Object imagery and object identification: object imagers are better at identifying spatially-filtered visual objects

Object imagery refers to the ability to construct pictorial images of objects. Individuals with high object imagery (high-OI) produce more vivid mental images than individuals with low object imagery (low-OI), and they encode and process both mental images and visual stimuli in a more global and holistic way. In the present study, we investigated whether and how level of object imagery may affect the way in which individuals identify visual objects. High-OI and low-OI participants were asked to perform a visual identification task with spatially-filtered pictures of real objects. Each picture was presented at nine levels of filtering, starting from the most blurred (level 1: only low spatial frequencies—global configuration) and gradually adding high spatial frequencies up to the complete version (level 9: global configuration plus local and internal details). Our data showed that high-OI participants identified stimuli at a lower level of filtering than participants with low-OI, indicating that they were better able than low-OI participants to identify visual objects at lower spatial frequencies. Implications of the results and future developments are discussed.     

View-invariant object category learning, recognition, and search: how spatial and object attention are coordinated using surface-based attentional shrouds

How does the brain learn to recognize an object from multiple viewpoints while scanning a scene with eye movements? How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects together? How are attention and eye movements intelligently coordinated to facilitate object learning? A neural model provides a unified mechanistic explanation of how spatial and object attention work together to search a scene and learn what is in it. The ARTSCAN model predicts how an object's surface representation generates a form-fitting distribution of spatial attention, or "attentional shroud". All surface representations dynamically compete for spatial attention to form a shroud. The winning shroud persists during active scanning of the object. The shroud maintains sustained activity of an emerging view-invariant category representation while multiple view-specific category representations are learned and are linked through associative learning to the view-invariant object category. The shroud also helps to restrict scanning eye movements to salient features on the attended object. Object attention plays a role in controlling and stabilizing the learning of view-specific object categories. Spatial attention hereby coordinates the deployment of object attention during object category learning. Shroud collapse releases a reset signal that inhibits the active view-invariant category in the What cortical processing stream. Then a new shroud, corresponding to a different object, forms in the Where cortical processing stream, and search using attention shifts and eye movements continues to learn new objects throughout a scene. The model mechanistically clarifies basic properties of attention shifts (engage, move, disengage) and inhibition of return. It simulates human reaction time data about object-based spatial attention shifts, and learns with 98.1% accuracy and a compression of 430 on a letter database whose letters vary in size, position, and orientation. The model provides a powerful framework for unifying many data about spatial and object attention, and their interactions during perception, cognition, and action.     

Problems inhibiting attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli in patients with frontotemporal dementia

We studied the role of the frontal lobes in orienting spatial attention and inhibiting attentional capture by goal-irrelevant stimuli, using a spatial cueing method in patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Two blocks of trials were presented, one with non-predictive cues and the other with counter-predictive cues. FTD patients showed a global orienting deficit, with a greater difference between invalid and valid trials than age-matched controls. However, they were able to use the (counter-) predictiveness of the cue to reduce the invalid/valid difference when targets occurred most often in the location opposite the cue. Thus, endogenous control of attention in our FTD patients was sufficient to reorient attention on the basis of the probability of events, but not to resist the capture of attention by goal-irrelevant stimuli. These results confirm the role of frontal lobes in the inhibition of attentional capture.     

Animals' use of landmarks and metric information to reorient: effects of the size of the experimental space

Disoriented children could use geometric information in combination with landmark information to reorient themselves in large but not in small experimental spaces. We tested fish in the same task and found that they were able to conjoin geometric and non-geometric (landmark) information to reorient themselves in both the large and the small space used. Moreover, fish proved able to reorient immediately when dislocated from a large to a small experimental space and vice versa, suggesting that they encoded the relative rather than the absolute metrics of the environment. However, fish tended to make relatively more errors based on geometric information when transfer occurred from a small to a large space, and to make relatively more errors based on landmark information when transfer occurred from a large to a small space. The hypothesis is discussed that organisms are prepared to use only distant featural information as landmarks.     

Mathematical skill in individuals with Williams syndrome: evidence from a standardized mathematics battery

Williams syndrome (WS) is a developmental disorder associated with relatively spared verbal skills and severe visuospatial deficits. It has also been reported that individuals with WS are impaired at mathematics. We examined mathematical skills in persons with WS using the second edition of the Test of Early Mathematical Ability (TEMA-2), which measures a wide range of skills. We administered the TEMA-2 to 14 individuals with WS and 14 children matched individually for mental-age on the matrices subtest of the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test. There were no differences between groups on the overall scores on the TEMA-2. However, an item-by-item analysis revealed group differences. Participants with WS performed more poorly than controls when reporting which of two numbers was closest to a target number, a task thought to utilize a mental number line subserved by the parietal lobe, consistent with previous evidence showing parietal abnormalities in people with WS. In contrast, people with WS performed better than the control group at reading numbers, suggesting that verbal math skills may be comparatively strong in WS. These findings add to evidence that components of mathematical knowledge may be differentially damaged in developmental disorders.     

Suitable stimuli to obtain (no) gender differences in the speed of cognitive processes involved in mental rotation

Gender differences in speed of perceptual comparison, of picture-plane mental rotation, and in switching costs between trials that do and do not require mental rotation, were investigated as a function of stimulus material with a total sample size of N=360. Alphanumeric characters, PMA symbols, animal drawings, polygons and 3D cube figures were used with an otherwise completely equivalent experimental design in which age and speed-based IQ were comparable across male and female groups. Small gender-related differences in speed of perceptual comparison were found with the magnitude as well as the direction depending upon the stimulus material. Polygons were the only material that produced substantial and reliable gender differences in mental rotation speed, and additionally revealed gender differences in switching costs. Thus, whereas gender differences in paper-pencil mental rotation tests constitute an empirical reality, the generalization that men outperform women in the speed of mental rotation was not supported in the present experiment.     

Being In Front Is Good—But Where Is In Front? Preferences for Spatial Referencing Affect Evaluation

Speakers of English frequently associate location in space with valence, as in moving up and down the “social ladder.” If such an association also holds for the sagittal axis, an object “in front of” another object would be evaluated more positively than the one “behind.” Yet how people conceptualize relative locations depends on which frame of reference (FoR) they adopt—and hence on cross-linguistically diverging preferences. What is conceptualized as “in front” in one variant of the relative FoR (e.g., translation) is “behind” under another variant (reflection), and vice versa. Do such diverging conceptualizations of an object's location also lead to diverging evaluations? In two studies employing an implicit association test, we demonstrate, first, that speakers of German, Chinese, and Japanese indeed evaluate the object “in front of” another object more positively than the one “behind.” Second, and crucially, the reversal of which object is conceptualized as “in front” involves a corresponding reversal of valence, suggesting an impact of linguistically imparted FoR preferences on evaluative processes.