On the Emotional Character of Trust

Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude.     

Human risky choice under temporal constraints: tests of an energy-budget model

Risk-sensitive foraging models predict that choice between fixed and variable food delays should be influenced by an organism's energy budget. To investigate whether the predictions of these models could be extended to choice in humans, risk sensitivity in 4 adults was investigated under laboratory conditions designed to model positive and negative energy budgets. Subjects chose between fixed and variable trial durations with the same mean value. An energy requirement was modeled by requiring that five trials be completed within a limited time period for points delivered at the end of the period (block of trials) to be exchanged later for money. Manipulating the duration of this time period generated positive and negative earnings budgets (or, alternatively, "time budgets"). Choices were consistent with the predictions of energy-budget models: The fixed-delay option was strongly preferred under positive earnings-budget conditions and the variable-delay option was strongly preferred under negative earnings-budget conditions. Within-block (or trial-by-trial) choices were also frequently consistent with the predictions of a dynamic optimization model, indicating that choice was simultaneously sensitive to the temporal requirements, delays associated with fixed and variable choices on the upcoming trial, cumulative delays within the block of trials, and trial position within a block.     

Concurrent schedules: reinforcer magnitude effects

Five pigeons were trained on pairs of concurrent variable-interval schedules in a switching-key procedure. The arranged overall rate of reinforcement was constant in all conditions, and the reinforcer-magnitude ratios obtained from the two alternatives were varied over five levels. Each condition remained in effect for 65 sessions and the last 50 sessions of data from each condition were analyzed. At a molar level of analysis, preference was described well by a version of the generalized matching law, consistent with previous reports. More local analyses showed that recently obtained reinforcers had small measurable effects on current preference, with the most recently obtained reinforcer having a substantially larger effect. Larger reinforcers resulted in larger and longer preference pulses, and a small preference was maintained for the larger-magnitude alternative even after long inter-reinforcer intervals. These results are consistent with the notion that the variables controlling choice have both short- and long-term effects. Moreover, they suggest that control by reinforcer magnitude is exerted in a manner similar to control by reinforcer frequency. Lower sensitivities when reinforcer magnitude is varied are likely to be due to equal frequencies of different sized preference pulses, whereas higher sensitivities when reinforcer rates are varied might result from changes in the frequencies of different sized preference pulses.     

Determinants of pigeons' choices in token-based self-control procedures

Four pigeons were exposed to a token-based self-control procedure with stimulus lights serving as token reinforcers. Smaller-reinforcer choices produced one token immediately; larger-reinforcer choices produced three tokens following a delay. Each token could be exchanged for 2-s access to food during a signaled exchange period each trial. The main variables of interest were the exchange delays (delays from the choice to the exchange stimulus) and the food delays (also timed from the choice), which were varied separately and together across blocks of sessions. When exchange delays and food delays were shorter following smaller-reinforcer choices, strong preference for the smaller reinforcer was observed. When exchange delays and food delays were equal for both options, strong preference for the larger reinforcer was observed. When food delays were equal for both options but exchange delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the larger reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays were equal. When exchange delays were equal for both options but food delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the smaller reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays favored smaller-reinforcer choices. On the whole, the results were consistent with prior research on token-based self-control procedures in showing that choices are governed by reinforcer immediacy when exchange and food delays are unequal and by reinforcer amount when exchange and food delays are equal. Further, by decoupling the exchange delays from food delays, the results tentatively support a role for the exchange stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer.     

Preference reversals with food and water reinforcers in rats

Rats were given a choice between a smaller, immediately available reward and a larger reward available after a delay. In one phase, the reward was food and in another phase, the reward was water. Constant delays were added between the choice presentation and the delivery of the reward alternatives. As the time between choice and reward delivery increased from 0 to 25 s, all rats (except one in the water phase) reversed their preference from the smaller, sooner alternative to the larger, later alternative. These findings extend the generality of the preference-reversal animal model to qualitatively different reinforcers. Furthermore, the presence of both impulsive and self-control choices within the same animal is consistent with the view that self-control may be understood as choice behavior, and that species differences in self-control may be differences in degree, not kind.     

