Mill on Happiness: A question of method

There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues – colour perception and visible figure – and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ‘directness’ as well as what Reid calls ‘acquired perception’, which is ‘mediate’ in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception.     

There must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite,Essentially Ordered,Causal Series

Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of the earlier members. Because the intermediate causes in such series possess causal powers only by deriving them from all the preceding causes, they need a first and non-derivative cause to serve as the source of their causal powers.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

Albert Pighius's Controversial Work on Original Sin

Abstract

Pighius's Controversies were first published in 1541 and apparently went through nine separate editions by 1586, although one of these never existed and two others incorporate copies of earlier editions. The first of the sixteen ‘controversies’, on original sin, proved to be controversial and was later branded as semi-Pelagian. Pighius had it printed on his way from the Worms to the Regensburg Colloquy, but was prevented from publishing the volume until after the collapse of the latter. He announced that he had been displeased with the first printed version and that he had had the first signature reprinted. The Cambridge University Library has a copy of the first edition with two different A signatures, the first of these being a unique and hitherto unnoticed examplar of the earlier, cancelled, printing. This copy also contains two hand-written notes banning the publication of the first controversy for the time being. The most likely explanation is that Nicholas Granvella, the imperial chancellor, wrote these notes, banning (until the conclusion of the Regensburg Colloquy) first the publication of the first controversy and later the publication of the entire first volume of the Controversies, comprising the first nine controversies. The article concludes with the cancelled text, collated with the text found in all of the later versions.     

‘Polydorus Italus’

Abstract

In his Anglica Historia, the expatriate Italian cleric, Polydore Vergil (1470–1555), cultivated a flexible and resourceful relationship with ecclesiastical and temporal authorities in Henrician and Edwardine England when residing there. His humanist learning enabled him to adapt to changes of power and religion by means of a prudent publishing strategy, to challenge with a degree of impunity the perceived wisdom of both kings and clerics, and to carry out revenge upon one who had wronged him: Cardinal Wolsey. Using primary and secondary source material, this article examines, for the first time, Vergil’s attitude to and dealings with those in authority through an assessment of his Anglica Historia. Dying a Roman Catholic in his native Italy, ‘Polydorus Italus’ adjudged the Henrician Reformation, in so far as he actually presents it, as deficient.     

Evolution and Providence: A Response to Thomas Tracy

The role of chance in evolutionary process need not negate belief in the purposes of the Creator. The nature of causality is not determined by science alone, for it requires also acts of metaphysical decision. Moreover, science's accounts of physical reality are notably patchy, with relationships between different regimes often ill-understood An honest science cannot exclude the exercise of agency, either human or divine. Evolutionary insight can offer some help with the problems of theodicy.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

Democratic Moral Education and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

How far is Thomas Aquinas available for current discussions in political philosophy? While there are certainly things to be learned from him about our political preoccupations, the pedagogy of his moral teaching typically resists our familiar questions. This holds even when the question is put in terms that Thomas should recognize—say, as a question about the virtues appropriate for a democracy. Thomas not only gives different meanings to these terms, he moves political topics away from the center of theological attention and so organizes them very differently. A reader can notice these differences at many points but perhaps especially in the attention that Thomas gives in the Summa to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. His account of these gifts qualifies significantly what he says of virtue and suggests large limits on human agency, whether in ethics or in politics.