Social effects on rat spatial choice in an open field task

Pairs of rats foraged in trials either together or separately in an open field apparatus for pellets hidden in discreet locations in a 5 × 5 matrix. Trial duration was either 1 or 4 min. The tendency to choose locations that had earlier been visited by another rat was examined by comparing the choices made in the presence and absence of the other rat. Rats avoided visits to locations that had earlier been visited by the other rat, but only if they had also visited the same location earlier in a short duration trial. This pattern of results is consistent with earlier findings from experiments using the radial arm maze. Furthermore, when rats did visit locations that had earlier been visited by the other rat in a long duration trial, they tended to be locations that had been visited longer ago by the other rat than would be expected. This suggests a forgetting function for social memories. These data provide evidence that the social memory reported in earlier studies using the radial-arm maze can be found in other experimental paradigms and that at least some of its properties are common in the two paradigms.     

Interaction between endogenous and exogenous orienting in crossmodal attention

Using a cue-target paradigm, we investigated the interaction between endogenous and exogenous orienting in cross-modal attention. A peripheral (exogenous) cue was presented after a central (endogenous) cue with a variable time interval. The endogenous and exogenous cues were presented in one sensory modality (auditory in Experiment 1 and visual in Experiment 2) whereas the target was presented in another modality. Both experiments showed a significant endogenous cuing effect (longer reaction times in the invalid condition than in the valid condition). However, exogenous cuing produced a facilitatory effect in both experiments in response to the target when endogenous cuing was valid, but it elicited a facilitatory effect in Experiment 1 and an inhibitory effect in Experiment 2 when endogenous cuing was invalid. These findings indicate that endogenous and exogenous cuing can co-operate in orienting attention to the crossmodal target. Moreover, the interaction between endogenous and exogenous orienting of attention is modulated by the modality between the cue and the target.     

Spatial probability cuing and right hemisphere damage

In this experiment we studied statistical learning, inter-trial priming, and visual attention. We assessed healthy controls and right brain damaged (RBD) patients with and without neglect, on a simple visual discrimination task designed to measure priming effects and probability learning. All participants showed a preserved priming effect for item color. Contrary to healthy controls and RBD participants without neglect, RBD participants with neglect did not show positional priming and both RBD groups learned the underlying spatial probability distribution of target locations to a lesser degree. To see if the latter deficiency could be improved, we tested a patient with long standing chronic spatial neglect on three separate days and observed improved identification times for left sided, high probability, targets. In summary, we found preservation of priming per se in people with spatial neglect. However, this was only clearly demonstrable for color priming and not for positional priming. Associated with this impairment was a difficulty in learning the overall statistical structure of target locations. In a patient with severe persistent neglect we were able to demonstrate that the deficit in statistical learning was not absolute, as this subject improved his identification times for targets appearing in high probability regions of the test display.     

Effects of irrelevant object structure on early attention deployment

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have suggested that Gestalt principles or grouping factors in a visual scene modulate attention deployment in early visual processing. The present study examined the effects of an extrinsic grouping factor, region commonality, on early ERP spatial attention. Effects of sex were also explored, since the processing of task-irrelvant objects may differ between the sexes. Twenty-four participants were required to discriminate one side of rapidly-presented bilateral letters, and attention effects were indexed by hemispheric lateralization accroding to attended visual fields. In results, an early P1 attention effect (70–110 ms) increased when the letters were surrounded by an object, compared to the control stimulus without a complete object, and this result was more prominent in women than in men. The present study demonstrates that visual object and sex differences play a novel role at very early cortical stages of processing in attention deployment to a task-irrelevant visual structure.     

