Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness

To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task of creating the “machine” consciousness would require a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG.

A foundation for support theory based on a non-Boolean event space

A new foundation is presented for the theory of subjective judgments of probability known in the psychological literature as “Support Theory”. It is based on new complementation operations that, unlike those of classical probability theory (set-theoretic complementation) and classical logic (negation), need not satisfy the principles of the Law of The Excluded Middle and the Law of Double Complementation. Interrelationships between the new complementation operations and the Kahneman and Tversky judgmental heuristic of availability are described.     

A new definition of well-behaved discrimination functions

A discrimination function shows the probability or degree with which stimuli are discriminated from each other when presented in pairs. In a previous publication [Kujala, J.V., & Dzhafarov, E.N. (2008). On minima of discrimination functions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52, 116–127] we introduced a condition under which the conformity of a discrimination function with the law of Regular Minimality (which says, essentially, that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) implies the constancy of the function’s minima (i.e., the same level of discriminability of every stimulus from the stimulus least discriminable from it). This condition, referred to as “well-behavedness,” turns out to be unnecessarily restrictive. In this note we give a significantly more general definition of well-behavedness, applicable to all Hausdorff arc-connected stimulus spaces. The definition employs the notion of the smallest transitively and topologically closed extension of a relation. We provide a transfinite-recursive construction for this notion and illustrate it by examples.     

Regular Minimality and Thurstonian-type modeling

A Thurstonian-type model for pairwise comparisons is any model in which the response (e.g., “they are the same” or “they are different”) to two stimuli being compared depends, deterministically or probabilistically, on the realizations of two randomly varying representations (perceptual images) of these stimuli. The two perceptual images in such a model may be stochastically interdependent but each has to be selectively dependent on its stimulus. It has been previously shown that all possible discrimination probability functions for same–different comparisons can be generated by Thurstonian-type models of the simplest variety, with independent percepts and deterministic decision rules. It has also been shown, however, that a broad class of Thurstonian-type models, called “well-behaved” (and including, e.g., models with multivariate normal perceptual representations whose parameters are smooth functions of stimuli) cannot simultaneously account for two empirically plausible properties of same–different comparisons, Regular Minimality (which essentially says that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) and nonconstancy of the minima of discrimination probabilities (the fact that different pairs of least discriminable stimuli are discriminated with different probabilities). These results have been obtained for stimulus spaces represented by regions of Euclidean spaces. In this paper, the impossibility for well-behaved Thurstonian-type models to simultaneously account for Regular Minimality and nonconstancy of minima is established for a much broader notion of well-behavedness applied to a much broader class of stimulus spaces (any Hausdorff arc-connected ones). The universality of Thurstonian-type models with independent perceptual images and deterministic decision rules is shown (by a simpler proof than before) to hold for arbitrary stimulus spaces.     

Self-representationalism and phenomenology

To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.

大学生客观社会经济地位与自尊:主观社会地位的中介作用

本研究探讨了大学生主观社会地位在客观社会经济地位与自尊间所起的作用。采用客观社会经济地位问卷、Rosenberg总体自尊量表、大学生主观社会地位问卷, 对1066名大学本科生进行调查。结果发现:大学生主观社会地位和客观社会经济地位均与自尊呈显著正相关;大学生主观社会地位在客观社会经济地位和自尊之间起显著中介作用(中介效应值为0.34)。     

Human choice in "counterintuitive" situations: fixed- versus progressive-ratio schedules.

College undergraduates were given repeated opportunities to choose between a fixed-ratio and a progressive-ratio schedule of reinforcement. Completions of a progressive-ratio schedule produced points (exchangeable for money) and incremented that response requirement by 20 responses with each consecutive choice. In the reset condition, completion of a fixed ratio produced the same number of points and also reset the progressive ratio back to its initial value. In the no-reset condition, the progressive ratio continued to increase by increments of 20 throughout the session with each successive selection of this schedule, irrespective of fixed-ratio choices. Subjects' schedule choices were sensitive to parametric manipulations of the size of the fixed-ratio schedule and were consistent with predictions made on the basis of minimizing the number of responses emitted per point earned, which is a principle of most optimality theories. Also, the present results suggest that if data from human performances are to be compared with results for other species, humans should be exposed to schedules of reinforcement for long periods of time, as is commonly done with nonhuman subjects.     

Determinants of human performance on concurrent schedules.

Six experiments, each with 5 human adults, were conducted to investigate the determinants of human performance on multiple concurrent variable-interval schedules. A two-key procedure was employed in which subjects' key presses produced points exchangeable for money. Variables manipulated across experiments were (a) changeover delay (Experiments 2, 4, and 6), (b) ordinal cues related to scheduled reinforcement frequencies (Experiments 3 and 4), and (c) instructions describing the ordinal relations between schedule-correlated stimuli and scheduled reinforcement frequency (Experiments 5 and 6). The performances of only 13 of the 30 subjects could be described by the generalized matching equation and were within a range of values typical of those reported in the animal literature. Eight subjects showed indifference, 9 undermatched, 7 approximated matching, 3 overmatched, and a further 3 responded exclusively to the richer component of the concurrent schedules. These differing modes of responding were closely related to the different types of performance rules reported by subjects in postexperimental questionnaires. The results are in good agreement with those from studies of human performance on single schedules, suggesting that rule-governed behavior, in interaction with contingencies, may be an important determinant of human choice.