THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

Abstract: This article seeks to explain how thought experiments work, and also the reasons why they can fail. It is divided into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy and science should be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought experiments. According to this account, a thought experimenter manipulates her worldview in accord with the “what if” questions posed by a thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried through, the result is either a consistent model or a contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved, the thought experimenter can conclude that the scenario is possible; if a consistent model cannot be constructed, then the scenario is not possible. The fourth section of the article uses this account to shed light on the circumstances in which thought experiments fail.     

Otto Neurath on the Structure of Protocol Sentences; A New Approach to an Interpretative Puzzle

Summary  Otto Neurath’s thesis concerning the structure of protocol sentences is central to the famous Protocol Sentence Debate in the Vienna Circle. However, its precise nature is far from easy to discern in Neurath’s writings. So far, only Thomas Uebel has attempted a closer analysis of Neurath’s contribution to the debate. I argue that Uebel’s interpretation is problematic in some respects and propose a novel analysis, which hopefully brings into a clearer light Neurath’s position in the Protocol Sentence Debate as well as his relevance to contemporary philosophies of science.     

The Christology of St Anthony of Padua: content and method

In 1946 St Anthony of Padua (1195–1231) was declared a Doctor of the Church, recognised for his profound learning. Whereas much has been written about St Anthony, very little of it concerns his profound learning – and so it is not inappropriate to ask wherein this learning lies. Reading St Anthony reveals Christological concerns to be at the heart of his work and in this paper the author explores and clarifies his position. However, anyone looking for new and exciting Christological insights is likely to be disappointed, for St Anthony is entirely orthodox and traditional, although we should not only consider the content of his work, but his ‘method’ too. The way that the saint presents doctrine, and the inferences he draws from it, has much to be commended. Indeed, St Anthony may well be contrasted with those modern theologians who, it has been suggested, have rather lost track of what it is they are really doing.     

Chinese Research in Medieval Philosophy: Retrospects and Prospects

The Chinese study of medieval philosophy has undergone an extraordinary historical process, and it has made great advances in the last 40 years. This paper provides a retrospective analysis of the pioneering Chinese scholars, both traditional and modern, who have played significant roles in the establishment and development of this historical field of inquiry. It pays particular attention to the important scholars, their works, methodologies, and findings over the course of the last forty years, and it also looks to the challenges currently facing this area of study and addresses the current state of the field and its future prospects. Although Chinese scholarship on medieval philosophy has already achieved great accomplishments, compared with the level of international research in the field abroad, there is still a huge gap to be remedied and therefore, we must recognize that there are great opportunities for Chinese scholars who will undertake the study of medieval philosophy with all due seriousness.     

Constitutive Luck

‘Constitutive luck’ refers to luck that affects the sort of person one is. This article demonstrates that it is a philosophically troubling sort of luck, causing problems in, at least, ethics and political philosophy. Some, notably Susan Hurley, Nicholas Rescher, and Daniel Statman, have argued that such trouble can be avoided, by pointing out that the notion of constitutive luck is incoherent. The article examines this claim by means of a discussion of the idea of luck in general, settling on an account of luck in terms of the notions of chance, value, and (lack of) control. This account is then used to show that the notion of constitutive luck is not incoherent. We are stuck with the problems made by constitutive luck.     

On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An Essay in Bridging Neuroscience and Faith

The article begins at the intellectual fissure between many statements coming from neuroscience and the language of faith and theology. First I show that some conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research are not as firm as they seem: neuroscientific data leave room for the interpretation that mind matters. I then take a philosophical‐theological look at the notions of soul, self, and freedom, also in the light of modern scientific research (self‐organization, neuronal networks), and present a view in which these theologically important notions are seen in relation both to matter (brain) and to God. I show that religious insights expressed with soul and free will bear a remarkable resemblance to certain insights from neuroscience and the science of complex, self‐organizing systems, including emphasis on corporeality and emphasis on organization as a form of that corporeality, and that they also show an interesting parallel — albeit described in different terms — concerning the crucial role of a valuation principle that generates attraction. With that, the common‐sense idea that freedom simply is the same as indeterminism is refuted: freedom primarily means self‐determination. I bring to the fore that the self is not a static thing but a “longing.” Such longing springs from something, and it is the relationship to this source that constitutes the self. The main concern is to point out the crucial role of attraction with respect to being and to life, and to draw attention not only to the astonishing parallel on this point between Thomas Aquinas and Alfred North Whitehead but also to a surprising — albeit more implicit — analogy between these philosophical‐theological views and scientific theories of self‐organization (such as those concerning neuronal networks). In short, being attracted toward what appears as “good” is what constitutes us as selves and what thereby signifies the primary meaning of our freedom.     

MOTIVES FOR PHILOSOPHIZING DEBUNKING AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task.     

DIVINE AGENCY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY

Many contemporary thinkers seeking to integrate theistic belief and scientific thought reject what they regard as two extremes. They disavow deism in which God is understood simply to uphold the existence of the physical universe, and they exclude any view of divine influence that suggests the performance of physical work through an immaterial cause. Deism is viewed as theologically inadequate, and acceptance of direct immaterial causation of physical events is viewed as scientifically illegitimate. This desire to avoid both deism and any positing of God as directly intervening in the physical order has led to models of divine agency that seek to defend the reality of divine causal power yet affirm the causal closure of the physical. I argue, negatively, that such models are unsuccessful in their attempts to affirm both the reality of divine causal power acting in the created world and the causal closure of the physical and, positively, that the assumption that underlies these models, namely that any genuine integration of theistic and scientific belief must posit the causal closure of the physical on pain of violating well-established conservation principles, is mistaken.