Comparative difficulty and the strategic regulation of accuracy: The impact of test-list context on monitoring and meta-metacognition

A growing body of research has shown that context manipulations can have little or no impact on accuracy performance, yet still significantly influence metacognitive performance. For example, participants in a test-list context paradigm study one list of words with a medium levels-of-processing task and a second word list with either a shallow or deep task: Recognition for medium words does not differ across conditions, however medium words are significantly more likely to be labeled as “remembered” (vs. merely familiar) if they had been studied with a shallow word list (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003). The goal of the current studies was to extend the test-list context paradigm to strategic regulation (report/withhold recognition test), and broaden it to incorporate different types of stimuli (i.e., face stimuli in place of a medium word list). The paradigm also was modified to include separate answer (studied/new) confidence and decision (report/withhold) confidence ratings at test. Results showed that context did not impact recognition accuracy for faces across the context conditions, however participants were more likely to report (i.e., volunteer) their face responses if they had studied the shallow word list. The results also demonstrated a difference between answer confidence and decision confidence, and the pattern of this difference depended on whether responses were reported or withheld (Experiment 1). Overall, the data are presented as support for the functional account of memory, which views memory states as inferential and attributional rather than static categories.     

The relationship between the objective identification threshold and priming effects does not provide a definitive boundary between conscious and unconscious perceptual processes

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model (OT/S) proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity (typically priming effects) and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold (identification d′ = 0). These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes.     

Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiations

We hypothesized that anger expressions increase expressers’ ability to claim value in negotiations, but only when the recipients of these expressions have poor alternatives. This effect occurs because anger expression communicates toughness, and only recipients who have poor alternatives are affected by the toughness of their counterpart. In Experiment 1, participants read a scenario about a negotiator who either was angry or not. In Experiment 2, dyads negotiated face-to-face after one negotiator within each dyad was advised to show either anger or no emotion. In both studies, recipients of anger expressions who had poor alternatives conceded more. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that toughness ascribed to the expresser mediated the effect of anger expression on claiming value.     

Correcting the misinformation effect

Decades of memory research have demonstrated a dire need for effective methods of correcting misinformation, particularly once it has been encoded. However, much of this research has exposed participants to misinformation first then provided a correction, and used indirect memory questions. Using a misinformation effect (ME) paradigm, in which participants' memory is distorted by misleading postevent information, we examine whether corrections can combat memory distortion on direct memory tests. Experiment 1 showed corrections greatly reduced the ME. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a longer lag time (3 min) between exposure to misinformation and its correction, except for participants that read only the misinformation and its correction. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that participants reported the most recent information they read, suggesting participants evaluate the correction's veracity. Finally, a meta‐analysis of the three experiments reiterates that corrections may be effective in combating misinformation.     

Reducing Binge Drinking in Adolescents through Implementation of the Strategic Prevention Framework

The Strategic Prevention Framework (SPF) is a conceptual model that supports coalition‐driven efforts to address underage drinking and related consequences. Although the SPF has been promoted by the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's Center for Substance Abuse Prevention and implemented in multiple U.S. states and territories, there is limited research on the SPF's effectiveness on improving targeted outcomes and associated influencing factors. The present quasi‐experimental study examines the effects of SPF implementation on binge drinking and enforcement of existing underage drinking laws as an influencing factor. The intervention group encompassed 11 school districts that were implementing the SPF with local prevention coalitions across eight Kansas communities. The comparison group consisted of 14 school districts that were matched based on demographic variables. The intervention districts collectively facilitated 137 community‐level changes, including new or modified programs, policies, and practices. SPF implementation supported significant improvements in binge drinking and enforcement outcomes over time (p < .001), although there were no significant differences in improvements between the intervention and matched comparison groups (p > .05). Overall, the findings provide a basis for guiding future research and community‐based prevention practice in implementing and evaluating the SPF.     

Synergistic Information Processing Encrypts Strategic Reasoning in Poker

There is a tendency in decision‐making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy and predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two‐player No‐Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing—creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents’ signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision‐making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public‐key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high‐stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory.     

How preferences for eager versus vigilant judgment strategies affect self-serving conclusions

People are often motivated to reach self-serving conclusions during judgment. This article examines how such self-serving judgment outcomes are influenced by preferences for different judgment strategies. Two studies tested how preferences for eager (promotion-oriented) versus vigilant (prevention-oriented) judgment strategies affected self-serving explanations for success or failure. Regardless of their performance, those preferring vigilant strategies selectively endorsed a few explanations above others, whereas those preferring eager strategies more evenly endorsed multiple explanations. Furthermore, although the explanations selected by those preferring vigilant strategies were indeed self-serving (emphasizing personal responsibility for success and external circumstances for failure), the more balanced endorsement of multiple explanations by those preferring eager strategies was associated with attenuated self-serving tendencies. Finally, those preferring eager strategies were also less self-serving in their generalization from explanations of current performance to predictions of future performance. The larger implications of these findings for the role of strategic preferences in judgment are discussed.     

Legitimation and Strategic Maneuvering in the Political Field

This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological theory of the political field. In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre Bourdieu and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis of the political field. I analyze a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, following his suspension by Parliament in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss its specificity as an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate legitimation as political strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the political field, which I see—following Bourdieu—as involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of power.

Strategic Maneuvering in Political Argumentation

Although political argumentation is not institutionalized in a formal sense, it does have recurrent patterns and characteristics. Its constraints include the absence of time limits, the lack of a clear terminus, heterogeneous audiences, and the assumption that access is open to all. These constraints make creative strategic maneuvering both possible and necessary. Among the common types of strategic maneuvering are changing the subject, modifying the relevant audience, appealing to liberal and conservative presumptions, reframing the argument, using condensation symbols, employing the locus of the irreparable, and argumentative use of figures and tropes. It is difficult to evaluate strategic maneuvering in political argumentation, however, because the activity types dictate wide latitude for the arguers, so there are few cases of unquestionable derailment.