Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?

Some of our largely unchosen first‐order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally‐laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.     

Is There a Place for Traditional Values and Virtues in Society Today?

This paper argues that rather than looking to the past for a previously developed set of traditional values and virtues we should instead look to the past for ways of thinking about morality and ethics which may be found in the “tradition” and which may also be relevant for the contemporary situation. It examines the causes of the disconnection between traditional ways of thinking and the contemporary situation at two levels: the marginalization of morality and the disarray in ethics. Both aspects are found to be rooted in the emergence of the empirical scientific differentiation of consciousness. The paper then goes on to ask what resources in the tradition may be found to overcome the gap between ancient and modern, or traditional and contemporary, ways of thinking about morality and ethics. The contemporary relevance of the thought of Bernard Lonergan to this issue is examined.     

ARE ANIMALS MORAL? A THEOLOGICAL APPRAISAL OF THE EVOLUTION OF VICE AND VIRTUE

I discuss controversial claims about the status of non‐human animals as moral beings in relation to philosophical claims to the contrary. I address questions about the ontology of animals rather than ethical approaches as to how humans need to treat other animals through notions of, for example, animal rights. I explore the evolutionary origins of behavior that can be considered vices or virtues and suggest that Thomas Aquinas is closer to Darwin's view on nonhuman animals than we might suppose. An appreciation of the complexity of the emotional lives of social animals and their cooperative behaviors in light of the work of animal ethologists such as Frans de Waal and Marc Bekoff suggests that social animals can be considered moral in their own terms. I discuss the charge of anthropomorphism, drawing on the work of archaeologist Steven Mithen, and consider arguments for the evolution of conscience in the work of anthropologist Christopher Boehm. Only the biological basis for the development of conscience and religion has evolved in nonhuman animals, and this should not be confused with sophisticated moral systems of analysis or particular religious beliefs found in the human community.     

The epistemically virtuous clinician

Today, modern Western medicine is facing a quality-of-care crisis that is undermining the patient–physician relationship. In this paper, a notion of the epistemically virtuous clinician is proposed in terms of both the reliabilist and responsibilist versions of virtue epistemology, in order to help address this crisis. To that end, a clinical case study from the literature is first reconstructed. The reliabilist intellectual virtues, including the perceptual and conceptual virtues, are then discussed and applied to the case study. Next, a similar method is employed to examine the responsibilist intellectual virtues, including curiosity, courage, honesty, and humility, and to apply them to the case study. To round out the discussion, the love of knowledge and both theoretical and practical wisdom are explored and applied to the case study. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how the notion of an epistemically virtuous clinician addresses the quality-of-care crisis, in terms of the connection between ethical and intellectual virtues, and of the notion’s implications for medical education.

Attempts to prime intellectual virtues for understanding of science: Failures to inspire intellectual effort

Strategies for effectively communicating scientific findings to the public are an important and growing area of study. Recognizing that some complex subjects require recipients of information to take a more active role in constructing an understanding, we sought to determine whether it was possible to increase subjects’ intellectual effort via “priming” methodologies. In particular, we asked whether subconsciously priming “intellectual virtues” (IVs), such as curiosity, perseverance, patience, and diligence might improve participants’ effort and performance on various cognitive tasks. In the first experiment, we found no significant differences in either effort or understanding between IV-primed and neutrally-primed individuals across two different priming techniques. The second experiment measured the effect of IV-priming on intellectual effort in simpler, shorter-duration puzzles and exploration activities; here, we observed an effect, but given its low strength and short duration, we do not believe that priming of IVs is a promising strategy for science communication.     

Character strengths predict resilience over and above positive affect,self-efficacy,optimism, social support,self-esteem,and life satisfaction

The incremental value of character strengths in the prediction of resilience, after the effects of other well-known resilience-related factors (i.e. positive affect, self-efficacy, optimism, social support, self-esteem, life satisfaction) and sociodemographic variables are accounted for, is examined. Using a cross-sectional design, participants (N = 363 adults) completed online measures of character strengths, resilience, and resilience-related factors. A principal component analysis of character strengths was conducted and five factors were extracted, which could be interpreted as emotional, interpersonal, intellectual, restraint, and theological strengths. All strengths factors, except theological strengths, yielded significant positive correlations with resilience. A hierarchical regression showed that strengths predicted an additional 3% of the variance in resilience over and above sociodemographic variables, positive affect, self-efficacy, optimism, social support, self-esteem, and life satisfaction. Emotional strengths and strengths of restraint were significant positive predictors. Implications, limitations, and future research are discussed.     

