A standard conceptual framework for the study of subjective time

Research on the mental representation of time (‘subjective time’) has provided broad insights into the nature of time perception and temporal processing. As the field comprises different scientific disciplines, such as psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience, studies differ with regard to the basic terms and concepts used. For this reason, research on subjective time lacks a coherent conceptual system. We argue that research in the field of subjective time should aim at establishing such a system, i.e., a more standardized terminology, in order to strengthen its theoretical basis and to support an efficient communication of results. Based on key empirical findings and concepts that are commonly (but inconsistently) used in the literature, we argue for a conceptual framework for the study of subjective time that differentiates between three types of mental representations of time: basic temporal processing, time perception in terms of passage, and time perception in terms of duration.     

Gender,sect and shrine: discursive contestations at Bibi Pak Daman,Lahore

The syncretic traditions and practices at a shrine can defy the prevalence of rationalistic bureaucratisation and authorised tradition along a number of vectors. One can find such activities at one of the most thriving shrines of Lahore, Pakistan, that of Bibi Pak Daman. Not only is this site unusual because of the veneration of women spiritual figures, additionally the contesting claims and practices found at this site map onto sectarian (Sunni-Shia) boundaries and challenge the very origin, found in modern historiographical narratives, of the shrine. Cleavages around gender and sect increase with the administrative taking over of the shrine by the postcolonial state of Pakistan, which is ideologically determined to wipe out pluralistic practices in the name of modernisation. Interestingly, this study shows that, contrary to disenchantment arising from bureaucratic modernisation, rationalising claims perversely add a few more localised practices giving depth to the shrines sacred geography and make no difference to devotee numbers.     

Suspects' consistency in statements concerning two events when different question formats are used

Lie detection research has typically focused on reports about a single event. However, in many forensic and security contexts, suspects are likely to report on several events, some of them may be untruthful. This presents interviewers with the challenge of detecting which reports are true and which are not. Varying question format in a second interview, we examined differences in liars' and truth‐tellers' statement consistency about two events. One hundred and fifty participants viewed a meeting in which a noncritical and a critical event were discussed. Truth‐tellers were instructed to be honest in their reports about both events, whereas liars had to lie about the critical event. In the first interview, all participants provided a free recall account. In a second interview, participants either gave another free recall account or responded to specific questions presented sequentially (concerning one event at a time) or nonsequentially (concerning both events simultaneously). Liars' accounts featured fewer repetitions than truth‐tellers for both events, particularly in response to questions presented in nonsequential order. The implications for the use of this question format are discussed.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Distortions of temporal integration and perceived order caused by the interplay between stimulus contrast and duration

Stimulus contrast and duration effects on visual temporal integration and order judgment were examined in a unified paradigm. Stimulus onset asynchrony was governed by the duration of the first stimulus in Experiment 1, and by the interstimulus interval in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, integration and order uncertainty increased when a low contrast stimulus followed a high contrast stimulus, but only when the second stimulus was 20 or 30 ms. At 10 ms duration of the second stimulus, integration and uncertainty decreased. Temporal order judgments at all durations of the second stimulus were better for a low contrast stimulus following a high contrast one. By contrast, in Experiment 2, a low contrast stimulus following a high contrast stimulus consistently produced higher integration rates, order uncertainty, and lower order accuracy. Contrast and duration thus interacted, breaking correspondence between integration and order perception. The results are interpreted in a tentative conceptual framework.     

How Do Lay People Weight Information About Instrumentality, Expressiveness, and Gender-Typed Hobbies When Judging Masculinity–Femininity in Themselves, Best Friends, and Strangers?

To study how people weight information when judging their own and others’ masculinity–femininity (M–F), I asked 170 male and 205 female participants to rate themselves and their best friends on M–F, instrumentality, expressiveness, and gender-typed hobby preferences. Also, each participant judged the M–F of eight fictitious women (or men) described as possessing low or high instrumentality, low or high expressiveness, and hobbies typical of men or women. Regression analyses showed that gender-typed hobby preferences predicted M–F ratings of self and friends more strongly than instrumentality or expressiveness did. Similarly, analyses of participants’ judgments of fictitious people showed that participants weighted gender-typed hobbies more strongly than instrumentality and expressiveness when judging targets’ M–F. All results converged to show that lay people’s judgments of M–F are based more on information about gender-typed interests than on information about instrumentality or expressiveness.     

时间顺序关系对语言理解的影响

通过2个实验探讨在语言理解中时间顺序相关性(顺时序、反时序、不相关)和时间间隔(200ms、500ms、1000ms)在日常事件认识中的作用。实验采用关系——认知范式(relarion-recognition paradigm)。结果表明：被试在有明显时间信息影响下,优先对将来取向(顺时序)的事件进行加工处理。对时间上不相关的事件比对顺时序和反时序的事件加工得快而准。但在无明显时间信息影响时,首先受到本身词义的影响,继而受到隐含的时间信息的影响。