RETHINKING THE PAST AND ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. John Caiazza presents the current technoculture as the latest development in the ongoing conflict of science and religion that began with Tertullian in the third century. I argue that his presentation is historically inaccurate, because for most of Western history science and religion interacted with and cross‐fertilized each other. Contrary to Caiazza's misleading presentation, Western thought did not follow the dichotomous model polemically posed by Tertullian. I take issue with Caiazza's portrayal of postmodernism and his claim that technology is the foundation of an inherently secularist culture. I conclude by highlighting certain ethical challenges engendered by the prevalence of new technologies and present the dialogue of science and religion as uniquely qualified to address these challenges.     

Reverie‐informed research interviewing

Drawing on Thomas Ogden's notion of ‘reverie’, the role of self‐reflection in research interviewing is explored. Ogden views reverie as a co‐created intersubjective phenomenon, a ‘third’, distinct from both analyst and patient. Two face‐to‐face research interviews with adolescent depression sufferers are described, showing how reverie can be used to help overcome impasse, and develop research hypotheses. Participant‐centred research interviews were thus shown to be enhanced by psychoanalytically informed self‐reflection as accessed through reverie. The role of reverie in research interviewing, in part spontaneous and ineffable, in part defined and systematic, is discussed.     

Hobbes’s agnostic theology before Leviathan

Prior to 1651, Hobbes was agnostic about the existence of God. Hobbes argued that God’s existence could neither be demonstrated nor proved, so that those who reason about God’s existence will systematically vacillate, sometimes thinking God exists, sometimes not, which for Hobbes is to say they will doubt God’s existence. Because this vacillation or doubt is inherent to the subject, reasoners like himself will judge that settling on one belief rather than another is epistemically unjustified. Hobbes’s agnosticism becomes apparent once we attend to his distinctions between the propositional attitudes one might adopt towards theological claims, including supposing, thinking, having faith and knowing.     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.     

Hobbes's Theory of Rights – A Modern Interest Theory

The received view in Thomas Hobbes scholarship is that theindividual rights described by Hobbes in his political writings andspecifically in Leviathan are simple freedoms or libertyrights, that is, rights that are not correlated with duties orobligations on the part of others. In other words, it is usually arguedthat there are no claim rights for individuals in Hobbes's politicaltheory. This paper argues, against that view, that Hobbes does describeclaim rights, that they come into being when individuals conform to thesecond law of nature and that they are genuine moral claim rights, thatis, rights that are the ground of the obligations of others to forebearfrom interfering with their exercise. This argument is defended againstboth Jean Hampton's and Howard Warrender's interpretations of rights inHobbes's theory. The paper concludes that the theory of rightsunderlying Hobbes's writing is not taken from Natural Law but isprobably closer to a modern interest theory of rights.     

KINDS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING?

Abstract: In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even if there is something it is like to have certain kinds of experience, it does not follow that there is anything it is like to be a certain kind of creature. Skepticism about the existence of something that it is like to be an F is recommended.     

The illuminative function of the agent intellect

Thomas Aquinas argues that the agent intellect's function is to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm. However, insofar as he claims that the intelligible species is not present in the phantasm, it is unclear how the agent intellect accomplishes this task. In this paper I explore two models of abstraction – the extraction model and the production model – suggesting that each fails to capture Aquinas’ understanding of abstraction. I then offer my own interpretation of the function of the agent intellect – the illumination model – by employing Aquinas’ comparison of the agent intellect to light. I argue that the agent intellect neither extracts nor produces an intelligible species, but rather makes the nature that is already present in the object intelligible by actualizing its passive power of intelligibility. This involves the co-actualization of partner powers in the intellect and in the intelligible object, and ultimately makes it possible to cognize a particular, material object in a universal way.     

论托马斯·阿奎那对实践-行为的区分

通常在追溯实践哲学传统时,都会上寻到古希腊的亚里士多德哲学,然后就会跨过中世纪哲学而直接到近代哲学的传统,因而往往忽略了中世纪哲学传统对实践哲学的影响。然而,事实并非如此。该文选取深受亚里士多德哲学思想影响的中世纪著名哲学家托马斯·阿奎那为分析对象,以《神学大全》中论述人的部分为基础,着重阐释他从实践伦理学角度对实践一行为的三重区分。同时,本文也指出在托马斯·阿奎那的思想中,实践与制作也不可以等同．即．作为伦理行为的实践与作为机械工艺的制作所遵循的原则是不同的．