On robusiness of the normal-theory based asymptotic distributions of three reliability coefficient estimates

This paper studies the asymptotic distributions of three reliability coefficient estimates: Sample coefficient alpha, the reliability estimate of a composite score following a factor analysis, and the estimate of the maximal reliability of a linear combination of item scores following a factor analysis. Results indicate that the asymptotic distribution for each of the coefficient estimates, obtained based on a normal sampling distribution, is still valid within a large class of nonnormal distributions. Therefore, a formula for calculating the standard error of the sample coefficient alpha, recently obtained by van Zyl, Neudecker and Nel, applies to other reliability coefficients and can still be used even with skewed and kurtotic data such as are typical in the social and behavioral sciences.This research was supported by grants DA01070 and DA00017 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and a University of North Texas faculty research grant. We would like to thank the Associate Editor and two reviewers for suggestions that helped to improve the paper.     

Neurodynamics of time consciousness: An extensionalist explanation of apparent motion and the specious present via reentrant oscillatory multiplexing

This paper situates an original model of reentrant oscillatory multiplexing within the philosophy of time consciousness to argue for an extensionalist theory of the specious present. I develop a detailed differential latency model of apparent motion to show how the ordinality of experiential content is isomorphic to the ordinality of relevant brain processes. I argue that the theory presented has resources to account for other key features of the specious present, including the representational discreteness between successive conscious moments as well as the phenomenological continuity between them. This work not only shows the plausibility of an extensionalist philosophical theory, it also illustrates the utility of differential latency views in squaring temporal illusions with empirically supported neurodynamics.     

Consistent inter-individual differences in susceptibility to bodily illusions

Illusory senses of ownership and agency (that the hand or effector that we see belongs to us and moves at our will, respectively) support the embodiment of prosthetic limbs, tele-operated surgical devices, and human-machine interfaces. We exposed forty-eight individuals to four different procedures known to elicit illusory ownership or agency over a fake visible rubber hand or finger. The illusory ownership or agency arising from the hand correlated with that of the finger. For both body parts, sensory stimulation across different modalities (visual with tactile or visual with kinesthetic) produced illusions of similar strength. However, the strengths of the illusions of ownership and agency were unrelated within individuals, supporting the proposal that distinct neuropsychological processes underlie these two senses. Developing training programs to enhance susceptibility to illusions of agency or ownership for people with lower natural susceptibility could broaden the usefulness of the above technologies.     

时间分层加工研究述评

为了探讨数秒内不同层级时间加工的特性,研究者分别从“时间信息加工”和“信息加工的计时特性”角度开展了一系列研究。Münsterberg (1889)、Michon(1985) 、Lewis 和 Miall(2003) 及Vierodt(1868)从前一角度,分别指出1/3秒、1/2秒、1秒及3秒可能是数秒以内时距加工机制的分界点,分界点以下与以上的加工机制存在差异。P?ppel(1997, 2009)则从后一角度指出限制信息加工过程的两类时间窗,一类时间窗是以20-60毫秒振荡周期运行的高频系统,属于初级整合单元;另一类时间窗主要是处理2-3秒以内事件系列的低频系统,属于高级整合单元。前一类时间窗可以为信息加工整合基本的心理事件,后一类时间窗则是把2-3秒内的心理事件整合为基本知觉单元。基于以往研究的剖析,我们认为1/3秒、1/2秒及1秒等分界点的真伪性尚需进一步验证,并进一步假设40毫秒以内时间不能觉察为时距;40毫秒至3秒之间,随着长度增加,自动化加工减弱,控制性加工增强;3秒以上主要为控制性加工,涉及记忆过程。     

Dare to compare: Fact-based versus simulation-based comparison in daily life

We examined the relative frequency of social, counterfactual, past-temporal, and future-temporal comparison in daily life using an experience-sampling method, in which participants were randomly prompted to record thought samples using palmtop computers carried for two weeks. Comparative thought accounted for 12% of all thoughts, and all four comparison types occurred with equivalent frequency. Comparisons may be either fact-based (i.e., based on actuality, as in social and past-temporal comparison) or simulation-based (i.e., based on imagination, as in counterfactual and future-temporal comparison). Because the latter are more “unbounded,” and because greater perceived opportunity invites greater self-improvement, we predicted and found that counterfactual and future-temporal comparison were more likely to be upward (vs. downward) than social and past-temporal comparison. All comparison types focused on approach more than avoidance motives, except for counterfactuals, which showed equivalent focus on both. These findings reveal the prominence of comparative thought in daily life, and underscore the value of an integrative theory that describes social, counterfactual, or temporal comparison using a common theoretical platform.     

Future anhedonia and time discounting

The temporal location of an event influences the way people mentally represent that event. We suggest (a) that such representational differences can produce an affective forecasting error that we call future anhedonia, which is the belief that hedonic states will be less intense in the future than in the present, and (b) that future anhedonia plays a role in time discounting (i.e., the tendency to place a smaller present value on present events than on future events). Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated that people are prone to future anhedonia, Experiments 2a and 2b ruled out artifactual alternatives, and Experiments 3a and 3b demonstrated that future anhedonia plays a role in time discounting. These studies suggest that one reason why people prefer to enjoy benefits in the present and pay costs in the future is that they do not realize how they will feel when those costs and benefits are actually experienced.     

Ethnicity, education, and the temporal stability of personality traits in the East Baltimore Epidemiologic Catchment Area study

We examined the influence of age, gender, Black vs. White ethnicity, and education on five indices of personality stability and change across an average interval of 8 years in the East Baltimore Epidemiologic Catchment Area study. In the full sample (n = 505, aged 30–88), examination of structural, rank-order, ipsative, and mean level stability, as well as indices of reliable change suggested that NEO-PI-R personality traits showed moderate to high levels of stability over time. There were few age and gender effects on temporal stability but rank-order, ipsative, and mean level stability were lower among Blacks and individuals with lower education. Future research should explore additional demographic predictors of temporal plasticity in a diverse range of samples, and employ observer ratings to assess personality.     

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past–future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.