The Future is Bright? Effects of Mood on Perception of the Future

Most people believe that the future will bring them more good things than bad, and therefore have high hopes for the future (MacLeod et al. Cogn Emot 10:69–85, 1996). However, many patients with mood disorders do not hold this positive belief about the future. At the extreme, low expectations of positive outcomes in the future can lead to feelings of hopelessness (O’Connor et al. Psychol Health Med 5:155–161, 2000). This paper aims to extend the literature on subjective probability of future events, using a mood induction paradigm to examine the effects of transient mood change on perceived likelihood of future events in a non-clinical community sample. Participants rated likelihood of future events from a standardized list and from their own lives. Ratings were made in both normal and experimentally-induced positive or negative mood. Results show that self-generated future events were perceived to be more likely than those from a standardized list, and that negative mood significantly biased perceived likelihood of other-generated future events. Participants rating standardized list events saw positive outcomes as less likely and negative outcomes as more likely in induced negative mood than they did in normal mood. Mood had no effect on ratings of self-generated events. Possible directions for future research are discussed.

The Pleasant Life, the Engaged Life, and the Meaningful Life: What about the Balanced Life?

Martin Seligman, in his very popular book Authentic Happiness (Seligman 2002), argued that authentic happiness is derived from three major sets of experiences in life, namely experiencing pleasantness regularly (the pleasant life), experiencing a high level of engagement in satisfying activities (the engaged life), and experiencing a sense of connectedness to a greater whole (the meaningful life). In this paper, we maintain that balance in life contributes significantly to subjective well-being. Balance contributes to subjective well-being because of the satisfaction limit that people can derive from a single life domain. People have to be involved in multiple domains to satisfy the full spectrum of human development needs. Different life domains tend to focus on different human developmental needs. More specifically, balance contributes to subjective well-being because subjective well-being can only be attained when both survival and growth needs are met. High levels of subjective well-being cannot be attained with satisfaction of basic needs or growth needs alone. Both needs have to be met to induce subjective well-being.     

Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness

To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task of creating the “machine” consciousness would require a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG.

A foundation for support theory based on a non-Boolean event space

A new foundation is presented for the theory of subjective judgments of probability known in the psychological literature as “Support Theory”. It is based on new complementation operations that, unlike those of classical probability theory (set-theoretic complementation) and classical logic (negation), need not satisfy the principles of the Law of The Excluded Middle and the Law of Double Complementation. Interrelationships between the new complementation operations and the Kahneman and Tversky judgmental heuristic of availability are described.     

A new definition of well-behaved discrimination functions

A discrimination function shows the probability or degree with which stimuli are discriminated from each other when presented in pairs. In a previous publication [Kujala, J.V., & Dzhafarov, E.N. (2008). On minima of discrimination functions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52, 116–127] we introduced a condition under which the conformity of a discrimination function with the law of Regular Minimality (which says, essentially, that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) implies the constancy of the function’s minima (i.e., the same level of discriminability of every stimulus from the stimulus least discriminable from it). This condition, referred to as “well-behavedness,” turns out to be unnecessarily restrictive. In this note we give a significantly more general definition of well-behavedness, applicable to all Hausdorff arc-connected stimulus spaces. The definition employs the notion of the smallest transitively and topologically closed extension of a relation. We provide a transfinite-recursive construction for this notion and illustrate it by examples.     

Regular Minimality and Thurstonian-type modeling

A Thurstonian-type model for pairwise comparisons is any model in which the response (e.g., “they are the same” or “they are different”) to two stimuli being compared depends, deterministically or probabilistically, on the realizations of two randomly varying representations (perceptual images) of these stimuli. The two perceptual images in such a model may be stochastically interdependent but each has to be selectively dependent on its stimulus. It has been previously shown that all possible discrimination probability functions for same–different comparisons can be generated by Thurstonian-type models of the simplest variety, with independent percepts and deterministic decision rules. It has also been shown, however, that a broad class of Thurstonian-type models, called “well-behaved” (and including, e.g., models with multivariate normal perceptual representations whose parameters are smooth functions of stimuli) cannot simultaneously account for two empirically plausible properties of same–different comparisons, Regular Minimality (which essentially says that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) and nonconstancy of the minima of discrimination probabilities (the fact that different pairs of least discriminable stimuli are discriminated with different probabilities). These results have been obtained for stimulus spaces represented by regions of Euclidean spaces. In this paper, the impossibility for well-behaved Thurstonian-type models to simultaneously account for Regular Minimality and nonconstancy of minima is established for a much broader notion of well-behavedness applied to a much broader class of stimulus spaces (any Hausdorff arc-connected ones). The universality of Thurstonian-type models with independent perceptual images and deterministic decision rules is shown (by a simpler proof than before) to hold for arbitrary stimulus spaces.     

Self-representationalism and phenomenology

To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.

初中生心理顽强性与主观幸福感的相关研究

目的探讨初中生心理顽强性与主观幸福感之间的相关性。方法采用自制心理顽强性量表和中学生牛津幸福感问卷,对调查结果进行T检验、方差分析、典型相关分析。结果①初中生心理顽强性存在性别差异,年级差异。②初中生主观幸福感的性别差异整体不显著,但女生的情绪体验得分要显著高于男生,同时还存在在年级差异。③初中生的责任感和自控感越高,就有越正向的自我感知和情绪体验。结论：心理顽强性与主观幸福感之间存在显著正相关。     

Predicting sports performance from well-being: A mapping of professional athletes’, amateur athletes’ and non-athletes’ positions

IntroductionPrediction of performance and well-being are two essential keys in sports performance.ObjectiveThe study aimed to map different positions regarding the way in which individuals integrated mentally five elements of eudaimonic well-being (relatedness, autonomy, competence, mental vitality and physical vitality) for predicting the degree of performance at the beginning of a match.MethodTwenty-four non-athletes, 44 amateur athletes and 26 professional athletes indicated their prediction of performance in 32 scenarios constructed from the combination of these elements of well-being. Cluster analysis, ANOVAs, and chi-square test have been done.ResultsTwo positions on prediction of performance were found. The first cluster was called “Sometimes Performance Prediction” and the second cluster was named “Seldom Performance Prediction”. The five elements had a positive effect on the prediction of performance. The composition of both clusters was linked to the level of involvement in sport.ConclusionOffering athletes a “well-being environment” may lead to predict the sports performance.     

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

We compare four subjective awareness measures in the context of a visual identification task and investigate quantitative differences in terms of scale use and correlation with task performance. We also analyse the effect of identification task decisions on subsequent subjective reports. Results show that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy for all scale types, although the type of awareness measure may influence the reported level of perceptual awareness. Surprisingly, the overall relationship between awareness ratings and performance was weaker when participants rated their awareness before providing identification responses. Furthermore, the Perceptual Awareness Scale was most exhaustive only when used after the identification task, whereas confidence ratings were most exhaustive when used before the identification task. We conclude that the type of subjective measure applied may influence the reports on visual awareness. We also propose that identification task decisions may affect subsequent awareness ratings.