From Freudian narcissism to the Buddhist notion of anatman,via Jung's idea of identity

Starting from the question the youthful Carl Gustav pondered as he sat on ‘his’ stone – ‘Am I he who sits on the stone, or am I the stone on which he sits?’ – the author has attempted to show that, for Jung, the idea of identity is founded on a wilful non‐determination. This stance results in ethical and methodological repercussions that differentiate it both from the Freudian project and from Hindu and Buddhist thought, while at the same time having much in common with them. The paper refers to the notions of emergence and (Varela et al. 1992) enaction 2 2 According to the Wikipedia entry, the introduction of the term ‘enaction’ is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1992), who proposed the name to ‘emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre‐given world by a pre‐given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs’.
and argues that the concept of the archetype, especially in relation to the self, merits a re‐evaluation in light of the new scientific paradigm.     

The roots of empathy and aggression in analysis

Empathy and interpretation have complementary roles in analysis. Empathy diminishes psychological arousal, ego-defences, and promotes the therapeutic relationship. Interpretation, when adopted in the service of character analysis and the uncovering of unconscious conflict, represents one element of a larger set of interventions termed analytic aggression, whose primary goal is to promote insight. Psychoanalysis has been increasingly influenced by derivative theories that promote the therapeutic relationship. Clinical observations suggest that the application of analytic aggression has diminished and that many modern treatments may have become overly skewed towards empathic approaches. This paper explores ethical humanism, Jamesian typology, and feminine psychology, as factors that have contributed to the diminished emphasis on analytic aggression in practice. Eastern myth and Buddhist psychology are used to explicate the core features of narcissistic mental structuring and to support the continued importance of analytic aggression in its treatment. Case material is examined to elucidate the benefits and limits of analytic aggression.     

Recovery and Buddhist practices in the aftermath of the Tsunami in Southern Thailand

For most Thai people, Buddhism serves as a base for explanations about life and death.This article focuses on Buddhist practices and the importance of ceremonies in the recovery process after the 2004 tsunami in Southern Thailand. The tsunami had devastating consequences for most people in the coastal regions. First, through the loss of life, and second, through the damage to and loss of houses, fishing boats and means of livelihood. This article analyses informants’ experiences, narratives, interpretations and actions in terms of their Buddhist beliefs. The key findings of this article are that collective ceremonies form an important part of the recovery process. One finding revealed that, in cases of ambiguous loss, a Buddhist ceremony that was unknown to most people before the tsunami became an important element of the search for missing persons. Another finding is that the common Buddhist practice of communicating across the boundary between the living and dead became the most important ritual among the surviving relatives. The ethnography is based on a long-term anthropological research project with in-depth interviews, life stories and participant observation carried out in coastal villages located mainly in Phang Nga, the worst hit province in Thailand.¹     

IMAG(IN)ING THE BUDDHIST BRAIN: EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Buddhism has captured the imagination of many in the modern (Western) world. Recently, scientists have seemed eager to discover whether claims about Buddhist meditation can be verified experimentally. Brain research is beginning to produce concrete evidence that mental discipline and meditative practice can change the workings of the brain and allow practitioners to achieve different levels of awareness, as measurable for instance in reaction times to stimuli. The goal of this section of articles in Zygon is to address recent developments in this area. The contributions address a wide array of questions, although they certainly do not cover the whole ground of what one may consider “problems” of meditation. Yet, we believe that the issues addressed here have widespread implications and that they constitute a strong argument for the richness of the meditation domain.     

超越人生的困境——论苏东坡对佛学如是观的认识

苏东坡对佛学人生观的领悟概括地讲即是对佛学“如是观”的认识。所谓“如是观”,在佛学中的本义被认为是以一种非世俗的般若佛智来观照世法真实相状的正确看法。因此,苏东坡虽经历诸多人生痛苦,却能以超然的态度作“如是观”,这也可以说是般若空观在东坡生活道路上所起的积极作用。     

Four noble truths based problem solving: a therapeutic view

This paper presents the application of the four noble truths based problem solving (FNTBPS) approach to supplement the contemporary and traditional Thai Theravada Buddhism literature on psychological healing. This paper outlines the core concept of FNTBPS, its key components and application, using an illustrated case example of Tom (????), a 50-year-old Thai man facing psychological problems due to his worsening eyesight. Lastly, this paper outlines the therapeutic implications of how an understanding of psychological healing via the knowledge of FNTBPS can be used for case formulation and treatment planning.     

From conscious experience to a conscious self

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011 Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.     

Who are these Buddhists and How Many of Them are There? Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in Counting Immigrant Buddhists: A Danish Case Study

Religious demography is generally a challenging endeavor and counting and defining religions and religious identities in an Asian context is notoriously difficult. Buddhists in both Asia and the West have a long tradition of gray-zone religiosity, which means that membership and mono-identity is less common than syncretic engagement and hybrid identity. The immigrant Buddhists in the West are generally far more numerous than the convert and new age Buddhists. Their numbers are, however, extremely difficult to ascertain. This article discusses the methodological and theoretical problems in quantifying immigrant religion and the challenges of operationalizing such constraints into concrete methods. The empirical data derive from the author’s engagement in research on Buddhism in Denmark, in which traditions from both Theravada and Mahayana groups are represented. While concrete figures are suggested, it is also concluded that further empirical research as well as comparison with more contexts are necessary for the continued refinement of usable methods in counting immigrant religion.     

BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE: HOW FAR CAN THE DIALOGUE PROCEED?

On the stage of the religion‐and‐science dialogue, Buddhism, especially Tibetan Buddhism, is a late arrival. However, thanks primarily to the long‐standing personal interest of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan tradition he represents has come to engage deeply with various disciplines of modern science. This essay follows the active engagement that has occurred particularly in the form of the biannual Mind and Life dialogues between the Dalai Lama and scientists. From the perspective of an active participant, I present the careful deliberations that ensure constructive parameters for these dialogues so that no one side can exert a hegemonic voice. I explore the challenges that are likely to confront the Buddhist side from its encounter with science, particularly with respect to its worldview. I identify specific areas where the two sides can and do engage in concrete collaboration, especially with respect to investigating healthy qualities of the mind and the effects of conscious mental training for attention and emotion regulation. Finally, I explore the question of the possible impact of this dialogue on modern science.     

A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catu?ko?i in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catu?ko?i: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catu?ko?i and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which (a) substance is a basic categorical concept; (b) substances have svabhāva, and (c) names and sentences have svabhāva.