Psychology is About Processes

Out of the eight points of methodological criticism against contemporary psychology formulated by Watson (Psychological Bulletin 31:755–776, 1934) and put forward by Toomela in this issue, the overemphasis on prediction, the neglect of individual differences, the habit of the differences between the mental states of subjects in objective experimental conditions are particularly important. Modern cognitive psychology has began to remedy those problems, in part by proposing broad, integrative theories. It is not useful to subdivide psychology into “schools of thought” defined by their methodological practices.

An experimentally confirmed statistical model on arm movement

The purpose of this research work was to develop a methodology to model arm movement in normal subjects and neurologically impaired individuals through the application of a statistical modelling method. Thirteen subjects with Parkinson's disease and 29 normal controls were recruited to participate in an arm motor task. An infrared optoelectronic kinematic movement analysis system was employed to record arm movement at 50 times per second. This study identified the modified extended Freundlich model as one that could be used to describe this task. Results showed that this model fit the data well and that it has a good correspondence between the observed and the predicted data. However, verification of the model showed that the residuals contained a sizeable autocorrelation factor. The Cochrane and Orcutt method was applied to remove this factor, which improved the fit of the model. Results showed that Parkinson's disease subjects had a higher autocorrelation coefficient than the normal subjects for this task. A positive correlation (r(s) = 0.72, p < 0.001) was found between the Langton-Hewer stage and the autocorrelation coefficient of PD subjects. This finding suggests that if autocorrelation is positively correlated with disease progression, clinicians in their clinical practice might use the autocorrelation value as a useful indicator to quantify the progression of a subjects' disease. Significant differences in model parameters were seen between normal and Parkinson's disease subjects. The use of such a model to represent and quantify movement patterns provides an important base for future study.     

Idiomatic syntactic constructions and language learning

This article explores the influence of idiomatic syntactic constructions (i.e., constructions whose phrase structure rules violate the rules that underlie the construction of other kinds of sentences in the language) on the acquisition of phrase structure. In Experiment 1, participants were trained on an artificial language generated from hierarchical phrase structure rules. Some participants were given exposure to an idiomatic construction (IC) during training, whereas others were not. Under some circumstances, the presence of an idiomatic construction in the input aided learners in acquiring the phrase structure of the language. Experiment 2 provides a replication of the first experiment and extends the findings by showing that idiomatic constructions that strongly violate the predictive dependencies that define the phrase structure of the language do not aid learners in acquiring the structure of the language. Together, our data suggest that (a) idiomatic constructions aid learners in acquiring the phrase structure of a language by highlighting relevant structural elements in the language, and (b) such constructions are useful cues to learning to the extent that learners can keep their knowledge of the idiomatic construction separate from their knowledge of the rest of the language.     

Extracting a maximum of useful information from statistical research data

The practice of statistical inference in psychological research is critically reviewed. Particular emphasis is put on the fast pace of change from the sole reliance on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) to the inclusion of effect size estimates, confidence intervals, and an interest in the Bayesian approach. We conclude that these developments are helpful for psychologists seeking to extract a maximum of useful information from statistical research data, and that seven decades of criticism against NHST is finally having an effect.     

Human preferences are biased towards associative information

There is ample evidence that the brain generates predictions that help interpret sensory input. To build such predictions the brain capitalizes upon learned statistical regularities and associations (e.g., “A” is followed by “B”; “C” appears together with “D”). The centrality of predictions to mental activities gave rise to the hypothesis that associative information with predictive value is perceived as intrinsically valuable. Such value would ensure that this information is proactively searched for, thereby promoting certainty and stability in our environment. We therefore tested here whether, all else being equal, participants would prefer stimuli that contained more rather than less associative information. In Experiments 1 and 2 we used novel, meaningless visual shapes and showed that participants preferred associative shapes over shapes that had not been associated with other shapes during training. In Experiment 3 we used pictures of real-world objects and again demonstrated a preference for stimuli that elicit stronger associations. These results support our proposal that predictive information is affectively tagged, and enhance our understanding of the formation of everyday preferences.     

The life of p: “Just significant” results are on the rise

Null hypothesis significance testing uses the seemingly arbitrary probability of .05 as a means of objectively determining whether a tested effect is reliable. Within recent psychological articles, research has found an overrepresentation of p values around this cut-off. The present study examined whether this overrepresentation is a product of recent pressure to publish or whether it has existed throughout psychological research. Articles published in 1965 and 2005 from two prominent psychology journals were examined. Like previous research, the frequency of p values at and just below .05 was greater than expected compared to p frequencies in other ranges. While this overrepresentation was found for values published in both 1965 and 2005, it was much greater in 2005. Additionally, p values close to but over .05 were more likely to be rounded down to, or incorrectly reported as, significant in 2005 than in 1965. Modern statistical software and an increased pressure to publish may explain this pattern. The problem may be alleviated by reduced reliance on p values and increased reporting of confidence intervals and effect sizes.     