Delay discounting by pathological gamblers

Discounting of delayed rewards by pathological gamblers was compared to discounting of delayed rewards by matched control nongambling participants. All participants completed a hypothetical choice task in which they made repeated choices between dollars 1,000 available after a delay and an equal or lesser amount of money available immediately. The delay to the large amount of money was varied from 1 week to 10 years across conditions. Indifference points between immediate money and delayed money were identified at each delay condition by varying the amount of immediate money across choice trials. For the majority of participants, indifference points decreased monotonically across delays. Overall, gamblers discounted the delayed rewards more steeply than did control participants.     

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00–9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice—a hallmark of moral agency—is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.     

A dual process item response theory model for polytomous multidimensional forced-choice items

The use of multidimensional forced-choice (MFC) items to assess non-cognitive traits such as personality, interests and values in psychological tests has a long history, because MFC items show strengths in preventing response bias. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in developing item response theory (IRT) models for MFC items. However, nearly all of the existing IRT models have been developed for MFC items with binary scores. Real tests use MFC items with more than two categories; such items are more informative than their binary counterparts. This study developed a new IRT model for polytomous MFC items based on the cognitive model of choice, which describes the cognitive processes underlying humans' preferential choice behaviours. The new model is unique in its ability to account for the ipsative nature of polytomous MFC items, to assess individual psychological differentiation in interests, values and emotions, and to compare the differentiation levels of latent traits between individuals. Simulation studies were conducted to examine the parameter recovery of the new model with existing computer programs. The results showed that both statement parameters and person parameters were well recovered when the sample size was sufficient. The more complete the linking of the statements was, the more accurate the parameter estimation was. This paper provides an empirical example of a career interest test using four-category MFC items. Although some aspects of the model (e.g., the nature of the person parameters) require additional validation, our approach appears promising.     

Reinforcing effects of caffeine in coffee and capsules.

In a residential research ward the reinforcing and subjective effects of caffeine were studied under double-blind conditions in volunteer subjects with histories of heavy coffee drinking. In Experiment 1, 6 subjects had 13 opportunities each day to self-administer either a caffeine (100 mg) or a placebo capsule for periods of 14 to 61 days. All subjects developed a clear preference for caffeine, with intake of caffeine becoming relatively stable after preference had been attained. Preference for caffeine was demonstrated whether or not preference testing was preceded by a period of 10 to 37 days of caffeine abstinence, suggesting that a recent history of heavy caffeine intake (tolerance/dependence) was not a necessary condition for caffeine to function as a reinforcer. In Experiment 2, 6 subjects had 10 opportunities each day to self-administer a cup of coffee or (on different days) a capsule, dependent upon completing a work requirement that progressively increased and then decreased over days. Each day, one of four conditions was studied: caffeinated coffee (100 mg/cup), decaffeinated coffee, caffeine capsules (100 mg/capsule), or placebo capsules. Caffeinated coffee maintained the most self-administration, significantly higher than decaffeinated coffee and placebo capsules but not different from caffeine capsules. Both decaffeinated coffee and caffeine capsules were significantly higher than placebo capsules but not different from each other. In both experiments, subject ratings of "linking" of coffee or capsules covaried with the self-administration measures. These experiments provide the clearest demonstrations to date of the reinforcing effects of caffeine in capsules and in coffee.     

Responding on concurrent-chains schedules in open and closed economies.

Pigeons' key pecks were reinforced according to concurrent-chains schedules of reinforcement. The programmed average time from the onset of the initial links to a terminal link entry was held constant across conditions while the value of variable-interval schedules in the terminal links was varied. Performance was assessed under two economic conditions: (a) an open economy in which session duration was limited to 1 hr and subjects were maintained at 80% of their free-feeding body weights with postsession food when necessary; and (b) a closed economy in which sessions were 23.5 hr long and no deprivation regimen was in effect. In all cases, the relative rate of responding in the initial links matched the reduction in overall delay to primary reinforcement correlated with entry into one terminal link relative to the reduction in delay correlated with entry into the other terminal link. Although the sum of responses made in the initial links and terminal links was found to increase, then decrease, as the rate of food presentation decreased in the closed economy, there was no consistent effect of overall rate of food presentation on total responding in the open economy. The choice data suggest that relative delay reduction predicts choice accurately, regardless of economic context.