Retrieval dynamics in self-terminated memory search

Attended stimuli are perceived as occurring earlier than unattended stimuli. This phenomenon of prior entry is usually identified by a shift in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in temporal order judgements (TOJs). According to its traditional psychophysical interpretation, the PSS coincides with the perception of simultaneity. This assumption is, however, questionable. Technically, the PSS represents the temporal interval between two stimuli at which the two alternative TOJs are equally likely. Thus it also seems possible that observers perceive not simultaneity, but uncertainty of temporal order. This possibility is supported by prior-entry studies, which find that perception of simultaneity is not very likely at the PSS. The present study tested the percept at the PSS in prior entry, using peripheral cues to orient attention. We found that manipulating attention caused varying temporal perceptions around the PSS. On some occasions observers perceived the two stimuli as simultaneous, but on others they were simply uncertain about the order in which they had been presented. This finding contradicts the implicit assumption of most models of temporal order perception, that perception of simultaneity inevitably results if temporal order cannot be discriminated.     

Does temporal contiguity moderate contingency learning in a speeded performance task?

In four experiments, we varied the time between the onset of distracting nonwords and target colour words in a word–word version of the colour–word contingency learning paradigm. Contingencies were created by pairing a distractor nonword more often with one target colour word than with other colour words. A contingency effect corresponds to faster responses to the target colour word on high-contingency trials (i.e., distractor nonword followed by the target colour word with which it appears most often) than on low-contingency trials (i.e., distractor nonword followed by a target colour word with which it appears only occasionally). Roughly equivalent-sized contingency effects were found at stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 50, 250, and 450 ms in Experiment 1, and 50, 500, and 1,000 ms in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, a contingency effect was observed at SOAs of –50, –200, and –350 ms. In Experiment 4, interstimulus interval (ISI) was varied along with SOA, and learning was equivalent for 200-, 700-, and 1,200-ms SOAs. Together, these experiments suggest that the distracting stimulus does not need to be presented in close temporal contiguity with the response to induce learning. Relations to past research on causal judgement and implications for further contingency learning research are discussed.     

Timing is everything: Changes in presentation rate have opposite effects on auditory and visual implicit statistical learning

Implicit statistical learning (ISL) is exclusive to neither a particular sensory modality nor a single domain of processing. Even so, differences in perceptual processing may substantially affect learning across modalities. In three experiments, statistically equivalent auditory and visual familiarizations were presented under different timing conditions that either facilitated or disrupted temporal processing (fast or slow presentation rates). We find an interaction of rate and modality of presentation: At fast rates, auditory ISL was superior to visual. However, at slow presentation rates, the opposite pattern of results was found: Visual ISL was superior to auditory. Thus, we find that changes to presentation rate differentially affect ISL across sensory modalities. Additional experiments confirmed that this modality-specific effect was not due to cross-modal interference or attentional manipulations. These findings suggest that ISL is rooted in modality-specific, perceptually based processes.     

The relativity of time perception produced by facial emotion stimuli

Insults elicit intense emotion. This study tests the hypothesis that one's social image, which is especially salient in honour cultures, influences the way in which one reacts to an insult. Seventy-seven honour-oriented and 72 non-honour oriented participants answered questions about a recent insult episode. Participants experienced both anger and shame in reaction to the insult. However, these emotions resulted in different behaviours. Anger led to verbal attack (i.e., criticising, insulting in return) among all participants. This relationship was explained by participants’ motivation to punish the wrongdoer. Shame, on the other hand, was moderated by honour. Shame led to verbal disapproval of the wrongdoers behaviour, but only among the honour-oriented participants. This relationship was explained by these participants’ motivation to protect their social image. By contrast, shame led to withdrawal among non-honour-oriented participants.     

Emotional facial expressions and the attentional blink: Attenuated blink for angry and happy faces irrespective of social anxiety

Although facial information is distributed over spatial as well as temporal domains, thus far research on selective attention to disapproving faces has concentrated predominantly on the spatial domain. This study examined the temporal characteristics of visual attention towards facial expressions by presenting a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm to high (n=33) and low (n=34) socially anxious women. Neutral letter stimuli (p, q, d, b) were presented as the first target (T1), and emotional faces (neutral, happy, angry) as the second target (T2). Irrespective of social anxiety, the attentional blink was attenuated for emotional faces. Emotional faces as T2 did not influence identification accuracy of a preceding (neutral) target. The relatively low threshold for the (explicit) identification of emotional expressions is consistent with the view that emotional facial expressions are processed relatively efficiently.     

