The development of linear syllogistic reasoning

Between 24 and 26 children in each of grades 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 (with mean ages of 8.5, 10.2, 13.0, 15.0, and 16.6 years, respectively) were tested in their ability to solve linear syllogisms, problems such as “John is taller than Mary. Mary is taller than Pete. Who is tallest? John, Mary, Pete.” Response latencies and error rates decreased across grade levels and sessions. Component latencies also generally decreased with increasing age. Four alternative information-processing models were fit to the group latency data at each grade level. These models were (a) a spatial model, according to which people represent the terms of a linear syllogism in the form of a linear spatial array; (b) a linguistic model, according to which linear syllogisms are solved via inferences on functional relations represented by linguistic deep structures; (c) an algorithmic model, according to which people solve linear syllogisms by applying a series of simple, essentially mechanical steps, and (d) a mixed model, which combines selected features of the spatial and linguistic models, and adds new features of its own. The latency data supported the mixed model at each grade level, although in grade 9 the model was not the preferred one until the second session of testing.     

Facilitating referential communication among children: The listener as teacher

This study was designed to test the hypothesis that systematic variations in listener behavior can have an important influence on both speaker behavior and communicative success among children. In particular, we investigated the idea that systematic variations in listener behavior might have not only within-trial effects on the adequacy of speakers' messages and the accuracy of communication among children, but also cumulative effects on speakers' initial messages across trials. Effects of stimulus complexity were also examined. Pairs of 7- and 9-year-old children participated in a referential communication game, with the younger child serving as speaker and the older one as listener. Half of the listeners were given a plan for effective listening which emphasized the importance of asking questions if the speakers' messages were ambiguous. Replicating earlier findings, the plan manipulation was successful in encouraging listeners to ask questions when necessary. The major result was that listener questions not only had the expected trial-by-trial effect on message adequacy and communicative accuracy, but also showed a cumulative effect on speaker performance. When exposed to systematic listener feedback, speakers improved their initial messages over trials. Stimulus complexity was not a major determinant of performances. These findings suggest that provision of systematic listener feedback may be an effective method for teaching speaker skills to young children.     

Attitude bolstering when behavior is inconsistent with central attitudes

An experiment was conducted to study the effects of behaving inconsistently with a central attitude. In a theoretical account, it is suggested that subjects who score high on a feminism scale and who fail to solve a sex-role problem and thus demonstrate sexist thinking will be motivated to adopt feminist (nonsexist) behavior more than subjects who are either lower in feminism or who don't fail such a problem. Since the attitude is central, attitude bolstering rather than change in the direction of the behavior should be the preferred mode of inconsistency reduction for such subjects. Bolstering, in the form of positive affirmative action decisions, was generally demonstrated by subjects who failed the sex-role problem. This effect was more pronounced for those highest in feminism. No such effects on affirmative action decisions were observed for subjects who didn't fail the sex-role problem. Results support the view that threats to one's self-image caused by one's own counter-attitudinal actions lead to attempts to reestablish those threatened values. A conceptual analysis of the conditions under which bolstering rather than attitude change in the direction of the behavior should be expected is presented.     

Test anxiety and breadth of encoding experiences in free recall

Subjects made three ratings for each of 30 words, then had an unannounced immediate free recall test and a second test after 1 week. There was no evidence to indicate significantly better retention on either test when the dimensions rated were unrelated as opposed to related. Subjects low on test anxiety performed better overall than subjects who scored high on either the emotionality or worry components of test anxiety. On the delayed test, the test anxiety effect was apparent only when study ratings involved unrelated dimensions (i.e., broad encoding). This interaction is consistent with two conclusions. First, rating related dimensions led to narrow encodings, thus hindering low-anxiety subjects who normally encode broadly. Second, even explicit ratings of unrelated dimensions did not induce high-anxiety subjects to encode more broadly. That the high-anxiety deficit was not overcome even with explicit orienting tasks may indicate inflexibility in deploying memory strategies.     

象征之镜的生产和生产之镜的象征,或马克思和鲍德里亚

鲍德里亚批评马克思的逻辑有一个递进过程,从最初借助于马克思的拜物教理论发展出一种以符号(或形式)分析为核心的消费社会观,到对马克思主义“生产力”理论批评,最后以“象征交换”理论替代马克思的“生产”理论。在这一过程中,他把西方马克思主义哲学逻辑的失败原因追溯到马克思主义起点上,并借助于结构主义、精神分析和相关人类学成果构建了一种从象征关系入手对当代资本主义文化和意识形态的批判话语,但是在根本上“象征之镜”却是资本主义“生产之镜”话语之外的另一种非历史话语,批判本身成为与历史生成具体情境无关的一种话语反对另一种话语的斗争。在直接的意义上,鲍德里亚式的批评是当代左派激进文化批判的困境表现。     

CRITICAL REALISM REDUX: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

This article combines an appreciation of several themes in Josh Reeves's Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology while arguing in favor of critical realism. The author holds that critical realism manages to combine the objective truth reached through inference and especially cognitive acts of judgment as well as the various, contingent historical contexts that also define where science is practiced. Reeves advocates a historical perspective, but this article claims that in order for critical realism to be credible, a philosophical perspective must be maintained.     

Constraints on Pavlovian conditioning of the pigeon: Relative conditioned reinforcing effects of red-light and tone CSs paired with food

Recent Pavlovian conditioning experiments presented all possible CS-US combinations of red-light and tone CSs and food and shock USs to separate groups of pigeons. Pigeons receiving shock USs demonstrated conditioned head raising followed by prancing to both CSs, but CRs were acquired more rapidly to tone than to red light. Although pigeons receiving food USs rapidly acquired a conditioned response of pecking to the red-light CS, there was no evidence of conditioned responding in groups receiving tone-food pairings. This outcome left open the possibility that Pavlovian pairings of tone and food may have resulted in association formation that was not revealed in performance. The present series of experiments attempted to reveal that association, using an indirect method of assessment, conditioned reinforcement. Experiment 1 demonstrated that both red light and tone paired with food became positive conditioned reinforcers, suggesting that an association between tone and food was formed in the same number of Pavlovian conditioning trials that previously failed to yield any direct evidence of conditioning. Experiment 2, which presented fewer conditioning trials, revealed that the tone-food association was formed less rapidly than the red light-food association. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the observed outcomes were not attributable to unconditioned, rather than conditioned, reinforcing effects of the Css.     

CONSCIOUS OBJECTIONS: GOD AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS DEBATES

Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field.     

Science and Constraint: The Role of Science within Theology

Abstract : The conversation between theology and science has accomplished much, yet the question of how to determine the limits of such dialogue—and whether there are limits at all—remains open. Key questions involve the degree to which science should constrain theology and the manner in which theology can influence science. Arthur Peacocke and Robert J. Russell provide sample methods by which theology can engage science. Peacocke's method emphasizes the influence of science on theology, while Russell's focuses on theology's influence on science. Both emphases will be required for theology's continued engagement with science.     

Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition

There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two: on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue, two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching a different way to think of that link.