How does thought suppression impact upon beliefs about uncontrollability of worry?

According to Wells’ metacognitive model of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; [Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: A cognitive model of generalised anxiety disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301–320]), GAD patients attempt to suppress intrusions that trigger worry. Wells postulates that these attempts are rarely effective and may increase the frequency of worry triggers. These apparent failures are interpreted as evidence for loss of mental control, thereby exacerbating beliefs about worry uncontrollability. The current study tested these predictions. Sixty-two high worriers completed a naturalistic experiment comprising two sessions separated by 1 week. In Session 1, participants recorded their beliefs about worry in general, including its uncontrollability. They then selected a current worry and recorded how often it came to mind over the following week. The Suppression group (N=32) suppressed their chosen worry during the week. The Mention group (N=30) simply monitored its occurrence. In Session 2, Session 1 measures were repeated. Contrary to prediction, the Suppression group reported a significant increase in worry controllability in general. No shift was demonstrated by the Mention group. In addition, relative to the Mention group, the Suppression group reported more success at suppressing their chosen worries, spent less time thinking about them, and found them more controllable and less distressing. Findings are discussed within the context of Wells’ model.     

The presence of magical thinking in obsessive compulsive disorder

Two research groups have raised the possibility that magical ideation may be a fundamental feature of obsessive-compulsive disorder. It has been proposed to underlie thought action fusion and superstitious beliefs. In this study, the Magical Ideation scale, the Lucky Behaviours and Lucky Beliefs scales, the Thought Action Fusion-Revised scale, the Padua Inventory, and the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Short Version were completed by 60 obsessive compulsive patients at a hospital clinic. Of all the measures, the Magical Ideation (MI) scale was found to be the most strongly related to obsessive compulsive symptoms. Large and significant relationships between MI scores and the measures of OCD were obtained even when alternative constructs (Lucky Behaviours, Lucky Beliefs, Thought Action Fusion-Revised scales) were held constant. No other variable remained significantly related to the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Short Version when magical ideation scores were held constant. The findings suggest that a general magical thinking tendency may underpin previous observed links between superstitiousness, thought action fusion and OCD severity.     

How to suppress obsessive thoughts

Thought suppression (i.e. consciously trying to avoid certain thoughts from entering consciousness) has been argued to be an inadequate strategy in case of unwanted intrusions. That is, thought suppression seems to result in more rather than less intrusions. Although this experimental finding has been explained in terms of failing attempts to distract oneself from the target thought, the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; a scale that measures chronic thought suppression tendencies) does not address the means by which respondents try to suppress unwanted thoughts. To examine which strategies of mental control people use to suppress unwanted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive disorder patients (N=47) completed the WBSI, the Thought Control Questionnaire, and two measures of psychopathology. Results suggest that the crucial mechanism in thought suppression may not be distraction, but self-punishment.     

"中国马克思主义哲学"理论体系的实存应予肯定--兼答徐素华先生

徐素华先生文章把我提出的“中国马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“党的指导思想形态”,“在中国的马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“学术研究形态”,这不符合我的本意。“马克思主义哲学合法性问题”的讨论确实存在。“中国马克思主义哲学”是在中国实践中学习、运用,在总结实践经验、发扬中国优秀哲学文化、升华人民群众智慧的基础上发展了的马克思主义哲学。它是中国哲学的一个现代形态。它既是一个创新的哲学理论体系,又是党的指导思想的哲学基础。     

Double-decision lexical tasks in thought-disordered schizophrenic patients: a path towards cognitive remediation?

It has been shown that schizophrenics have certain difficulties in the processing of semantic context. These difficulties have usually been evaluated using lexical decision tasks with semantic priming. In this study, we chose to examine the idea of an abnormality in the early stages of semantic context processing in thought-disordered schizophrenics using two double lexical decision tasks: one with a high (25%) and one with a low (15%) proportion of related words to assess the participants' competency in controlled and possibly also more automatic context processing. The results obtained in 40 control participants and 40 schizophrenic patients revealed no significant differences in the amplitude of semantic priming between the two groups. These results suggest that, in the disorganized schizophrenic subjects evaluated in this study, the context processing processes mobilized by the employed tasks were unimpaired.     

