Pleasure and interest are differentially affected by replaying versus analyzing a happy life moment

Previous research regarding the effects of thinking about a happy moment on emotional experience has been equivocal. The discrepancies may be explained by different modes of thinking: systematically thinking about a happy moment versus mentally replaying the happy moment. Another explanation may involve the difference between the emotion of interest and the emotion of pleasantness, which are often erroneously grouped together under the broad concept of ‘positive affect.’ We hypothesized that systematically thinking about a happy moment would generate interest, whereas mental replaying would generate pleasantness. In an experimental setting, people who systematically analyzed a happy moment increased feelings of interest, while the level of pleasantness remained unchanged. In the alternative condition, people who mentally replayed a happy moment reported increased interest and pleasantness. At post-intervention, the replay group scored higher on pleasantness, but not on interest, relative to the analyze group.     

Knowledge and man

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis.     

Evidence that an episodic mode of thinking facilitates encoding of perceptually rich memories for naturalistic events relative to a gist-based mode of thinking

ABSTRACT

Several studies have demonstrated that an episodic specificity induction (ESI) can influence cognitive abilities that involve episodic processes at retrieval. To better understand the downstream implications of an “episodic mode of thinking,” we investigate whether an ESI influences encoding of new events. In a between-subjects design, participants were given an ESI or gist (control) induction. In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants then were shown film clips of naturalistic events. After a filled delay, participants were given a surprise memory test, which required narrative recollection of the film clips. Participants who received the ESI generated narratives that contained more perceptual details specifically. Relative to gist thinking, an episodic mode of thinking appears to facilitate encoding of perceptually rich memories for naturalistic events.     

术前人文关怀对肺癌手术患者全麻诱导心理和生理的影响

为探讨术前进行人文关怀式沟通和健康教育对肺癌手术患者全麻诱导后心理和生理的影响,将83例非同期别的肺癌手术患者（均采用全身麻醉,双腔管气管插管辅助通气）分成两组。观察组进行人文关怀式沟通,对照组采用普通沟通。判定方法采用焦虑自评量表（SAS）,根据焦虑评分反映两组患者入院即刻及手术前的心理变化情况,监测全麻诱导即刻与全麻诱导气管插管后5min患者平均动脉压（MBP）的波动、心率（HR）的变化,用两个时间段两个变量的差值来反映两组患者全麻诱导期发生心理和生理反应的情况。结果显示,两组患者入院即刻焦虑差异无统计学意义（P〉0．05）;手术前SAS评分两组患者较入院即刻降低（P〈0．05）,并且观察组与对照组相比下降更明显（P〈0．01）;观察组患者MBP波动无统计学意义（P〉0．05）、HR波动有统计学意义（P〈0．05）。因此,证实人文关怀式沟通和健康教育能够减轻肺癌患者在心理和生理两个方面对麻醉和手术产生的不良反应。     

Trait Meta-Mood,gender and EEG response during emotion-regulation

Effective emotion-regulation is central to emotional intelligence. Relationships between the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) and wellbeing may reflect individual differences in the strategies used for regulating negative emotions. The present study (N = 136) manipulated emotion-regulation strategy during viewing of a fear-inducing film clip. EEG response was assessed across five frequency bands in reappraisal, suppression and control conditions. The TMMS predicted higher power in theta and gamma bands, a pattern of response that may represent directed attention to emotional processing. Gender differences included elevated theta in females in the reappraisal condition, but effects of gender and Trait Meta-Mood appeared to be dissociable.     

Mood effects on attentional control: a preregistered replication study and critical analysis

In a widely cited paper, Jefferies et al. (2008) report a study in which they manipulated participants’ mood and examined the effects of this manipulation on their performance on the Attentional Blink task. Their results revealed an interaction between emotional valence and arousal: attentional control of participants who experienced a negative mood with low arousal (i.e. sadness) was best, whereas it was worst for participants who experienced a negative mood with high arousal (i.e. anxiety). Performance for participants who were in a positive mood, either with low arousal (i.e. calmness) or high arousal (i.e. happiness) had intermediate scores. In this study, I examined the replicability of this effect and performed additional analyses to investigate the extent to which this effect is due to perceptual or attentional processes and to examine the role of distraction on AB performance. Importantly, the results showed that the crucial interaction between emotional valence and arousal did not reach significance. This could be due a diversity of factors that are addressed in the discussion.     

Phenomena of awareness in dementia: Heterogeneity and its implications

Despite much research on the relationship between awareness and dementia little can be concluded concerning their relationship and the role of other factors. It is likely that studies capture different phenomena of awareness. This study aimed at identifying and delineating such variation by analysing data from three questionnaires obtained during the longitudinal study of awareness in 101 people with early-stage dementia. The data concerned awareness in relation to memory, activities of daily living and socio-emotional function. Significant differences in patterns of discrepancies were obtained. This suggests that the awareness phenomena involved were structurally different; and that, in turn, this may reflect variation in the intrinsic linking between awareness and its ‘object’ (different ‘objects’ determining different kinds of judgements). The identification of such differences is necessary so that appropriate methodologies can be applied to the study of awareness in different contexts.     

A Note on Prototypes,Convexity and Fuzzy Sets

The work on prototypes in ontologies pioneered by Rosch [10] and elaborated by Lakoff [8] and Freund [3] is related to vagueness in the sense that the more remote an instance is from a prototype the fewer people agree that it is an example of that prototype. An intuitive example is the prototypical “mother”, and it is observed that more specific instances like ”single mother”, “adoptive mother”, “surrogate mother”, etc., are less and less likely to be classified as “mothers” by experimental subjects. From a different direction Gärdenfors [4] provided a persuasive account of natural predicates to resolve paradoxes of induction like Goodman’s “Grue” predicate [5]. Gärdenfors proposed that “quality dimensions” arising from human cognition and perception impose topologies on concepts such that the ones that appear “natural” to us are convex in these topologies. We show that these two cognitive principles — prototypes and predicate convexity — are equivalent to unimodal (convex) fuzzy characteristic functions for sets. Then we examine the case when the fuzzy set characteristic function is not convex, in particular when it is multi-modal. We argue that this is an indication that the fuzzy concept should really be regarded as a super concept in which the decomposed components are subconcepts in an ontological taxonomy.