Brazelton Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale: A psychometric study in a Portuguese sample

BackgroundThe Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale (NBAS, Brazelton &; Nugent, 1995) is an instrument conceived to observe the neonatal neurobehavior. Data analysis is usually performed by organizing items into groups. The most widely used data reduction for the NBAS was developed by Lester, Als, and Brazelton (1982).ObjectiveExamine the psychometric properties of the NBAS items in a sample of 213 Portuguese infants.MethodThe NBAS was performed in the first week of infant life (3 days ± 2) and in the seventh week of life (52 days ± 5).ResultsPrincipal component analyses yielded a solution of four components explaining 55.13% of total variance. Construct validity was supported by better neurobehavioral performance of 7-week-old infants compared with 1-week-old infants.ConclusionChanges in the NBAS structure for the Portuguese sample are suggested compared to Lester factors in order to reach better internal consistency of the scale.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.     

How does the strength of the relationships between cognitive abilities evolve over the life span for low-IQ vs high-IQ adults?

The present study was designed to examine how the correlations between cognitive abilities evolve during adulthood. Data from 1104 participants on the French version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition were analyzed. The entire sample was divided into four age groups (16–24 years; 25–44 years; 45–69 years and 70–89 years), which were themselves split into two IQ-levels using the mean standard score on Vocabulary and Block Design. For every age group, the mean correlation between subtest scores of low-IQ participants was higher than that of high-IQ participants. There was also no interaction between age and IQ for the strength of subtest relationships. Indeed, the effect sizes of correlation differences between low- and high-IQ participants appeared to be relatively constant across age. A general developmental schema of how the strength of correlations between cognitive abilities of low- and high-IQ individuals evolves during the entire life span is sketched in the discussion.     

Psychometric analysis of the short-form UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8) in Taiwanese undergraduate students

The main purpose of this study was to validate the short-form of the UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8; Hays & DiMatteo, 1987) in Taiwanese undergraduate students. A total of 130 undergraduate students participated in this study. Participants completed the ULS-8 in addition to measures of life satisfaction, social support, and adult attachment style. Result of confirmatory factor analysis supported the one-factor model of the ULS-8 with adequate values of various fit indices, revealing that the 8 items of the scale were homogeneous for measuring loneliness. In addition, the ULS-8 had a negative relationship with life satisfaction, and social support; and a positive one with anxiety and avoidant attachment tendency. All the findings showed that the ULS-8 was an adequate short-form measure of loneliness.     

Investigating speech motor practice and learning in people who stutter

In this exploratory study, we investigated whether or not people who stutter (PWS) show motor practice and learning changes similar to those of people who do not stutter (PNS). To this end, five PWS and five PNS repeated a set of non-words at two different rates (normal and fast) across three test sessions (T1, T2 on the same day and T3 on a separate day, at least 1 week apart). The results indicated that PWS and PNS may resemble each other on a number of performance variables (such as movement amplitude and duration), but they differ in terms of practice and learning on variables that relate to movement stability and strength of coordination patterns. These findings are interpreted in support of recent claims about speech motor skill limitations in PWS.

Educational objectives: The reader will be able to: (1) define oral articulatory changes associated with motor practice and learning and their measurement; (2) summarize findings from previous studies examining motor practice and learning in PWS; and (3) discuss hypotheses that could account for the present findings that suggest PWS and PNS differ in their speech motor learning abilities.     

The work-related flow inventory: Construction and initial validation of the WOLF

The WOrk-reLated Flow inventory (WOLF) measures flow at work, defined as a short-term peak experience characterized by absorption, work enjoyment, and intrinsic work motivation. Results of Study 1 among 7 samples of employees (total N = 1346) from different occupational groups offer support for the factorial validity and reliability of the WOLF. Study 2 examined the validity of the WOLF in more detail among some of the samples. Positive correlations between a general flow index and the three flow dimensions confirm the convergent validity of the WOLF. In addition, the findings of Study 2 provide evidence for the construct and predictive validity of the WOLF using five job characteristics as predictors of flow, and other-ratings of performance as outcomes.     

Stevens' power law and the problem of meaningfulness

Frequently, it is postulated that the results of a ratio production (resp., ratio estimation) experiment can be summarized by Stevens' power law psi=alphaphi(beta). In the present article, it is argued that the power law parameters depend, among other things, on the standard stimulus presented as a reference point, and the physical stimulus scale by which the physical intensities are measured. To formalize this idea, a new formulation of Stevens' power law is presented. We show that the exponent in Stevens' power law can only be interpreted in a meaningful way if the stimulus scale is a ratio scale. Furthermore, we present empirically testable axioms (termed invertibility and weak multiplicativity) which are both necessary and sufficient for the power law exponent to be invariant under changes of the standard stimulus. Finally, invertibility and weak multiplicativity are evaluated in a ratio production experiment. Ten participants were required to adjust the area of variable circles to prescribed ratio production factors. Both axioms are violated for all participants. The results cast doubts on the well-established practice of comparing power law exponents across different modalities.     

From universal laws of cognition to specific cognitive models

The remarkable successes of the physical sciences have been built on highly general quantitative laws, which serve as the basis for understanding an enormous variety of specific physical systems. How far is it possible to construct universal principles in the cognitive sciences, in terms of which specific aspects of perception, memory, or decision making might be modelled? Following Shepard (e.g., 1987 ), it is argued that some universal principles may be attainable in cognitive science. Here, 2 examples are proposed: the simplicity principle (which states that the cognitive system prefers patterns that provide simpler explanations of available data); and the scale‐invariance principle, which states that many cognitive phenomena are independent of the scale of relevant underlying physical variables, such as time, space, luminance, or sound pressure. This article illustrates how principles may be combined to explain specific cognitive processes by using these principles to derive SIMPLE, a formal model of memory for serial order ( Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007 ), and briefly mentions some extensions to models of identification and categorization. This article also considers the scope and limitations of universal laws in cognitive science.     

Development and validation of the Achievement Goal Scale for Youth Sports

ObjectiveThe objective was to develop and validate an achievement goal scale for young athletes that was aligned with the 2 (mastery/ego)×2 (approach/avoidance) achievement goal framework.MethodA total of 1675 male and female athletes ranging in age from 9 to 14 years participated in the AGSYS scale development and validation phases. Items having a readability level of grade 4 (age 9) or below were written and evaluated in a series of studies to assess the reliability, factorial validity, and construct validity of the Mastery and Ego scales.DesignBoth correlational and experimental methods were used to assess reliability and validity.ResultsExploratory and confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated factorial validity in samples of 9–10-, 11–12-, and 13–14-year-old athletes, and the subscales correlated in a predicted fashion with one another, with other sport and academic goal orientation measures and with several other theoretically relevant variables, including coach-initiated motivational climate, competitive trait anxiety, sport enjoyment, motivation, and self-esteem. Scores also changed significantly in response to a motivational climate coach intervention.ConclusionThe Achievement Goal Scale for Youth Sports (AGSYS) appears to be a reliable and valid measure of achievement goal approach orientations in children between the ages of 9 and 14 years. We were not successful in developing corresponding avoidance goal orientation scales that were not highly correlated, raising the possibility that children do not cognitively differentiate between mastery-avoidance and ego-avoidance orientations.