A unity of the self or a multiplicity of locations? How the graphesthesia task sheds light on the role of spatial perspectives in bodily self-consciousness

Integrating multisensory stimuli from a self-centred perspective is crucial for the unity of the self. On the other hand, understanding external space and communicating spatial knowledge with others necessitate the adoption of decentred perspectives. How do we juggle these two requirements? In this article, we review those studies that have used the graphesthesia task in order to investigate the perspectives that people adopt when interpreting ambiguous tactile symbols (e.g., b, d, p, and q). With such ambiguous symbols, self-centred and decentred perspectives conflict with one another. The results reviewed here reveal that the perspectives adopted vary significantly with spatial, personal, and interpersonal factors. Such findings suggest that the self can adopt a multiplicity of spatial locations. However, the unity of the self can partly be explained by the predominance of a head-centred perspective. On the other hand, perspective-taking abilities contribute to the distinction between self and others, reinforcing self-consciousness.     

Reconstructing maps from text

Previous research has demonstrated that Distributional Semantic Models (DSMs) are capable of reconstructing maps from news corpora (Louwerse & Zwaan, 2009) and novels (Louwerse & Benesh, 2012). The capacity for reproducing maps is surprising since DSMs notoriously lack perceptual grounding. In this paper we investigate the statistical sources required in language to infer maps, and the resulting constraints placed on mechanisms of semantic representation. Study 1 brings word co-occurrence under experimental control to demonstrate that standard DSMs cannot reproduce maps when word co-occurrence is uniform. Specifically, standard DSMs require that direct co-occurrences between city names in a corpus mirror the proximity between the city locations in the map in order to successfully reconstruct the spatial map. Study 2 presents an instance-based DSM that is capable of reconstructing maps independent of the frequency of co-occurrence of city names.     

A purely power-space association without spatial and strategic biases

Previous studies have shown that powerful and powerless concepts are metaphorically associated with top and bottom spaces respectively. However, this association might be contaminated by spatial and strategic biases due to the involvement of spatialized stimuli or responses. It is unknown whether power by itself can automatically activate spatial representations. To eliminate spatial and strategic biases, Experiment 1 separately presented power and spatial stimuli at the center of the screen, and participants had to classify power words and HIGH/LOW labels (Experiment 1a) or indicate up/down arrows (Experiment 1b) using a single key and follow different response rules that were combined with a Go/no-go task. Experiment 2 replicated the non-spatialized design but used an implicit power judgment task. Based upon the non-spatialized method, the results provide the first evidence that a power-space association effect still exists when eliminating spatial and strategic biases, revealing the nonconscious spatial nature of power.     

Thinking outside of the box: Transfer of shape-based reorientation across the boundary of an arena

The way in which human and non-human animals represent the shape of their environments remains a contentious issue. According to local theories of shape learning, organisms encode the local geometric features of the environment that signal a goal location. In contrast, global theories of shape learning suggest that organisms encode the overall shape of the environment. There is, however, a surprising lack of evidence to support this latter claim, despite the fact that common behaviours seem to require encoding of the global-shape of an environment. We tested one such behaviour in 5 experiments, in which human participants were trained to navigate to a hidden goal on one side of a virtual arena (e.g. the inside) before being required to find the same point on the alternative side (e.g. the outside). Participants navigated to the appropriate goal location, both when inside and outside the virtual arena, but only when the shape of the arena remained the same between training and test (Experiments 1a and 1b). When the arena shape was transformed between these stages, participants were lost (Experiments 2a and 2b). When training and testing was conducted on the outside of two different-shaped arenas that shared local geometric cues participants once again explored the appropriate goal location (Experiment 3). These results provide core evidence that humans encode a global representation of the overall shape of the environments in, or around, which they navigate.     

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception,spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.     

The spatial specificity of sensory attenuation for self-touch

Self-touch is sensed less intense as touch produced by another person. According to the standard explanation, if predicted and actual sensations match, the intensity of the touch will be reduced. Here, we asked whether sensory attenuation is spatially specific. To this end, participants laid their left hand under a metal arc on which a force sensor was mounted. Pressing the sensor caused one of two motors to rotate a lever that either touched the index or the ring finger. We took care that no cues would reveal in advance which of the motors would move in order to leave participants uninformed about the finger that will be stimulated. Any reduction in felt intensity of the touch could therefore be induced only by the efference copy of the touching movement. We found strong spatial specificity of sensory attenuation of self-touch, selecting between two fingers of the same hand.