Is ‘object-centred neglect’ a homogeneous entity?

The nature of object-centred (allocentric) neglect and the possibility of dissociating it from egocentric (subject-centred) forms of neglect are controversial. Originally, allocentric neglect was described by  and  in patients who reproduced all the elements of a multi-object scene, but left unfinished the left side of one or more of them. More recently, however, Karnath, Mandler, and Clavagnier (2011) have claimed that the severity of allocentric neglect worsens when a complex ‘object’ shifts from an ipsilesional to a contralesional egocentric position. On the basis of these and of other clinical data, showing that allocentric and egocentric neglect are strongly associated, they have questioned the possibility of dissociating these two forms of neglect, suggesting that egocentric and allocentric neglect constitute different manifestations of the same disturbed system. Since these statements were inconsistent with the clinical findings which had prompted the construct of object-centred neglect, we checked in a group of right brain-damaged patients, who had copied the original multi-object scene, if the degree of neglect for the left side of figures varied as a function of their position on the horizontal axis. Furthermore, we reviewed all papers where copies of other multi-object scenes had been reported. Results of both studies failed to confirm the assumption of a relationship between spatial location of the stimulus and severity of object-centred neglect. This discrepancy between our data and those obtained by Karnath et al. (2011) could be due to the characteristics of stimuli and of procedures used to evaluate ‘object-centred’ neglect. If the stimulus is complex and the task requires its thorough exploration, the spatial location of the stimulus will influence the severity of ‘object-centred neglect’. If, on the contrary, the stimulus is simple and can be identified with few eye fixations, the spatial location of the stimulus should not influence the severity of ‘object-centred neglect’. In any case, our data confirm the possibility of dissociating allocentric from egocentric neglect.     

Visual processing speed in old age

Mental speed is a common concept in theories of cognitive aging, but it is difficult to get measures of the speed of a particular psychological process that are not confounded by the speed of other processes. We used Bundesen’s (1990) Theory of Visual Attention (TVA) to obtain specific estimates of processing speed in the visual system controlled for the influence of response latency and individual variations of the perception threshold. A total of 33 non‐demented old people (69–87 years) were tested for the ability to recognize briefly presented letters. Performance was analyzed by the TVA model. Visual processing speed decreased approximately linearly with age and was on average halved from 70 to 85 years. Less dramatic aging effects were found for the perception threshold and the visual apprehension span. In the visual domain, cognitive aging seems to be most clearly related to reductions in processing speed.     

Meaning in life across the life span: Levels and correlates of meaning in life from emerging adulthood to older adulthood

Meaning in life is thought to be important to well-being throughout the human life span. We assessed the structure, levels, and correlates of the presence of meaning in life, and the search for meaning, within four life stage groups: emerging adulthood, young adulthood, middle-age adulthood, and older adulthood. Results from a sample of Internet users (N = 8756) demonstrated the structural invariance of the meaning measure used across life stages. Those at later life stages generally reported a greater presence of meaning in their lives, whereas those at earlier life stages reported higher levels of searching for meaning. Correlations revealed that the presence of meaning has similar relations to well-being across life stages, whereas searching for meaning is more strongly associated with well-being deficits at later life stages.     

Similarity and binding in memory: Bound to be detrimental

The process of binding information from different modalities and sources into an object is ubiquitous in cognition and has been a problem for research and modelling efforts in psychology. This process has been considered by most researchers as necessarily always beneficial to memory. In the present study we provide evidence that binding can be detrimental through the propagation of vulnerabilities to interference. Phonologically similar and dissimilar letters were presented sequentially at different locations on a computer monitor. Participants had to recall either the letters in their order of presentation or the spatial locations at which the letters had appeared. Whether binding was encouraged or not—providing prior knowledge of which dimension to remember—phonological similarity had a detrimental effect on recall of locations. Such a finding poses a challenge to the view that binding is the panacea in enhancing memory capacity.     

Deficits in verbal long-term memory and learning in children with poor phonological short-term memory skills

Possible links between phonological short-term memory and both longer term memory and learning in 8-year-old children were investigated in this study. Performance on a range of tests of long-term memory and learning was compared for a group of 16 children with poor phonological short-term memory skills and a comparison group of children of the same age with matched nonverbal reasoning abilities but memory scores in the average range. The low-phonological-memory group were impaired on longer term memory and learning tasks that taxed memory for arbitrary verbal material such as names and nonwords. However, the two groups performed at comparable levels on tasks requiring the retention of visuo-spatial information and of meaningful material and at carrying out prospective memory tasks in which the children were asked to carry out actions at a future point in time. The results are consistent with the view that poor short-term memory function impairs the longer term retention and ease of learning of novel verbal material.     

Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

Embodied representation of the body contains veridical spatial information

In two experiments, the extent to which mental body representations contain spatial information was examined. Participants were asked to compare distances between various body parts. Similar to what happens when people compare distances on a real visual stimulus, they were faster as the distance differences between body parts became larger (Experiment 1), and this effect could not (only) be explained by the crossing of major bodily categories (umbilicus to knee vs. knee to ankle; Experiment 2). In addition, participants also performed simple animate/inanimate verification on a set of nouns. The nouns describing animate items were names of body parts. A spatial priming effect was found: Verification was faster for body part items preceded by body parts in close spatial proximity. This suggests automatic activation of spatial body information. Taken together, results from the distance comparison task and the property verification task showed that mental body representations contain both categorical and more metric spatial information. These findings are further discussed in terms of recent embodied cognition theories.     

The first-perspective alignment effect: The role of environmental complexity and familiarity with surroundings

People often remember relatively novel environments from the first perspective encountered or the first direction of travel. This initial perspective can determine a preferred orientation that facilitates the efficiency of spatial judgements at multiple recalled locations. The present study examined this “first-perspective alignment effect” (FPA effect). In three experiments, university students explored three-path routes through computer-simulated spaces presented on a desktop computer screen. Spatial memory was then tested employing a “judgement of relative direction” task. Contrary to the predictions of a previous account, Experiment 1 found a reliable FPA effect in barren and complex environments. Experiment 2 strongly implicated the importance of complete novelty of the space surrounding the route in producing the effect. Experiment 3 found that, while familiarity with the surrounding space greatly attenuated the FPA effect with immediate testing, the effect reemerged following a 7-day delay to testing. The implications for the encoding and retrieval of spatial reference frames are discussed.     

Boundary extension: Findings and theories

A view of a scene is often remembered as containing information that might have been present just beyond the actual boundaries of that view, and this is referred to as boundary extension. Characteristics of the view (e.g., scene or nonscene; close-up or wide-angle; whether objects are cropped, static, or in motion, emotionally neutral or emotionally charged), display (e.g., aperture shape and size; target duration; retention interval; whether probes of memory involve magnification/minification or change in physical distance), and observer (e.g., allocation of attention; age; planned fixation, gaze direction, and eye movements; monocular or binocular viewing; prior exposure; neurological correlates) that influence boundary extension are reviewed. Proposed mechanisms of boundary extension (perceptual, memory, or motion schema; extension–normalization; attentional selection; errors in source monitoring) are discussed, and possible relationships of boundary extension to other cognitive processes (e.g., representational momentum; remembered distance and remembered size; amodal completion; transsaccadic memory) are briefly addressed.