量了青年组和老年组的一般认知能力(加工速度、工作记忆和抑制能力), 以及在词汇、句子和语篇三个水平上的语言理解能力和语言产生能力。结果发现, 一般认知能力、语言理解和语言产生能力都存在年老化现象。分层回归分析表明, 一般认知能力对语言能力的贡献, 以及语言理解能力和产生能力之间的相互贡献在青年组和老年组中是不同的, 且存在词汇、句子和语篇水平上的差异。在词汇水平上, 青年人的成绩能够被一般认知能力和另一种语言能力所显著预测, 而老年人的成绩却不受一般认知因素影响; 在句子水平上, 青年人的成绩仍能被一般认知能力或另一种语言能力所解释, 但这两类变量都无法预测老年人的任务成绩; 在语篇水平上, 青年人理解任务的成绩显著地受到产生能力影响, 而老年人的理解和产生任务成绩则分别可以被一般认知能力和语言理解能力所解释。对组间差异的回归分析表明, 一般认知能力和另一种语言能力对组间差异都有显著贡献, 且前者的贡献大于后者。上述研究结果表明, 语言能力的老化是语言特异性因素和非特异性因素共同作用的结果。     

图式教学对阅读理解能力、推理能力与自我效能感的影响

本研究采用自然实验法对吉林省松原市逸夫实验小学160名四、五年级的学生进行了对比实验研究,探讨图式教学对阅读理解能力、推理能力和自我效能感的影响。结果表明:(1)四、五年级实验班学生的阅读理解能力普遍提高,五年级明显。(2)仅五年级实验班学生的推理能力有了显著提高,相对而言,图式教学对五年级学生推理能力的影响要优于四年级。(3)四、五年级实验班学生的自我效能感均明显增强。这说明图式教学比常规教学更能有效地提高学生的阅读理解能力和自我效能感。     

Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call "non-sentential computationalism"; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call "dynamical cognition." Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.     

A Poetics of Psychological Explanation

Intentional, 'commonsense,' or 'folk' psychology is, as Jerry Fodor has remarked, ubiquitous. Explanations of what we say and do in terms of our reasons for acting are the stock in trade of intentional psychology. But there is a question whether explanations in terms of reasons are properly explanatory. Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, to name two, have defended intentional psychology and its reason-explanations. Still, many philosophers – including Fodor, Davidson and Dennett – fail to pay due attention to the narrative basis of such agent-centered accounts of action. In this paper, I argue that psychological explanation is an agent-centered, narrative-based interpretive practice. To make my case, I present a poetics of psychological explanation: seven elements which collectively describe what makes psychological explanations work. Narrative form allows us to represent the temporal arc of agents' actions – as well as the temporal arc of their reasoning about their actions, both prospective and retrospective. It allows us to negotiate between the canonical and the exceptional in human experience, and thus to account for actions that strike us as puzzling or unusual – whether the puzzle originates in our suboptimal understanding or the agent's suboptimal reasoning. And it allows us to juxtapose different perspectives on any action. Such juxtapositioning gives us a mechanism for coming to see how an action that strikes us as misguided might have been construed by the agent as reasonable given her understanding of her circumstances. After establishing the seven elements of the poetics, I address the objection that narrative-based accounts of intentional action are not properly explanatory.     

On the Poverty of Scientism, or: The Ineluctable Roughness of Rationality

If there is one rationality there must be a plurality of them. This conclusion follows, I argue, partly from the extreme and ineradicable vagueness of the fundamental concepts that every would-be rational explanation must presuppose. Logicistic/scientistic assaults on this vagueness are doomed to fail partly because they are unable to acknowledge the imaginative dimension of rational thought. Being limited to the play of "outward appearances," scientific investigations are also dependent on "inward imaginings" on their speculative side. The upshot is that schools of philosophy should be characterized by the kind of imaginary they adopt rather than by their logics. In which case, every attempt to get and tell something right about the world is bound to incorporate mythopoeic elements in its explanations.     

基因芯片技术的出现及对生命科学发展的影响

对于复杂的生命系统,基因芯片技术以一种综合、全面、系统的观点来研究生命现象,打破了以往“一种疾病一个基因”的研究模式,它充分利用了生命科学、信息学等当今带头科学的成果,已成为后基因组时代生命科学研究强有力的工具。随着基因芯片技术的出现, 白质芯片等类似新技术也相继发明,生命科学研究的思维方式正经历一场深刻的改革,同时加速了生物信息、基因工业时代的到来。     

Are cognitive sex differences disappearing? Evidence from Spanish populations

Sex differences in cognitive abilities were determined using the norms from two standardizations of the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT) and the Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) conducted between 1979 and 1995 in Spain. The standardized sex differences (ds) were computed separately for the DAT and the PMA subscales. Males scored higher in the DAT subscales Verbal Reasoning, Numerical Ability, Spatial Relations and Mechanical Reasoning, as well as in the PMA subscales Numerical Ability and Mental Rotation. Females scored higher in Inductive Reasoning (PMA-R) in the 1979 and 1995 standardizations. Taken together, these data do not support the hypothesis that cognitive sex differences are disappearing: there are still some differences favoring females and still some differences favoring males.