Contingency Horizon: on Private Events and the Analysis of Behavior

Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.     

Sorting Out the Concept Disorder

Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are necessary for defining disorder. I argue that the main concern in defining disorder, namely demarcation, is obscured by a number of these other philosophical issues and that a focus on demarcation gives us a means of placing these other issues in a clarifying context.The problem [being debated in the literature on health and disease] remains fuzzy... people often do not really engage one another or refine their conceptual reflections by means of previous contributions... As a result, no actual debate takes place at all. Perhaps we can better view the discourse as a series of monologues, with occasional flurries of discussion. After each flurry, the process starts afresh.¹     

儿童基于心理本质论的种族认知及其影响因素

心理本质论将类别成员视为由共同的本质所决定,且这些本质对应着一些表面的不可改变的属性。其中,种族本质论就是心理本质论的一种。研究种族本质论的发展对于了解儿童的种族认知具有重要意义。种族本质论者认为,种族具有遗传不变性、有较强的归纳强度和标签具有客观性等特征。但是,基于不同特征的种族本质论的发展存在差异。类属语言、社会文化背景和群体地位,均可能影响儿童种族本质论的发展。这些影响因素提示,可通过减少类属语言的描述和促进民族融合等方式改变儿童的种族本质论。比较儿童对种族本质论的建构与自然世界的建构之间的差异,方便我们探索类别学习跨领域的一致性问题。如何确保种族本质论的发展是适宜的,这需要未来开展一些干预性的研究。     

Function, goals and intention: children's teleological reasoning about objects

A fundamental aspect of adult thought is the 'teleological' tendency to assume that objects exist for a purpose. When seeing an unfamiliar artifact or strange anatomical part on an animal, the first question an adult will usually ask is 'what's that for?' - a query that assumes that the object can be teleologically explained in terms of its function. Current debate focuses on the origin and scope of teleological thought, and its role in children's emerging theories of the biological world. The bias to view objects as 'designed for a purpose' probably derives from children's privileged understanding of intentional behavior and artifacts. This makes children prone to a 'promiscuous teleology' in which artifacts and natural objects of all types are viewed as existing for a function. Because of this, I argue that we should be cautious about taking the existence of an early teleological bias as evidence that there is biological understanding that exists independently of a psychological construal of living things.     

Is teaching Jung within university possible?: a response to David Tacey

Until recently, Jungian psychology has been suspicious of academia and remained almost exclusively connected with analytical practice. Attempts by analytical psychologists towards a rapprochement have, by and large, failed because they were based either on inappropriate efforts to fit Jung within an unsuitable paradigm of science or on omnipotent expectations that academics accept the Jungian 'wisdom' unquestionably. By distinguishing two different Jungian epistemologies (an open and closed one) it is argued that the emergence of the new paradigm in social and human sciences (based on constructivist and non-essentialist ideas) offers now a unique opportunity to connect the epistemologically open Jung with these new developments in the academy. Thus, Jungians should now face the challenge of open dialogue with academics which can result in mutual benefit.     

Psychological Essentialism at the Explicit and Implicit Levels: The Unique Status of Social Categories

Psychological essentialism refers to a naive theory concerning fundamental elements that bring a category into its existence. The present study examined the structure of this lay theory as well as its implicitness, with a special focus on social categories. In Study 1, Japanese college students rated a number of categories that were natural‐kind, social, or human artifacts, in terms of different elements of essentialist beliefs. A factor analysis revealed that entitativity and naturalness are the common underlying dimensions across these category domains. We also identified some natural‐kind and human artifact categories that can be used as two extreme referent points for the examination of naturalness perceived in a whole array of social categories. Study 2 assessed implicit and automatic judgments on naturalness using a go/no‐go task, and compared them to explicit judgments. Unlike natural kinds and artifacts, social categories were essentialized to a greater extent at the implicit level. These results suggest a dual process of intuitive and deliberate cognition, particularly involving social categories, with implications concerning the bases of stereotypes and prejudices.     

My Heart Made Me Do It: Children's Essentialist Beliefs About Heart Transplants

Psychological essentialism is a folk theory characterized by the belief that a causal internal essence or force gives rise to the common outward behaviors or attributes of a category's members. In two studies, we investigated whether 4‐ to 7‐year‐old children evidenced essentialist reasoning about heart transplants by asking them to predict whether trading hearts with an individual would cause them to take on the donor's attributes. Control conditions asked children to consider the effects of trading money with an individual. Results indicated that children reasoned according to essentialism, predicting more transfer of attributes in the transplant condition versus the non‐bodily money control. Children also endorsed essentialist transfer of attributes even when they did not believe that a transplant would change the recipient's category membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig's heart would act pig‐like, but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from a strong interpretation of the “minimalist” position, an alternative to essentialism.     

Differences in the Evaluation of Generic Statements About Human and Non‐Human Categories

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non‐human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non‐threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alternative hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects reflect differences between human and non‐human categories more generally, as adults showed a negativity bias for categories of non‐human animals, but not for categories of humans. These findings suggest the presence of important, early‐emerging domain differences in people's judgments about generics.     

Immigration from the perspective of hosts and immigrants: Roles of psychological essentialism and social identity

Implicit person theory research can be conceptualized within the framework of psychological essentialism. Essentialist beliefs are associated with entity theories and both predict phenomena such as stereotyping. The present research extended previous work on the links between implicit theories and social identity processes, examining how essentialist beliefs are associated with social identification and processes related to prejudice and intergroup perception. After developing a new measure of essentialist beliefs in Study 1, Study 2 showed that these beliefs were associated with negative bias towards immigrants, particularly when participants were primed with an exclusive social identity. In Study 3, essentialist beliefs among immigrants moderated their adoption of Australian identity as a self-guide during acculturation. Essentialist beliefs therefore play a significant role in the psychology of social identity.     

THE UNIVERSAL VERSUS THE PARTICULAR IN ECOFEMINIST ETHICS

While not a monolithic movement, ecofeminists are united in their conviction that there are important connections between the exploitation of both women and nature. They are internally divided, however, on the propriety of applying their theoretical claims and activist strategies across social contexts. This paper explores three debates within ecofeminism that largely turn on this universalist versus particularist tension: whether ecofeminist theorizing can adequately account for cultural variation; whether its common usage of essentialist rhetoric is productive or troubling; and whether resources for social activism could legitimately be culled from an assembly of heterogeneous and foreign sources. I conclude that the universalism of the women–nature connection can indeed be justified if perceived in multivalent ways, that “earthcare” or “ecomaternalist” discourse can be helpful in some contexts but harmful in others, and that selective retrieval of other cultures for the purposes of advocacy should not be ruled out as necessarily imperialistic or otherwise inappropriate.