Thought action fusion: can it be corrected?

The goal of this study was to investigate whether or not a brief educational intervention delivered prior to engaging in an anxiety-provoking task (writing a sentence about hoping that a friend/relative was in a car accident) would be effective in offsetting anxiety in college students with a strong propensity to endorse statements of thought action fusion (TAF). As hypothesized, individuals receiving the educational intervention were less anxious than a placebo intervention control group at post task; they were also less likely to endorse statements of TAF after receiving the educational intervention. Also, those who chose to neutralize after writing the sentence (regardless of experimental group) were more likely to report feeling guiltier, more immoral and a greater sense of responsibility about writing the sentence prior to neutralizing than those who did not subsequently neutralize. These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder and implications for prevention programs.     

Cycling outdoors facilitates external thoughts and endurance

ObjectivesThe aims of this study were twofold: (a) to compare the effects of indoor and outdoor environments on cycling endurance and thought dynamics, (b) to investigate a possible link between cycling endurance and the adherence to task-unrelated thoughts (TUT) in both environments. Design: An experimental, within-subject design with two-trial random assignment was used.MethodsParticipants (n = 13) cycled at constant power until volitional exhaustion while imposing TUT. They reported thought changes using self-selected key words that were subsequently classified based on task-relatedness (TUT, and task-related thoughts (TRT)) and direction (internal, external). Mean values of relative time spent in TUT and TRT categories were computed and compared for 5 equal time intervals. The association between cycling endurance and time spent at each thought-related category was analyzed.ResultsAnalyses revealed a decrease of TUT and an increase of TRT as a function of time (spent cycling) in both environments. Three qualitative thought phases emerged: an initially stable TUT phase was followed by a metastable phase characterized by shifts between TUT and TRT, and a final stable TRT phase appeared nearing exhaustion. Participants cycled longer outdoors than indoors M_outdoors = 12.54 min, SEM = 2.17 s, M_indoors = 11.35 min, SEM = 1.52 s (Z = −2.27, p < 0.05, d(95% CI) = 0.56 (−0.80, 3.07)), with a dominance of external thought categories. Cycling endurance seemed to be facilitated by TUT-E outdoors and TRT-I in both types of environments.ConclusionOutdoor environment resulted in improved cycling endurance and greater use of external thoughts (i.e., dissociative attentional strategy) relative to indoor environment. The effectiveness of thought categories seemed contingent upon their stability, which in turn depended on effort accumulation.     

Manipulating the temporal locus and content of mind-wandering

The human brain has a tendency to drift into the realm of internally-generated thoughts that are unbound by space and time. The term mind-wandering (MW) is often used describe such thoughts when they are perceptually decoupled. Evidence suggests that exposure to forward and backward illusory motion skews the temporal orientation of MW thoughts to either the future or past respectively. However, little is known about the impact of this manipulation on other features of MW. Here, using a novel experimental paradigm, we first confirmed that our illusory motion method facilitated the generation of MW thoughts congruent with the direction of motion. We then conducted content analyses which revealed that goal orientation and temporal distance were also significantly affected by the direction of illusory motion. We conclude that illusory motion may be an effective means of assaying MW and could help to elucidate this ubiquitous, and likely critical, component of cognition.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

The relation between thinking and mood in daily life: The effects of content and context of thought

The association between thought content and mood in daily life is far from established. The aim of the present investigation was to examine the role of content and context of thought in daily life mood (i) concurrent and across time, and (ii) as simple effects and as interactions between them. Participants were 50 university students (82% female), who completed experience sampling assessments for a week. Linear mixed-effects models showed that time and object aspects of thought were significantly associated with concurrent mood. In addition, interaction effects between object of thought and thought context (activity) significantly predicted concurrent, but not future, mood, sometimes showing a switch from a positive to a negative association in certain contexts. It is concluded that associations between thought content and mood in daily life (i) are depending on the activity context, and (ii) seem to be relatively short-lived in most cases.