Self-versus drug-produced relaxation and the effects of instructional set in standardized systematic desensitization

Snake fearful college students underwent Standardized Systematic Desensitization (SSD) treatment in which they received instructions designed to induce cognitions of either self- or drug-produced relaxation. Half of the subjects in each of these conditions were also given high expectancy therapy instructions and low expectancy therapy instructions respectively. All four SSD groups showed significantly greater improvement than a no-treatment control group on both the behavior avoidance test (BAT) and the self-report measure of fear. No differences between self- and drug-attributions of relaxation were found on any measure. Subjects' high expectancy ratings were significantly correlated with improvement on self-report measures but not related to BAT performance.     

Selective imitation of the passive construction through modeling

Six 4- to 5-yr-old subjects were exposed to five sessions in which an adult model used passive sentences to describe a set of modeling stimuli. Probe stimuli, which the subjects were asked to describe without benefit of modeling and without selective reinforcement were interspersed among modeling stimuli. A matched group of control subjects received probletrials but no modeling trials. Both groups of subjects were subsequently tested on their ability to comprehend active and passive sentence forms. Every subject in the experimental group produced passive sentences on probe trials even though there was considerable variability in the number of passives produced. No control subject produced passives. The modeling procedure increased the comprehension scores of the experimental group above those of the control group though the scores of both groups were above chance. The results were contrasted with earlier studies in which modeling was ineffective in producing passive usage and in which comprehension of the passive was not demonstrated by even older children.     

Conditions necessary for sand digging in laboratory rats

Continuous availability of a sand blocked tube elicited intense and persistent digging by laboratory rats. Neither training nor prior exposure to the apparatus were necessary for response initiation. Continuous presence of an open pile of sand would not elicit digging. No theoretical explanation is offered.     

Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?

“Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that (i) there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that (ii) intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discuss some methodological issues that arise when comparing intuitions about thought experiments and end with a discussion of the implications of our argument for the reliability of intuitions about FSCs.     

Exploring athletes' perceptions of the relationship between mental toughness and dispositional flow in sport

ObjectivesDespite considerable scholarly attention over the last two decades, little is known about the influence of dispositional attributes on flow in sport. In achievement settings, mental toughness (MT) is a personal capacity supporting the process of high performance. Based on common overlaps with peak performance, confidence, control, concentration, and thriving in demanding situations, the present research aimed to explore the relationship between MT and dispositional flow and elucidate the psychological variables underlying dispositional flow.DesignA mixed method explanatory participant-selection design was adopted, whereby a quantitative approach was used to identify individuals for a qualitative follow-up phase to explore the relationship between MT and dispositional flow.MethodAn intensity sampling strategy was used to identify individuals with higher/lower MT and dispositional flow. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 athletes (M age = 25, SD = 3.24; female n = 10; male n = 6). An inductive content analysis was undertaken to interpret data.ResultsSeven general dimensions describing the psychological attributes related to dispositional flow in athletes with higher and lower MT emerged. Specifically, differences in confidence, perfectionism, goal orientation, coping mechanism selection, locus of control, optimism and concentration were apparent and could account for differences in dispositional flow.ConclusionWhile all athletes experienced flow, there were differences in dispositional flow and the processes involved in entering, maintaining and restoring flow between higher and lower MT subgroups. Findings are discussed in relation to the existing literature, and recommendations for future research into the MT-flow relationship are outlined.     

Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.     

Libet-style experiments,neuroscience, and libertarian free will

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will, but that Libet-style experiments have not done that so far.     

Evil and moral detachment: further reflections on The Mirror Thesis

A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does so by eliminating moral concerns from her character.     

Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane's recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones's A-ing butJones*'s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.     

心理应激对大白鼠自由基损伤的影响

本研究将动物分为实验模型５天、１０天、２０天组及对照组,并检测各组动物上述组中的ＬＰＯ、ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ水平进行了分析;研究因噪音诱发的心理应激反应时大白鼠脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织自由基损伤情况及防御酶的活性变化;结果发现：在心理应激反应条件下,动物各组织的因自由基反应而使ＬＰＯ含量升高、防御酶ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ活性下降,表明：１．心理应激可以诱发动物体内产生大量的自由基,并对脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织产生影