MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

WHY I AM AN ACCOMMODATIONIST AND PROUD OF IT

There is a strong need of a reasoned defense of what was known as the “independence” position of the science–religion relationship but that more recently has been denigrated as the “accommodationist” position, namely that while there are parts of religion—fundamentalist Christianity in particular—that clash with modern science, the essential parts of religion (Christianity) do not and could not clash with science. A case for this position is made on the grounds of the essentially metaphorical nature of science. Modern science functions because of its root metaphor of the machine: the world is seen in mechanical terms. As Thomas Kuhn insisted, metaphors function in part by ruling some questions outside their domain. In the case of modern science, four questions go unasked and hence unanswered: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation of morality? What is mind and its relationship to matter? What is the meaning of it all? You can remain a nonreligious skeptic on these questions, but it is open for the Christian to offer his or her answers, so long as they are not scientific answers. Here then is a way that science and religion can coexist.     

Mill on Happiness: A question of method

There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues – colour perception and visible figure – and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ‘directness’ as well as what Reid calls ‘acquired perception’, which is ‘mediate’ in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception.     

There must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite,Essentially Ordered,Causal Series

Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of the earlier members. Because the intermediate causes in such series possess causal powers only by deriving them from all the preceding causes, they need a first and non-derivative cause to serve as the source of their causal powers.     

Albert Pighius's Controversial Work on Original Sin

Abstract

Pighius's Controversies were first published in 1541 and apparently went through nine separate editions by 1586, although one of these never existed and two others incorporate copies of earlier editions. The first of the sixteen ‘controversies’, on original sin, proved to be controversial and was later branded as semi-Pelagian. Pighius had it printed on his way from the Worms to the Regensburg Colloquy, but was prevented from publishing the volume until after the collapse of the latter. He announced that he had been displeased with the first printed version and that he had had the first signature reprinted. The Cambridge University Library has a copy of the first edition with two different A signatures, the first of these being a unique and hitherto unnoticed examplar of the earlier, cancelled, printing. This copy also contains two hand-written notes banning the publication of the first controversy for the time being. The most likely explanation is that Nicholas Granvella, the imperial chancellor, wrote these notes, banning (until the conclusion of the Regensburg Colloquy) first the publication of the first controversy and later the publication of the entire first volume of the Controversies, comprising the first nine controversies. The article concludes with the cancelled text, collated with the text found in all of the later versions.     

‘Polydorus Italus’

Abstract

In his Anglica Historia, the expatriate Italian cleric, Polydore Vergil (1470–1555), cultivated a flexible and resourceful relationship with ecclesiastical and temporal authorities in Henrician and Edwardine England when residing there. His humanist learning enabled him to adapt to changes of power and religion by means of a prudent publishing strategy, to challenge with a degree of impunity the perceived wisdom of both kings and clerics, and to carry out revenge upon one who had wronged him: Cardinal Wolsey. Using primary and secondary source material, this article examines, for the first time, Vergil’s attitude to and dealings with those in authority through an assessment of his Anglica Historia. Dying a Roman Catholic in his native Italy, ‘Polydorus Italus’ adjudged the Henrician Reformation, in so far as he actually presents it, as deficient.     

Evolution and Providence: A Response to Thomas Tracy

The role of chance in evolutionary process need not negate belief in the purposes of the Creator. The nature of causality is not determined by science alone, for it requires also acts of metaphysical decision. Moreover, science's accounts of physical reality are notably patchy, with relationships between different regimes often ill-understood An honest science cannot exclude the exercise of agency, either human or divine. Evolutionary insight can offer some help with the problems of theodicy.     

Democratic Moral Education and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

How far is Thomas Aquinas available for current discussions in political philosophy? While there are certainly things to be learned from him about our political preoccupations, the pedagogy of his moral teaching typically resists our familiar questions. This holds even when the question is put in terms that Thomas should recognize—say, as a question about the virtues appropriate for a democracy. Thomas not only gives different meanings to these terms, he moves political topics away from the center of theological attention and so organizes them very differently. A reader can notice these differences at many points but perhaps especially in the attention that Thomas gives in the Summa to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. His account of these gifts qualifies significantly what he says of virtue and suggests large limits on human agency, whether in ethics or in politics.