The Structure of Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility

Max Weber's distinction in Politics as a Vocation between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is best understood as a distinction between mutually exclusive ethical worldviews. Interpretations that correlate the two ethics with Weber's distinction between value-rational social action and instrumental-rational social action are misleading since Weber assumes that both types of rational social action are present in both ethics. The ethic of conviction recognizes a given hierarchy of values as the context for moral endeavor. The ethic of responsibility acknowledges value obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of values and the inevitability of value conflict as the context for moral endeavor. When interpreted in the context of his multilayered understanding of value conflict, Weber's ethic of responsibility emerges as a coherent ethical perspective.     

Morally Relevant Features

This article summarizes the account of morality presented in Morality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford, 1998), with emphasis on that aspect of morality that deals with justifying violations of the moral rules. Such justification requires a two-step procedure; the first is describing the situation using only morally relevant features. I list these features, noting how diverse they are, and describe their characteristics. The second step is estimating the consequences of publicly allowing a violation with the same morally relevant features, that is, allowing a violation when everyone knows that it is allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances, and comparing this to the estimated consequences of not publicly allowing that kind of violation. I then explain why fully informed, impartial rational persons can sometimes disagree about whether a violation should be publicly allowed and note that such weakly justified violations are the controversial cases.     

Molecular geneticists and moral responsibility: “maybe if we were working on the atom bomb I would have a different argument”

Senior molecular geneticists were interviewed about their perceptions of the ethical and social implications of genetic knowledge. Inductive analysis of these interviews identified a number of strategies through which the scientists negotiated their moral responsibilities as they participated in generating knowledge that presents difficult ethical questions. These strategies included: further analysis and application of scientific method; clarification of multiple roles; negotiation with the public through public debate, institutional processes of funding, ethics committees and legislation; and personal responsibility.     

HUMANITY IN THE WORLD OF LIFE

Abstract. The position and role of humanity in the world of life is examined in the light of the ontological structure of life itself. This problem is approached by considering the possible units of life representing various modes of life phenomena. I argue that the only meaningful unit of life without interposing some special external conditions is "global life" framed in a star-planet system. Any other possible unit of life exhibited by various kinds of individuals is conditional in the sense that it would leave out an essential part as "co-life." The relationship between human being and the global life should be understood in this general scheme of individual and global life. It is emphasized, however, that human being occupies a unique position in global life in the sense that humanity can promote either a cancerous situation or a healthy higher-order enhancement of the global life.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

Are University Professors Qualified to Teach Ethics?

In the light of recent talk in Canadian business schools about the importance of teaching courses in business ethics, the authors ask whether business professors have the qualifications required to teach business ethics. They point to various ethical dilemmas that arise in a collegial setting and argue that academics who teach business ethics have to first understand the complex ethical situations in which they find themselves if business ethics is to be taught in a meaningful way.     

The TRAMS: The Team-Referent Attributions Measure in Sport

ObjectivesTo provide initial evidence for the construct, concurrent, and predictive validity of the Team-Referent Attributions Measure in Sport (the TRAMS).DesignCross-sectional in Studies 1 and 2, and multiple time points in Study 3.MethodStudy 1 required participants (N = 500) to complete the TRAMS for their “least successful” and “most successful” performances in the preceding three months. In Study 2, after performance, participants (N = 515) completed the TRAMS and the Causal Dimension Scale for Teams (CDS-T; Greenlees et al., 2005). Study 3 required participants (N = 165) to complete a measure of pre-competition collective-efficacy prior to performance (Day 1, Time 1), the TRAMS following performance (Day 1, Time 2), and a measure of subsequent collective-efficacy prior to subsequent performance (Day 7–9, Time 3).ResultsStudy 1 supported the factor structure of the TRAMS across least successful and most successful conditions. Study 2 provided further support for the factor structure of the TRAMS, together with evidence of concurrent validity with subscales of the CDS-T. Study 3 revealed, following team defeat, interactions between controllability and generalisability dimensions: Controllability had a significant effect upon subsequent collective-efficacy when causes of team defeat were also perceived to generalise across situations and/or across teams. Following team victory, stable attributions were positively associated with subsequent collective-efficacy.ConclusionsThis article provides initial evidence for the validity of the TRAMS and demonstrates for team-referent attributions the theoretical advantages of examining a broader conceptualisation of generalisability attributions and interactive effects of attributions.     

RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND EMPIRICAL ETHICS

In recent decades, cognitive and behavioral scientists have learned a great deal about how people think and behave. On the most general level, there is a basic consensus that many judgments, including ethical judgments, are made by intuitive, even unconscious, impulses. This basic insight has opened the door to a wide variety of more particular studies that investigate how judgments are influenced by group identity, self‐conception, emotions, perceptions of risk, and many other factors. When these forms of research engage ethical issues, they are sometimes called empirical ethics. This essay argues that the field of religious ethics would benefit from a more robust engagement with empirical ethics than it has thus far undertaken. In doing so, it offers a brief account of how issues of moral psychology and moral anthropology have been treated in religious ethics, and it highlights ways that the scientific findings challenge some prevailing norms in religious ethics. It ends by suggesting avenues by which religious ethics research could productively engage empirical ethics.     

评中国思想家对道德与法律之关系的探索

儒家礼法合一论的真义是对“善法”的追求 ,对“恶法”的否定。因为善法体现了儒家的道德精神 ,反映了一种人道主义的价值取向 ,而恶法则是反人道的。墨家强调“法不仁不可以为法” ,其真实的意思是不道德的法律不是真正的法律 ,与儒家的礼法合一论有相似之处。法家主张“法虽不善犹善于无法” ,从而否定了法律的道德基础和价值根据。今天 ,我们在立法中贯彻道德的法律化取向需要谨慎从事 :一是注意把那些体现时代精神、合乎社会潮流的道德予以法律化 ,不能把落伍于时代的道德法律化 ;二是切忌把过高的道德义务转化为法律义务。必须认识到 ,应该法律化的道德只是“底线道德” ,而高层次的道德是不宜法律化的 ,否则就是强人所难。