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151.
Beginning with an eastern concept of human beings rooted in the Buddhist and Yogic traditions, this paper describes a theoretical assimilation of western models and therapies into the eastern paradigm. It traces the beginning of the east–west psychotherapy dialogue in the United States, citing early examples of Buddhist and yogic practices in the west. Ken Wilber's spectrum of consciousness model is presented and its unifying value for psychotherapy is explored. An integrative model of wholistic therapy, developed by a group of eastern and western practitioners, is then described. The paper concludes with an exploration of the issues and implications for psychotherapy integration raised by this model.  相似文献   
152.
    
Jung and Freud had very different ideas about the nature of analysis. This paper begins by exploring how Jung's gnostic approach, with its goal of individuation, is deeply informed by Buddhist and Taoist principles. His pluralistic, relational model regards truth as subjective and co‐constructed with the patient. In contrast, Freud's secular methodology has objective truth as its goal. His classical psychoanalysis is a form of reality testing where the analyst claims to know the painful, singular, objective reality which the patient tries to evade. The theory of aesthetic development (see Piaget 1951, Baldwin 1975, Parsons 1980, Housen 1992, Harris Williams 2010) proposes that artistic appreciation is linked to human development. The paper looks at how the apperception of beauty, related to both truth and meaning, acts as an indicator and facilitator of individuation in the clinical encounter. This is illustrated by a clinical case study. Through empirical research, support is given to the argument (Bollas 1978, Meltzer 1988) that our early experience of the feminine/maternal plays a central role in developing an aesthetic capacity. The experience of the sublime in analysis is examined and portrayed as a means by which aesthetic development may be reignited and narcissistic isolation shattered.  相似文献   
153.
ABSTRACT

In contrast to forms of Buddhism popular in the West such as Vipassana meditation and Zen Buddhism which emphasize doctrinal study, meditation practice, and personal transformation above traditional rituals of deity yoga and merit-making, and Buddhist cosmology, Tibetan Buddhism retains its traditional framework of belief and practice. The worldwide Gelugpa Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (FPMT) teaches the traditional practice of deity visualization, during which the meditator generates the view of the visualized deity as that of emptiness, the understanding that all objects, including buddhas, bodhisattvas, and deities are ultimately empty of inherent existence. Data obtained from fieldwork conducted at two FPMT centres: Vajrayana Institute in Sydney, Australia, and Kopan Monastery in Nepal, suggests an interpretation of the manner in which practitioners come to an appreciation of deity practice in the broader context of the FPMT's teachings. In outlining how this occurs, I discuss the role of doctrine including the ontological status of the deity, and the role of personal experience and both personal and traditional religious authority in this interpretive process. Here, I aim to add to scholarly understanding of how Western practitioners come to accept the traditional elements of non-Western religions such as forms of Tibetan Buddhism.  相似文献   
154.
    
A quantitative study explored the relationship for teen Buddhists in Britain between the frequency of personal religious practice (PRP), affective religiosity (as measured by Thanissaro’s 24-item Scale of Attitude to Buddhism), individual differences in attitudes and Psychological Type (as measured by the Francis Psychological Type Scales). Those with frequent PRP (18% practising daily and 54% monthly) were more likely to want their children to grow up Buddhist and felt school was helping them prepare for life. Only daily PRP was associated with Buddhist worldview whereas less frequent PRP was associated with collectivist and traditionalist attitudes. Daily PRP was found to be positively linked with affective religiosity for heritage Buddhists, males, females and 17-to-20-year-olds, but linked with diminished affective religiosity for convert Buddhists. Daily PRP was associated with a Sensing preference in terms of Psychological Type, rather than psychoticism predicted by some previous meditation research.  相似文献   
155.
Ivan Strenski 《Religion》2020,50(4):653-670
ABSTRACT

In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, and in ‘On the Definition of Religious Phenomena,' Durkheim famously asserted both that Buddhism was a ‘religion' and an ‘atheistic' one at that. Why he did so is a problem long-considered settled. Of two possible answers, one is commonplace, while the other is uncommon and consequential. I shall attempt to explicate Durkheim's uncommon and far- reaching, but overlooked, reasons for declaring atheistic Buddhism a ‘religion.' This essay concurs with Martin Southwold that Durkheim believed – wrongly – that religion was ‘monothetic' class, when, in fact, it was ‘polythetic.' In order to admit Buddhism as a ‘religion,' Durkheim discovered that he had to apply different criteria for defining Buddhism as ‘religion’ than to theistic religions. Buddhism did not radiate dynamogenic force or induce a sense of existential dependence. Buddhism was a religion because it was an agent in making a meaningful life.  相似文献   
156.
    
Pema McLaughlin 《Religion》2020,50(4):529-549
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157.
    
Gregg D. Caruso 《Zygon》2020,55(2):474-496
In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.  相似文献   
158.
Abstract

Erich Fromm was one of the first psychoanalytic thinkers who was genuinely interested in Asian philosophies. In the first part of this article, I will show Fromm’s imago of Buddhism as a radical, nontheistic, and ethical philosophy “without God.” I will argue that Fromm made an important difference between the phenomenal ego and being that proves crucial for his understanding of psychoanalysis and his critique of modern society. I will also explore Fromm’s synthesis of Buddhist philosophy and psychoanalysis, and show the similarities and differences between them.  相似文献   
159.
    
David Cummiskey 《Zygon》2020,55(2):497-518
My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego-less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine Korsgaard, and David Velleman.  相似文献   
160.
    
ABSTRACT

Richard Watson maintains that deep ecology suffers from an internal contradiction and should therefore be rejected. Watson contends that deep ecology claims to be non-anthropocentric while at the same time is committed to setting humans apart from nature, which is inherently anthropocentric. I argue that Watson’s objection arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding of how deep ecologist’s conceive of the ‘Self.’ Drawing on resources from Buddhism, I offer an understanding of the ‘Self’ that is fully consistent with deep ecology, and does not lead to the anthropocentric contradiction that Watson identifies. The paper will proceed as follows: First, I articulate Watson’s objection, and briefly discuss the traditional deep ecology position. Next, I turn to a discussion of the ‘Self’ and show that there are conceptions of human nature that are not separate from ‘Nature.’ It will thus be shown that deep ecology is not inconsistent and need not be rejected.  相似文献   
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