Integrating Covariates into Social Relations Models: A Plausible Values Approach for Handling Measurement Error in Perceiver and Target Effects

The Social Relations Model (SRM) is a conceptual and analytical approach to examining dyadic behaviors and interpersonal perceptions within groups. In an SRM, the perceiver effect describes a person's tendency to perceive other group members in a certain way, whereas the target effect measures the tendency to be perceived by others in certain ways. In SRM research, it is often of interest to relate these individual SRM effects to covariates. However, the estimated individual SRM effects might not provide a very reliable measure of the true, unobserved SRM effects, resulting in distorted estimates of associations with other variables. This article introduces a plausible values approach that allows users to correct for measurement error when assessing the association of individual SRM effects with other individual difference variables. In the plausible values approach, the latent, true individual SRM effects are treated as missing values and are imputed from an imputation model by applying Bayesian estimation techniques. In a simulation study, the statistical properties of the plausible values approach are compared with two approaches that have been used in previous research. A data example from educational psychology is presented to illustrate how the plausible values approach can be implemented with the software WinBUGS.     

Reducing the Negative Effect of the Retention Interval on the Composite Face Recognition

Our memories are quite fragile. We sometimes recognize something unseen as something seen before. This error often causes serious problems, such as the misidentification of composite faces in a criminal investigation. In such a scene, people occasionally claim to have seen a face that is actually a composite face consisting of facial parts separately seen before; this error is called the memory conjunction error. Although the likelihood of the memory conjunction error increases over time, previous studies suggest that it could be suppressed by the number of response options, which are expected to affect the criterion for the “Old” response. Our results show that the presence of three response options reduced the memory conjunction error. Additionally, providing information about the existence of composite faces affected the sensitivity for detecting old faces, whereas three response options affected the criterion. This study might contribute to the improvement of procedures for eyewitness testimony.     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

Photic Stimulation of Young Rats

Zajonc, Harrison, and their colleagues have recently conducted a series of studies demonstrating a positive, monotonic relation between frequency of “mere” exposure and liking for stimuli. Other studies have found either the inverted-U relation or a decrease in liking. It was proposed that an emphasis upon mere exposure may be somewhat misleading, and that a concern with degree of stimulus familiarity might be more fruitful. Conflicting forms of the exposure-liking relation seem to be potentially reconcilable if consideration is given to factors that influence the rate at which stimuli become familiar, or capable of being anticipated and represented in memory.

Two experiments using stimuli and procedures taken from Zajonc (23) yielded a positive, monotonic relation between frequency and liking. A third experiment, designed to produce greater attention to the stimuli and thus hasten familiarization, yielded an inverted-U relation. A fourth experiment used simpler verbal stimuli than the first three. This was designed to result in even faster familiarization. As expected, there was a negative relation between liking and exposure frequency.

The “frequency group” of investigators has explained the monotonic exposure effect in terms of the response competition hypothesis. However, the latter is incapable of handling a nonmonotonic relation. A reasonable alternative seems to be the expectancy arousal hypothesis (5): viz., that liking is maximum for stimuli that arouse moderately strong expectancies of either a “molar” or a “molecular” nature. Previous research (5, 6, 7, 8) has supported this hypothesis, although some of the studies are also amenable to the response competition hypothesis. A further experiment was designed to distinguish between predictions from the response competition and the expectancy arousal hypotheses. The results supported the latter.     

Functions of Clinical Psychological Service in California Juvenile and Adult Courts

Subjects provided free responses to six concepts representing varying degrees of involvement. Responses were obtained from each subject under normal and negative affect conditions. Group data were used. Under negative affect conditions, significant correlations were found between concept involvement and type/token ratio (TTR), tokens per type, response variation index (RVI), and total types. Correlations were in the direction of increased redundancy as involvement decreased and, conversely, increased response variation as involvement increased. These relationships held only under negative affect conditions. Implications were discussed for the problems of communication under negative affect conditions and the assessment of individuals’ internal states from verbal behavior. Finally, a sociolinguistic view of the “language community” concept was offered.     

Error Theory and the Concept of Morality

Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires one to act against one's self‐interest while insisting on the categorical, inescapable, or overriding status of moral considerations: they argue that morality requires magic, then (rightly) claim that there is no such thing as magic. An alternate eudaimonist conception of morality is introduced which itself has an older provenance than the social point of view, dating to the ancient Greeks. Eudaimonism answers to the normative requirements of morality, yet does not require magic. Thus, the initial motivation for error theory is removed.     

Methods for second order meta-analysis and illustrative applications

This paper presents methods for second order meta-analysis along with several illustrative applications. A second order meta-analysis is a meta-analysis of a number of statistically independent and methodologically comparable first order meta-analyses examining ostensibly the same relationship in different contexts. First order meta-analysis greatly reduces sampling error variance but does not eliminate it. The residual sampling error is called second order sampling error. The purpose of a second order meta-analysis is to estimate the proportion of the variance in mean meta-analytic effect sizes across multiple first order meta-analyses attributable to second order sampling error and to use this information to improve accuracy of estimation for each first order meta-analytic estimate. We present equations and methods based on the random effects model for second order meta-analysis for three situations and three empirical applications of second order meta-analysis to illustrate the potential value of these methods to the pursuit of cumulative knowledge.     

Decoding facial blends of emotion: Visual field,attentional and hemispheric biases

Most clinical research assumes that modulation of facial expressions is lateralized predominantly across the right-left hemiface. However, social psychological research suggests that facial expressions are organized predominantly across the upper-lower face. Because humans learn to cognitively control facial expression for social purposes, the lower face may display a false emotion, typically a smile, to enable approach behavior. In contrast, the upper face may leak a person’s true feeling state by producing a brief facial blend of emotion, i.e. a different emotion on the upper versus lower face. Previous studies from our laboratory have shown that upper facial emotions are processed preferentially by the right hemisphere under conditions of directed attention if facial blends of emotion are presented tachistoscopically to the mid left and right visual fields. This paper explores how facial blends are processed within the four visual quadrants. The results, combined with our previous research, demonstrate that lower more so than upper facial emotions are perceived best when presented to the viewer’s left and right visual fields just above the horizontal axis. Upper facial emotions are perceived best when presented to the viewer’s left visual field just above the horizontal axis under conditions of directed attention. Thus, by gazing at a person’s left ear, which also avoids the social stigma of eye-to-eye contact, one’s ability to decode facial expressions should be enhanced.