The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference

We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as ‘preface’ and ‘lottery’ rules. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Consequence Operations Based on Hypergraph Satisfiability

Four consequence operators based on hypergraph satisfiability are defined. Their properties are explored and interconnections are displayed. Finally their relation to the case of the Classical Propositional Calculus is shown.     

Does the Traditional Treatment of Enthymemes Rest on a Mistake?

In many actual arguments, the conclusion seems intuitively to follow from the premisses, even though we cannot show that it follows logically. The traditional approach to evaluating such arguments is to suppose that they have an unstated premiss whose explicit addition will produce an argument where the conclusion does follow logically. But there are good reasons for doubting that people so frequently leave the premisses of their arguments unstated. The inclination to suppose that they do stems from the belief that the only way in which an argument's conclusion can follow definitely from its premisses is to follow logically. I argue that this belief is mistaken. I propose a revision of the current generic conception of logical consequence, and its variant specifications, to avoid the paradoxes of strict implication. The revised conception can then be naturally extended to include also what we might call 'enthymematic consequence'. This concept is a kind of consequence, whose properties merit investigation.     

Causes of Allais common consequence paradoxes: An experimental dissection

The common consequence paradox of Allais can be decomposed into three simpler principles: transitivity, coalescing, and restricted branch independence. Different theories attribute such paradoxes to violations of restricted branch independence only, to coalescing only, or to both. This study separates tests of these two properties in order to compare these theories. Although rank-dependent utility (RDU) theories, including cumulative prospect theory (CPT), violate branch independence, the empirical pattern of violations is opposite that required by RDU theories to account for Allais paradoxes. Data also show systematic violations of coalescing, which refute RDU theories. The findings contradict both original and CPTs with or without their editing principles of combination and cancellation. Modal choices were well predicted by Birnbaum's RAM and TAX models with parameters estimated from previous data. The effects of event framing on these tests were also assessed and found to be negligible.     

左右侧颞顶联合区对道德意图信息加工能力的共同作用——基于经颅直流电刺激技术

行为人的意图动机是我们对日常行为的对错做出判断的重要依据。以往研究表明,左右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)都可能与信念意图的整合加工能力相关,尤其是近年来越来越多的神经刺激研究为TPJ区域与心理状态归因能力之间的因果关系提供了证据。然而,这些研究在实验任务的选取,实验设计的优化,实验结论的稳健性上仍然有改进的空间。基于此,本研究开展了两个在设计上互相补充的实验。实验中被试的TPJ区域会接受一段时间的经颅直流电刺激,并完成一系列的道德判断任务,任务是由意图和结果,以及负性和中性2×2双变量构成的4种条件的故事:无伤人、伤人未遂、意外伤人和伤人成功,被试要对故事主角的行为做出谴责程度的道德判断。结合道德判断的谴责程度和决策时间数据发现,当人们在处理信念意图信息时,左右侧TPJ区域可能是协同互动、共同发挥作用的。在激活右侧TPJ并限制左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性结果的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为结果做出道德判断;而在限制右侧TPJ并激活左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性意图的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为者的动机做出道德判断。     

A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence

Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truth-preserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truth-preserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises whether the usual model-theoretic sense of validity and Tarski's 1936 sense are the same. I argue in this paper that they probably are not, and that the proof Tarski had in mind, although unusable to prove that model-theoretically valid arguments are truth-preserving, can be used to prove that arguments valid in Tarski's 1936 sense are truth-preserving.     

Perceived consequences underlying approach goals and avoidance goals in relation to anxiety

Numerous studies have examined anxiety from a cognitive and affective perspective but relatively little research has studied anxiety from a motivational perspective. There are theoretical grounds (e.g., Gray, 1982) for expecting anxiety to be characterised by heightened avoidance motivation, but this motivational bias is not thought to be accompanied by diminished approach motivation. A cross-sectional, mixed model design was used to investigate individuals’ response-variations on personal approach and avoidance goal systems. A convenience sample comprising an anxious group (n = 41) and non-anxious group (n = 33) completed tasks that measured number of self-generated approach goals and avoidance goals, and number of associated positive and negative consequence steps for goals. As predicted, anxious individuals, relative to non-anxious individuals, generated more avoidance goals and more negative consequence steps in response to goal non-attainment (irrespective of goal type) but did not differ on number of approach goals or positive consequence steps in response to goal attainment (irrespective of goal type). The present findings highlight the importance of personal goal systems in understanding the nature of anxiety.     

Wie Natürlich ist das System der Natürlichen Deduktion?

How natural is natural deduction?– Gentzen's system of natural deduction intends to fit logical rules to the effective mathematical reasoning in order to overcome the artificiality of deductions in axiomatic systems (¶ 2). In spite of this reform some of Gentzen's rules for natural deduction are criticised by psychologists and natural language philosophers for remaining unnatural. The criticism focuses on the principle of extensionality and on formalism of logic (¶ 3). After sketching the criticism relatively to the main rules, I argue that the criteria of economy, simplicity, pertinence etc., on which the objections are based, transcend the strict domain of logic and apply to arguments in general (¶ 4). (¶ 5) deals with Frege's critique of the concept of naturalness as regards logic. It is shown that this concept means a regression into psychologism and is exposed to the same difficulties as are: relativity, lack of precision, the error of arguing from `is' to `ought' (the naturalistic fallacy). Despite of these, the concept of naturalness plays the role of a diffuse ideal which favours the construction of alternative deductive systems in contrast to the platonic conception of logic (¶ 6).     

移情与后果认知训练对儿童欺负行为影响的实验研究

研究以移情和后果认知为训练内容,运用个体心理咨询、团体心理咨询等教育干预手段对有欺负行为的18名儿童进行了为期3个月的教育干预。结果表明:综合性的教育干预能够有效地减少儿童的欺负行为。