Laypeople do use sample variance: The effect of embedding data in a variance-implying story

When using sample data to decide whether two populations differ, laypeople attend to the difference between group means, but largely overlook within-group variability (Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2007 Obrecht, N. A., Chapman, G. B. and Gelman, R. 2007. Intuitive t-tests: Lay use of statistical information. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14: 1147–1152.  [Google Scholar]). We show, first, that laypeople know about and use story-implied variability when making pairwise comparisons. Then we demonstrate that participants’ sensitivity to variance in a dataset is boosted when presented in a context that implies consistent variance information. Statistical data were couched in stories about electrical conductivity measurements obtained from element samples (low-variability category) or body weight measurements from samples of peoples (high-variability category). We manipulated, between participants, whether the data variance matched or mismatched the story-implied variability. Participants who received data in a matching context showed high sensitivity to variance, while those in the mismatching condition did not. Laypeople use statistical data to make reasonable inferences when those data are provided in a context that makes sense.     

Influences of credibility of testimony and strength of statistical evidence on children’s and adolescents’ reasoning

According to dual-process models that include analytic and heuristic modes of processing, analytic processing is often expected to become more common with development. Consistent with this view, on reasoning problems, adolescents are more likely than children to select alternatives that are backed by statistical evidence. It is shown here that this pattern depends on the quality of the statistical evidence and the quality of the testimonial that is the typical alternative to statistical evidence. In Experiment 1, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 64) were presented with scenarios in which solid statistical evidence was contrasted with casual or expert testimonial evidence. When testimony was casual, children relied on it but adolescents did not; when testimony was expert, both children and adolescents relied on it. In Experiment 2, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 83) were presented with scenarios in which casual testimonial evidence was contrasted with weak or strong statistical evidence. When statistical evidence was weak, children and adolescents relied on both testimonial and statistical evidence; when statistical evidence was strong, most children and adolescents relied on it. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for dual-process accounts of cognitive development.     

Is an attention-based associative account of adjacent and nonadjacent dependency learning valid?

Pacton and Perruchet (2008) reported that participants who were asked to process adjacent elements located within a sequence of digits learned adjacent dependencies but did not learn nonadjacent dependencies and conversely, participants who were asked to process nonadjacent digits learned nonadjacent dependencies but did not learn adjacent dependencies. In the present study, we showed that when participants were simply asked to read aloud the same sequences of digits, a task demand that did not require the intentional processing of specific elements as in standard statistical learning tasks, only adjacent dependencies were learned. The very same pattern was observed when digits were replaced by syllables. These results show that the perfect symmetry found in Pacton and Perruchet was not due to the fact that the processing of digits is less sensitive to their distance than the processing of syllables, tones, or visual shapes used in most statistical learning tasks. Moreover, the present results, completed with a reanalysis of the data collected in Pacton and Perruchet (2008), demonstrate that participants are highly sensitive to violations involving the spacing between paired elements. Overall, these results are consistent with the Pacton and Perruchet's single-process account of adjacent and nonadjacent dependencies, in which the joint attentional processing of the two events is a necessary and sufficient condition for learning the relation between them, irrespective of their distance. However, this account should be completed to encompass the notion that the presence or absence of an intermediate event is an intrinsic component of the representation of an association.     

Learning a Generative Probabilistic Grammar of Experience: A Process‐Level Model of Language Acquisition

We introduce a set of biologically and computationally motivated design choices for modeling the learning of language, or of other types of sequential, hierarchically structured experience and behavior, and describe an implemented system that conforms to these choices and is capable of unsupervised learning from raw natural‐language corpora. Given a stream of linguistic input, our model incrementally learns a grammar that captures its statistical patterns, which can then be used to parse or generate new data. The grammar constructed in this manner takes the form of a directed weighted graph, whose nodes are recursively (hierarchically) defined patterns over the elements of the input stream. We evaluated the model in seventeen experiments, grouped into five studies, which examined, respectively, (a) the generative ability of grammar learned from a corpus of natural language, (b) the characteristics of the learned representation, (c) sequence segmentation and chunking, (d) artificial grammar learning, and (e) certain types of structure dependence. The model's performance largely vindicates our design choices, suggesting that progress in modeling language acquisition can be made on a broad front—ranging from issues of generativity to the replication of human experimental findings—by bringing biological and computational considerations, as well as lessons from prior efforts, to bear on the modeling approach.