不同词长中文句子阅读知觉广度的年老化:眼动证据

采用移动窗口范式分别探测单字词句、双字词句和混合句子阅读知觉广度的年老化模式。单字词句是完全由单字词组成的句子,双字词句是完全由双字词组成的句子,混合句的所有词由1~4个汉字组成,这些词汇的平均词长为1.5个字。结果发现：（1）老年读者在各种词长句子上的阅读知觉广度范围均是从注视字至其右侧2个汉字;（2）青年读者在各种词长句子上的阅读知觉广度为注视点左侧1个汉字到右侧3个汉字空间。由此可见,年老化促使中文读者的阅读知觉广度变小,变得更加不对称;且句子构成词汇的词长并不调节中文阅读知觉广度的年老化。     

A Life Span Developmental Perspective on Psychosocial Development in Midlife

Research in life span development suggests that middle adulthood is a time of stability, discovery, and psychosocial growth. This review applies the life span developmental perspective to advance counselors’ understanding of psychosocial development during middle adulthood, specifically, midlife adults’ sense of self, perceptions of aging, developmental tasks, and contexts.     

Special issue on problem-solving,creativity and spatial reasoning

Problem-solving, creativity and spatial reasoning are high level abilities of cognitive systems with high potential for synergies. However, they have been treated separately by different fields. This special issue presents research work on these topics, aiming to observe their interrelations in order to create theoretical approaches, methodologies and computational tools to advance work on creativity and spatial problem-solving in cognitive systems.     

心智游移、工作记忆对初中生阅读理解的影响

心智游移（mind wandering,MW）是一种特殊的注意分散状态,是个体内部自发的一种非自主内源性意识体验。选取101名初一学生被试,采用心智游移频率问卷和SART测验研究初中生的心智游移特质和状态,并分别考察两种角度中的心智游移、工作记忆对初中生阅读理解的影响,结果表明：（1）初中生的心智游移相对较低;（2）心智游移影响初中生的散文阅读;（3）工作记忆影响初中生的散文阅读,且心智游移在其中起调节作用。     

Effects of irrelevant object structure on early attention deployment

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have suggested that Gestalt principles or grouping factors in a visual scene modulate attention deployment in early visual processing. The present study examined the effects of an extrinsic grouping factor, region commonality, on early ERP spatial attention. Effects of sex were also explored, since the processing of task-irrelvant objects may differ between the sexes. Twenty-four participants were required to discriminate one side of rapidly-presented bilateral letters, and attention effects were indexed by hemispheric lateralization accroding to attended visual fields. In results, an early P1 attention effect (70–110 ms) increased when the letters were surrounded by an object, compared to the control stimulus without a complete object, and this result was more prominent in women than in men. The present study demonstrates that visual object and sex differences play a novel role at very early cortical stages of processing in attention deployment to a task-irrelevant visual structure.     

A unity of the self or a multiplicity of locations? How the graphesthesia task sheds light on the role of spatial perspectives in bodily self-consciousness

Integrating multisensory stimuli from a self-centred perspective is crucial for the unity of the self. On the other hand, understanding external space and communicating spatial knowledge with others necessitate the adoption of decentred perspectives. How do we juggle these two requirements? In this article, we review those studies that have used the graphesthesia task in order to investigate the perspectives that people adopt when interpreting ambiguous tactile symbols (e.g., b, d, p, and q). With such ambiguous symbols, self-centred and decentred perspectives conflict with one another. The results reviewed here reveal that the perspectives adopted vary significantly with spatial, personal, and interpersonal factors. Such findings suggest that the self can adopt a multiplicity of spatial locations. However, the unity of the self can partly be explained by the predominance of a head-centred perspective. On the other hand, perspective-taking abilities contribute to the distinction between self and others, reinforcing self-consciousness.     

Reconstructing maps from text

Previous research has demonstrated that Distributional Semantic Models (DSMs) are capable of reconstructing maps from news corpora (Louwerse & Zwaan, 2009) and novels (Louwerse & Benesh, 2012). The capacity for reproducing maps is surprising since DSMs notoriously lack perceptual grounding. In this paper we investigate the statistical sources required in language to infer maps, and the resulting constraints placed on mechanisms of semantic representation. Study 1 brings word co-occurrence under experimental control to demonstrate that standard DSMs cannot reproduce maps when word co-occurrence is uniform. Specifically, standard DSMs require that direct co-occurrences between city names in a corpus mirror the proximity between the city locations in the map in order to successfully reconstruct the spatial map. Study 2 presents an instance-based DSM that is capable of reconstructing maps independent of the frequency of co-occurrence of city names.     

A purely power-space association without spatial and strategic biases

Previous studies have shown that powerful and powerless concepts are metaphorically associated with top and bottom spaces respectively. However, this association might be contaminated by spatial and strategic biases due to the involvement of spatialized stimuli or responses. It is unknown whether power by itself can automatically activate spatial representations. To eliminate spatial and strategic biases, Experiment 1 separately presented power and spatial stimuli at the center of the screen, and participants had to classify power words and HIGH/LOW labels (Experiment 1a) or indicate up/down arrows (Experiment 1b) using a single key and follow different response rules that were combined with a Go/no-go task. Experiment 2 replicated the non-spatialized design but used an implicit power judgment task. Based upon the non-spatialized method, the results provide the first evidence that a power-space association effect still exists when eliminating spatial and strategic biases, revealing the nonconscious spatial nature of power.     

Thinking outside of the box: Transfer of shape-based reorientation across the boundary of an arena

The way in which human and non-human animals represent the shape of their environments remains a contentious issue. According to local theories of shape learning, organisms encode the local geometric features of the environment that signal a goal location. In contrast, global theories of shape learning suggest that organisms encode the overall shape of the environment. There is, however, a surprising lack of evidence to support this latter claim, despite the fact that common behaviours seem to require encoding of the global-shape of an environment. We tested one such behaviour in 5 experiments, in which human participants were trained to navigate to a hidden goal on one side of a virtual arena (e.g. the inside) before being required to find the same point on the alternative side (e.g. the outside). Participants navigated to the appropriate goal location, both when inside and outside the virtual arena, but only when the shape of the arena remained the same between training and test (Experiments 1a and 1b). When the arena shape was transformed between these stages, participants were lost (Experiments 2a and 2b). When training and testing was conducted on the outside of two different-shaped arenas that shared local geometric cues participants once again explored the appropriate goal location (Experiment 3). These results provide core evidence that humans encode a global representation of the overall shape of the environments in, or around, which they navigate.     

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception,spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.