Information need,affect, and cognition of autonomic activity

Several studies have shown that bogus feedback of physiological change induces a greater liking for attractive stimuli. Other research suggests that the affective change induced by bogus feedback requires an opportunity to visually search change-associated stimuli for information which can account for its purported physiological effect. While there is considerable agreement among theorists that a greater disliking should obtain when the stimuli are unattractive (but a lack of data supporting this contention), there is disagreement about whether information searching is directed equally toward change-associated stimuli and no-change stimuli, or toward change-associated stimuli alone.Results of the present study support the contention that stimulus features determine the kind of affect experienced: change-associated slides depicting nudes are rated as more attractive than no-change-associated nudes, and change-associated slides depicting accident vitctims are rated as more repulsive than no-change-associated victims. Information seeking data are more consistent with the contention that information needs exist after both types of feedback.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

What makes triangles point: Local and global effects in configurations of ambiguous triangles

Perceived pointing of ambiguous triangles was investigated in three experiments. The results show that the probability of seeing an equilateral triangle point in a given direction is strongly influenced by (a) the direction of the ambiguous alternatives, (b) the orientational characteristics of the configuration of elements surrounding the triangle, and (c) the shape of the surrounding elements. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that perceived pointing is determined by perceptual reference frames induced at multiple levels of globality: one for the general visual field, one for the entire configuration, and one for the local elements of the configuration.     

THE LOVE RACKET: DEFINING LOVE AND AGAPEFOR THE LOVE‐AND‐SCIENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM

Abstract. Scholars of religion and science have generated remarkable scholarship in recent years in their explorations of love. Exactly how scholars involved in this budding field believe that love and science should relate and/or be integrated varies greatly. What they share in common is the belief that issues of love are of paramount importance and that the various scientific disciplines—whether natural, social, or religious—must be brought to bear upon how best to understand love. I briefly introduce the emergence of the love‐and‐science research program and note that scholars have not done well defining what they mean by love. I suggest that the present surge in love scholarship will fail to produce the positive results that it otherwise might if love is not defined well. I provide and defend a definition of love adequate for those doing love‐and‐science research: To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including God), to promote well‐being. To explain better what this simple definition entails, I explore its three main phrases. Love is said to have many forms, but agape is the form to which the love‐and‐science literature most commonly refers. I comment briefly on the debates about how to best understand agape, noting sixteen different definitions proposed by major scholars. I identify weaknesses in many of them and then offer what I argue is a more adequate definition of agape as intentional response to promote well‐being when confronted by that which generates ill‐being. In short, agape repays evil with good. While research on love and science requires much more than adequate definitions, I believe that the definitions I proffer can prove useful in furthering the love‐and‐science research program.     

Towards an account of argumentation in science

In this article it is argued that a complex model that includes Toulmin's functional account of argument, the pragma-dialectical stage analysis of argumentation offered by the Amsterdam School, and criteria developed in critical thinking theory, can be used to account for the normativity and field-dependence of argumentation in science. A pragma-dialectical interpretation of the four main elements of Toulmin's model, and a revised account of the double role of warrants, illuminates the domain specificity of scientific argumentation and the restrictions to which the confrontation and opening stages of scientific critical discussions are subjected. In regard to the argumentation stage, examples are given to show that a general account of argumentation, as advocated by informal logicians, is not applicable to arguments in science. Furthermore, although patterns of inference differ in various scientific practices, deductive validity is argued to be a crucial notion in the assessment of scientific arguments. Finally, some remarks are made concerning the burden of proof and the concluding stage of scientific argumentation.     

“Magic” revisited: Children's responses to apparent violations of conservation

Using a procedure adapted from E. Mermelstein and L. S. Shulman (1967, Child Development, 37, 39–52), kindergarten and third-grade children were exposed to one of two apparent violations of conservation or to a transformation in which conservation was preserved. In the violation conditions, water attained either the same or a higher level in a wider container than it had in a narrower container. The dependent measures were children's (a) predictions of the outcome of the transformation, (b) spontaneous reactions and verbal explanations of the actual outcome, and (c) responses to conventional conservation questions. The findings suggest that children very gradually progress from a stage at which they expect the water level to remain constant and base judgments of quantitative relations on water level alone to a stage at which they view reciprocal compensation and conservation as logically necessary. The findings indicate that, although some third-grade children may have attained the latter stage, many have not.     

Assessing familiality of cognitive ability

In a recent paper in this journal, Benbow, Zonderman, and Stanley (1983) conclude that intellectually precocious children resemble their parents to a lesser extent than do children of lesser ability. In reply, Vining (1985) asserts that Benbow, Zonderman, and Stanley's results are artifacts of selection and their statistical methodology, and that a more appropriate statistical methodology yields quite the opposite conclusion. The present study has two purposes: (1) To show that Vining's criticism is misdirected, stemming from a misunderstanding of how Benbow, Zonderman, and Stanley selected their subjects, and (2) to point out some problems in the model, indices of familiarity, and design used by Benbow, Zonderman, and Stanley that need to be addressed before future comparative studies of familiality are attempted.     

Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.

“Our Fellow Creatures”

This paper defends “moral individualism” against various arguments that have been intended to show that membership in the human species or participation in our distinctively human form of life is a sufficient basis for a moral status higher than that of any animal. Among the arguments criticized are the “nature-of-the-kind argument,” which claims that it is the nature of all human beings to have certain higher psychological capacities, even if, contingently, some human beings lack them, and various versions of the idea that there is a special form of life that all human beings share but of which no animal can be a full participant. The paper concludes that none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that there are moral reasons to permit animals to be treated less well than members of our own species whose psychological capacities and potential are no higher than those of the animals.