Therapy and immunization of long-term analgesia in rats

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of experience with escapable shock either subsequent to (Experiment 1) or prior to (Experiments 2 and 3) a session of inescapable shock on the subsequently produced long-term analgesic reaction in rats. Experment 1 demonstrated that experience with escapable shock 4 hr after a session of inescapable tail shock completely reverses the analgesic response that is normally observed 24 hr later upon reexposure to shock. The escapability of the shock was shown to be the important factor in reversing the analgesic reaction, since subjects given inescapable shock in amounts equivalent to escape subjects exhibited no reduction in analgesia. Experiment 2 showed that experience with escapable shock 4 hr prior to a session of inescapable tail shock could also completely eliminate the long-term analgesic reaction. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2, but employed a different escape task and temporal parameters in order to extend the generality of the findings, and to more closely match the procedures employed in behavioral experiments reported by J. L. Williams and S. F. Maier (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 1977, 3, 240–253). The implications of these results for the areas of pain control and learned helplessness were discussed.     

A developmental study of schedule-induced polydipsia in the rat

Rats 30, 60, 90, and 120 days of age were fed 105 45-mg food pellets on a noncontingent VT 70-sec schedule during 14 daily 2-hr sessions. Every animal became polydipsic on this schedule when compared with a schedule in which 105 pellets were presented at the beginning of the session. Mean polydipsic ratios (schedule intake/control intake) ranged from 2.9–5.4. Water intakes (milliliters per 100g body weight) did not differ during the last five sessions as a function of age. The results are discussed with respect to the generality of the class of adjunctive behaviors.     

Social skills training for juvenile delinquents

Twenty-seven incarcerated juvenile delinquents matched on the number of previous offenses, age, WISC-R IQ, and locus of control were assigned to a Social Skills. Discussion or Control group. Social skills training consisted of instruction, feedback, modeling, behavior rehearsal, social reinforcement and graduated homework assignments. All subjects were assessed before and after treatment on a variety of self-report, role-play and behavioral measures. Analyses of variance for difference scores indicated that the Social Skills group improved significantly more than the Discussion and Control groups, which did not differ. Appropriate interpersonal skills were learned, state anxiety was reduced, internal locus of control was increased, and significant shifts in adjustment to the institutional program were evidenced for the Social Skills group.     

Reverie‐informed research interviewing

Drawing on Thomas Ogden's notion of ‘reverie’, the role of self‐reflection in research interviewing is explored. Ogden views reverie as a co‐created intersubjective phenomenon, a ‘third’, distinct from both analyst and patient. Two face‐to‐face research interviews with adolescent depression sufferers are described, showing how reverie can be used to help overcome impasse, and develop research hypotheses. Participant‐centred research interviews were thus shown to be enhanced by psychoanalytically informed self‐reflection as accessed through reverie. The role of reverie in research interviewing, in part spontaneous and ineffable, in part defined and systematic, is discussed.     

Hobbes’s agnostic theology before Leviathan

Prior to 1651, Hobbes was agnostic about the existence of God. Hobbes argued that God’s existence could neither be demonstrated nor proved, so that those who reason about God’s existence will systematically vacillate, sometimes thinking God exists, sometimes not, which for Hobbes is to say they will doubt God’s existence. Because this vacillation or doubt is inherent to the subject, reasoners like himself will judge that settling on one belief rather than another is epistemically unjustified. Hobbes’s agnosticism becomes apparent once we attend to his distinctions between the propositional attitudes one might adopt towards theological claims, including supposing, thinking, having faith and knowing.     

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matter

In this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good reason to suspect that Locke is a crypto-materialist, at least with respect to human beings, and in this respect, could reasonably be labeled a ‘Hobbist.’     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.