Cognitive control and socially desirable behavior: The role of interpersonal impact

The current research reconciles two contradicting sets of findings on the role of cognitive control in socially desirable behaviors. One set of findings suggests that people are tempted by self-serving impulses and have to rely on cognitive control overriding such impulses to act in socially desirable ways. Another set of findings suggests people are guided by other-regarding impulses and cognitive control is not necessary to motivate socially desirable behaviors. We theorize that the dominant impulse is to behave in a socially desirable manner when the interpersonal impact of an action is salient, and that the dominant impulse is to behave in a self-serving manner when the interpersonal impact of an action is not salient. Studies 1–3 found that impairing participants’ cognitive control led to less socially desirable behavior when interpersonal impact was not salient, but more socially desirable behavior when interpersonal impact was salient. Study 4 demonstrates that behaving in a socially desirable manner causes cognitive control impairment when interpersonal impact is not salient. But, when interpersonal impact is salient, behaving in a self-serving manner impairs cognitive control. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding and managing socially desirable behaviors.     

No time for powers

In this paper, I will investigate the compatibility of different metaphysics of time with the powers view. At first sight, it seems natural to combine some sort of powers ontology with a dynamical view of time, since the dynamic character of powers appears to account for the progression of time. Accordingly, it has been argued that a powers ontology, which is supposed to be inherently dynamic and productive, is incompatible with eternalism, which does not allow for any sort of real productivity. After having reviewed these arguments, I will argue that the powers view is not only incompatible with eternalism but also with the moving spotlight view and growing block theory. I will go on to argue that the specific notion of activity that the powers ontology provides is not straightforwardly compatible with presentism either.     

Memory Without Consolidation: Temporal Distinctiveness Explains Retroactive Interference

Is consolidation needed to account for retroactive interference in free recall? Interfering mental activity during the retention interval of a memory task impairs performance, in particular if the interference occurs in temporal proximity to the encoding of the to‐be‐remembered (TBR) information. There are at least two rival theoretical accounts of this temporal gradient of retroactive interference. The cognitive neuroscience literature has suggested neural consolidation is a pivotal factor determining item recall. According to this account, interfering activity interrupts consolidation processes that would otherwise stabilize the memory representations of TBR items post‐encoding. Temporal distinctiveness theory, by contrast, proposes that the retrievability of items depends on their isolation in psychological time. According to this theory, information processed after the encoding of TBR material will reduce the temporal distinctiveness of the TBR information. To test between these accounts, implementations of consolidation were added to the SIMPLE model of memory and learning. We report data from two experiments utilizing a two‐list free recall paradigm. Modeling results imply that SIMPLE was able to model the data and did not benefit from the addition of consolidation. It is concluded that the temporal gradient of retroactive interference cannot be taken as evidence for memory consolidation.     

The contents of long-term memory and the emergence of knowledge

Through a review of the literature, this paper proposes arguments in favour of a multimodal, dynamic, functional, and situational conception of memory. Memory is assumed to contain traces that reflect past experiences. The properties of these experiences are considered to be distributed across multiple neuronal systems, which are responsible, in particular, for sensorimotor and emotional processing. Memory is dynamic because knowledge emerges almost continuously from the activation and integration of these multimodal components. Memory is functional and situational because knowledge emerges from the subject's activity in a given situation, that is from a type of resonance between the properties of the past experiences that have shaped the neuronal networks and the properties of present experiences.     

Giving from a distance: Putting the charitable organization at the center of the donation appeal

Past research has shown repeatedly that people prefer donating to a single identified human victim rather than to unidentified or abstract donation targets. In the current research we show results countering the identifiable victim effect, wherein people prefer to donate to charitable organizations rather than to an identifiable victim. In a series of five studies, we manipulate temporal and social distance, examine a variety of donation targets, and measure intention to donate time or money as well as actual donations of money. We show that people are more willing to donate to a charitable organization when they are temporally or socially distant from the population in need. Willingness to donate to a specific person in need is higher when donors are temporally or socially close to the donation target. Furthermore, we demonstrate that (a) empathy mediates donations to a single victim, yet does not mediate donations to charitable organizations; (b) that donation giving to charitable organizations is unique and is not similar to donations to a group of victims. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.