Information need,affect, and cognition of autonomic activity

Several studies have shown that bogus feedback of physiological change induces a greater liking for attractive stimuli. Other research suggests that the affective change induced by bogus feedback requires an opportunity to visually search change-associated stimuli for information which can account for its purported physiological effect. While there is considerable agreement among theorists that a greater disliking should obtain when the stimuli are unattractive (but a lack of data supporting this contention), there is disagreement about whether information searching is directed equally toward change-associated stimuli and no-change stimuli, or toward change-associated stimuli alone.Results of the present study support the contention that stimulus features determine the kind of affect experienced: change-associated slides depicting nudes are rated as more attractive than no-change-associated nudes, and change-associated slides depicting accident vitctims are rated as more repulsive than no-change-associated victims. Information seeking data are more consistent with the contention that information needs exist after both types of feedback.     

What makes triangles point: Local and global effects in configurations of ambiguous triangles

Perceived pointing of ambiguous triangles was investigated in three experiments. The results show that the probability of seeing an equilateral triangle point in a given direction is strongly influenced by (a) the direction of the ambiguous alternatives, (b) the orientational characteristics of the configuration of elements surrounding the triangle, and (c) the shape of the surrounding elements. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that perceived pointing is determined by perceptual reference frames induced at multiple levels of globality: one for the general visual field, one for the entire configuration, and one for the local elements of the configuration.     

Rehabilitating AI: Argument Loci and the Case for Artificial Intelligence

This article examines argument structures and strategies in pro and con argumentation about the possibility of human-level artificial intelligence (AI) in the near term future. It examines renewed controversy about strong AI that originated in a prominent 1999 book and continued at major conferences and in periodicals, media commentary, and Web-based discussions through 2002. It will be argued that the book made use of implicit, anticipatory refutation to reverse prevailing value hierarchies related to AI. Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) study of refutational argument, this study considers points of contact between opposing arguments that emerged in opposing loci, dissociations, and casuistic reasoning. In particular, it shows how perceptions of AI were reframed and rehabilitated through metaphorical language, reversal of the philosophical pair artificial/natural, appeals to the paradigm case, and use of the loci of quantity and essence. Furthermore, examining responses to the book in subsequent arguments indicates the topoi characteristic of the rhetoric of technology advocacy.     

Analysing Personal Value

It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.     

Piagetian object permanence and its development in Eurasian jays (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Garrulus glandarius</Emphasis>)

Object permanence in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) was investigated using a complete version of the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Nine hand-raised jays were studied, divided into two groups according to their different developmental stages (experiment 1, older jays: 2–3 months old, n = 4; experiment 2, younger jays: 15 days old, n = 5). In the first experiment, we investigated whether older jays could achieve piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. Tasks were administered in a fixed sequence (1–15) according to the protocols used in other avian species. The aim of the second experiment was to check whether testing very young jays before their development of “neophobia” could influence the achievement times of piagetian stages. Furthermore, in this experiment tasks were administered randomly to investigate whether the jays’ achievement of stage 6 follows a fixed sequence related to the development of specific cognitive abilities. All jays tested in experiments 1 and 2 fully achieved piagetian stage 6 and no “A not B” errors were observed. Performance on visible displacement tasks was better than performance on invisible ones. The results of experiment 2 show that “neophobia” affected the response of jays in terms of achievement times; the older jays in experiment 1 took longer to pass all the tasks when compared with the younger, less neophobic, jays in experiment 2. With regard to the achieving order, jays followed a fixed sequence of acquisition in experiment 2, even if tasks were administered randomly, with the exception of one subject. The results of these experiments support the idea that piagetian stages of cognitive development exist in avian species and that they progress through relatively fixed sequences. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at and is accessible for authorized users.     

Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.