Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics

Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolutionary therapeutic implications for neurology and psychiatry. All these selves, according to Kolak—even the purely imaginary ones that exist as such only in our dreams—are not just conscious but also self-conscious, with beliefs, intentions, living lives informed by memories (confabulatory, in the case of the fictional ones) and personal histories. Kolak’s derivation of psychiatrically relevant aspects of his theory—a neurological rendition of a Kantian transcendental argument—can be given a straightforward neurological, and therefore open to scientific scrutiny, interpretation that would then more easily lend itself to the clinical setting in which these perplexing phenomena, along with their purveyors, must live and cope. This will be the main focus of this paper.     

The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness

It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.

The step to rationality: the efficacy of thought experiments in science, ethics, and free will

Examples from Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others suggest that fundamental laws of physics were—or, at least, could have been—discovered by experiments performed not in the physical world but only in the mind. Although problematic for a strict empiricist, the evolutionary emergence in humans of deeply internalized implicit knowledge of abstract principles of transformation and symmetry may have been crucial for humankind's step to rationality—including the discovery of universal principles of mathematics, physics, ethics, and an account of free will that is compatible with determinism.     

先秦法家法治思想的衍变——以《管子》、《商君书》和《韩非子》为中心

中国的“法治”思想源远流长,始于先秦法家,从春秋时期的管仲提出“以法治国”的主张,到战国时期的商鞅治国重“法”,再到韩非“法术势”相结合的法治理论的构建,先秦法家的法治思想经历了一个从萌芽到发展再到成熟的衍变过程,但法家的法治思想始终没有脱出君主专制下“以法治国”的巢臼。     

The ego, the Other and the primal fact

Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl later discovered that the constitution of both the I and the Other is more of a two-way movement. This double-movement is essential for all constitutions and departs from a deep (primal) dimension that is not yet egological. Even in the self-reflection of the I, a similar double-movement between the primal and egological dimensions can be seen. The I is supported, but at the same time threatened, by this movement.     

The destiny of freedom: in Heidegger

The essay recapitulates the decisive steps in Heidegger’s development of the problem of human freedom. The interpretation is set in the context of a general matrix for how freedom is treated in the tradition, as both a theoretical ontological problem, and as practical appeal. According to some readers, Heidegger’s thinking is a philosophy of freedom throughout; according to others his “turning” implies abandoning the idea of human freedom as a metaphysical remnant. The essay seeks an intermediate path, by following his explicit attempts to develop an ontology based on the concept of freedom in the earlier writings, showing how this is the central theme in his confrontation and also his final break with German idealism, with Kant and with Schelling in particular, and with the prospects for a system of freedom. However, this break does not terminate his preoccupation with the problem of freedom, which is then transformed into the idea of thinking as a practice of freedom, as a way of reaching into “the free”.

How to test the threat-simulation theory

Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Tredoux [Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M.,Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams: An adaptation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281-1291.] have made an attempt to test the Threat-Simulation Theory (TST), a theory offering an evolutionary psychological explanation for the function of dreaming [Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(6), 877-901]. Malcolm-Smith et al. argue that empirical evidence from their own study as well as from some other studies in the literature does not support the main predictions of the TST: that threatening events are frequent and overrepresented in dreams, that exposure to real threats activates the threat-simulation system, and that dream threats contain realistic rehearsals of threat avoidance responses. Other studies, including our own, have come up with results and conclusions that are in conflict with those of Malcolm-Smith et al. In this commentary, we provide an analysis of the sources of these disagreements, and their implications to the TST. Much of the disagreement seems to stem from differing interpretations of the theory and, consequently, of differing methods to test it.     

《论语》开篇发覆

"子日:学而时习之,不亦说乎?有朋自远方来,不亦乐乎?人不知而不愠,不亦君子乎?"<论语>开篇这三句平直易解的话,由于缺失具体语境,在孔子身后的数千年间,语义泛化,被加以最通俗、最一般的解释.学就是学习,习就是温习或复习.由此也产生了"学习"一词.并且,"不亦乐乎"也化为习用的成语,"有朋自远方来"也成为欢迎远道而来的友人的套话.本文运用本证式的语句互见法,以<论语>证<论语>,首先对这三句话的几个关键词进行了考证.考证结果认为,"学"字,大多是指为了干政"复礼"而进行的学习,"习"是演习与实践之意,"时"则是"适时"之意.又根据前人的训释,将"朋"解为"众".与上述考证结果相应,笔者还从<论语·子路>篇所云"叶公问政,子日:近者说,远者来"一句发现了理解<论语>开篇语境的密码.这就是"问政"的"政"字.关于这句话与<论语>开篇的联系,历来无人揭示,因而也就无法准确把握<论语>开篇的语境.由于这一发现,<论语>开篇豁然开朗,孔子说这句话不是无的放矢,而是对为政者言为政.     

冯友兰先生的《中国哲学史》:"同情之了解"与新儒学

冯友兰先生先以中国哲学史家名于世。两卷本《中国哲学史》是其成名的代表作。《中国哲学史》有很多特点,其中最主要的即是"同情之了解"与"新儒学"。"同情之了解"不仅是冯先生成功写作《中国哲学史》的原则和方法,而且也是我们今后弘扬中国优秀传统文化所不可或缺的原则与方法。冯先生后来又成了一位著名的新儒家。作为中国现代学术思潮中新儒家的一位典型代表,冯先生本人以及一般论者都公认为应以其"贞元六书"的"新理学"哲学体系为代表。文章赞同这个共识,但想补充一点,即广而言之,似乎也可以包括冯先生所著的两卷本《中国哲学史》在内。文章从其目录、内容、审查、批评、自觉与自白和"贞元六书"多方面进行了探索与论述。     

Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world

ABSTRACT

This paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image (of the posits of the successful sciences) and the practical scientific image (which, besides explanatory posits, includes everything presupposed by the practices of doing science (e.g. scientists, funding agencies, laboratories, chairs and other artifacts, linguistic communication, a just and democratic ethos). The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image (e.g. persons) are more deeply rooted in our conceptual scheme than any version of the scientific image.