Being, Doing, and Knowing: Developing Ethical Competence in Health Care

There is a growing interest in ethical competence-building within nursing and health care practising. This tendency is accompanied by a remarkable growth of ethical guidelines. Ethical demands have also been laid down in laws. Present-day practitioners and researchers in health care are thereby left in a virtual cross-fire of various legislations, codes, and recommendations, all intended to guide behaviour. The aim of this paper was to investigate the role of ethical guidelines in the process of ethical competence-building within health care practice and medical research. A conceptual and critical philosophical analysis of some paragraphs of the Helsinki Declaration and of relevant literature was performed. Three major problems related to ethical guidelines were identified, namely, the interpretation problem (there is always a gap between the rule and the practice, which implies that ethical competence is needed for those who are to implement the guidelines); the multiplicity problem (the great number of codes, declarations, and laws might pull in different directions, which may confuse the health care providers who are to follow them); and the legalisation problem (ethics concerns may take on a legal form, where ethical reflection is replaced by a procedure of legal interpretations). Virtue ethics might be an alternative to a rule based approach. This position, however, can turn ethics into a tacit knowledge, leading to poorly reflected and inconsistent ethical decisions. Ethical competence must consist of both being (virtues) and doing (rules and principles), but also of knowing (critical reflection), and therefore a communicative based model is suggested.     

公正作为德性——亚里士多德公正德性探析

People currently regard justice as the main principle of institutions and society, while in ancient Greek people took it as the virtue of citizens. This article analyzes Aristotle’s virtue of justice in his method of virtue ethics, discussing the nature of virtue, how justice is the virtue of citizens, what kind of virtue the justice of citizens is, and the prospect of the virtue of justice against a background of institutional justice. Since virtue can be said to be a specific individual character, Aristotle also defines the virtue of justice as the character of justice, with which citizens act justly and desire to do what is just. The virtue of justice is also an individual ethical virtue, differing from others for it is at the same time a social ethic. We can call the virtue of justice a “non-individual individual ethical virtue.” It has been explained as between pure altruism and egoism, which is a wrong explanation. John Rawls regards justice as the first virtue of social institutions, challenging Aristotle’s virtue of justice, an assertion which also needs further deliberation. Translated from Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao 中国人民大学学报 (Journal of Renmin University of China), 2006, (2): 61–69     

Cultural Complexities and Scientific Development

Methodological issues in psychology consist of a key aspect for the scientific development of the discipline. In this paper I elaborate on the reasons why I partially agree with Toomela's ideas, and why I also disagree with some of his arguments. The convergence refers to the need for a radical change concerning the widespread use of methodologies that has been typical of mainstream psychology, which still flavors too positivist and pseudo-quantitative, overlooking the central relevance of theory for scientific development. The divergence resides in Toomela's insistence to oppose what he designates as "the North American" to "the German-Austrian" scientific thinking: from my perspective, the misuse of cultural categories can only lead to misguided and unconstructive dichotomies that entails a naive concept of culture, and do not contribute to scientific development. From a contemporary systemic approach, complex issues deserve more sophisticated analysis.     

Reciprocal relations between autonomous motivation from self-determination theory and social cognition constructs from the theory of planned behavior: A cross-lagged panel design in sport injury prevention

ObjectivesThe present study examined reciprocal relations between autonomous motivation from self-determination theory (SDT) and constructs from the theory of planned behavior (TPB) in a sport injury context.MethodsThe study adopted a three-wave longitudinal cross-lagged panel design. Physical education students in China (N = 4414; M_age = 14.42, SD = 1.75) completed self-report measures of autonomous motivation, attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control with respect to sport injury prevention at baseline (T1) and at two follow-up occasions one (T2) and three (T3) months later. Proposed reciprocal relations between autonomous motivation and the TPB constructs controlling for construct stability over time were tested using structural equation modeling.ResultsThree cross-lagged SEMs for effects of constructs measured at T1 on constructs measured at T2 and T3, and effects of constructs measured at T2 on constructs measured at T3 met goodness-of-fit criteria (CFI > 0.95, TLI > 0.94, RMSEA = 0.03, SRMR = 0.05) with consistent patterns of effects. Across the three models, autonomous motivation predicted the prospectively-measured TPB constructs with small-to-medium effect sizes (β range = 0.17 to 0.32, ps < .001), but associations between the TPB variables and prospectively-measured autonomous motivation were markedly smaller in size (β range = 0.01 to 0.18, ps range = .001 to .892).ConclusionsFindings provide initial support for the temporal ordering of the constructs in the integrated model of SDT and TPB in a sport injury context. Autonomous motivation from SDT is likely to be an antecedent of the constructs from the TPB.