When less is more: Line drawings lead to greater boundary extension than do colour photographs

Is boundary extension (false memory beyond the edges of the view) determined solely by the schematic structure of the view or does the quality of the pictorial information impact this error? To examine this, colour photographs or line-drawings of 12 multi-object scenes (Experiment 1: N=64) and 16 single-object scenes (Experiment 2: N=64) were presented for 14 s each. At test, the same pictures were each rated as being the “same”, “closer-up”, or “farther away” (five-point scale). Although the layout, the scope of the view, the distance of the main objects to the edges, the background space and the gist of the scenes were held constant, line drawings yielded greater boundary extension than did their photographic counterparts for multi-object (Experiment 1) and single-object (Experiment 2) scenes. Results are discussed in the context of the multisource model and its implications for the study of scene perception and memory.     

Four models of the functional contribution of mirror systems

In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of ‘luck’ and ‘Frankfurt-style’ objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about ‘compatibilism’ and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.     

Empathy, theory of mind, and individual differences in the appropriation bias among 4- and 5-year-olds

Evidence that young children often claim ownership of their partner’s contributions to an earlier collaborative activity, the appropriation bias, has been attributed to shared intentionality (Cognitive Development (1998) 13, 91–108). The current investigation explored this notion by examining individual differences in the bias among 4- and 5-year-olds as a function of empathy and theory of mind. On two occasions, children joined an adult and two dolls (with each doll being operated by one of the humans) in a picture matching board game before being asked to remember who placed each picture. Children showed a robust appropriation bias despite excellent recognition memory for the studied pictures (Study 1) and particularly in relation to the human sources (Study 2). Whereas higher levels of self-reported empathy were associated with a greater frequency of appropriation errors and fewer correct attributions for pictures placed by the adult and her doll partner, the opposite pattern emerged for theory of mind. Moreover, the positive relations between theory of mind and source monitoring accuracy remained robust after controlling for general ability and inhibitory skills. We consider the implications of these findings for understanding the processes driving the appropriation bias.     

The role of recollection in source memory: an examination of schizophrenia patients and their first-degree relatives

Source recognition memory deficits have repeatedly been observed in people with schizophrenia (SZ), and have also recently been observed in their first-degree relatives. These deficits have been hypothesized to result, at least in part, from impairments in the conscious recollection process. Although other processes are clearly also affected in SZ, it has been proposed that impairments in the conscious recollection process could be a parsimonious explanation for the source memory deficits observed in their relatives. Here, we tested 25 patients with SZ and 34 of their non-affected parents, as well as two groups of matched healthy controls, on a short-term associative memory task that shares the characteristics of standard source recognition tasks but minimizes the need for recollection of stored information from memory. This task was administered in order to determine if deficits can still be observed in these people when involvement of the conscious recollection process is minimized. We observed deficits on our short-term source memory task in people with SZ, but their first-degree relatives did not share this deficit. These results support the idea that multiple memory processes supporting associative/source memory are affected in SZ, whereas the source memory deficits previously observed in relatives of SZ seem specific to tasks that rely on the conscious recollection process.     

False rumors and true belief: Memory processes underlying children’s errant reports of rumored events

Previous research has shown that overhearing an errant rumor—either from an adult or from peers—about an earlier experience can lead children to make detailed false reports. This study investigates the extent to which such accounts are driven by changes in children’s memory representations or merely social demands that encourage the reporting of rumored information. This was accomplished by (a) using a warning manipulation that eliminated social pressures to report an earlier heard rumor and (b) examining the qualitative characteristics of children’s false narratives of a rumored-but-nonexperienced event. Findings indicated that overheard rumors can induce sensory and contextual characteristics in memory that can lead children to develop genuine false beliefs in seeing rumored-but-nonexperienced occurrences. Such constructive tendencies were especially likely among 3- and 4-year-olds (relative to 5- and 6-year-olds) and when rumors were picked up from peers during natural social interactions (relative to when they were planted by an adult).     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Disconfirming Expectations: Incorrect Imprecise (vs. Precise) Estimates Increase Source Trustworthiness and Consumer Loyalty

Estimations that include numerical information are ubiquitous in our daily lives, for example, housing prices, calories, etc. In the present work, we investigate how the type of information used in an estimate, particularly its level of imprecision, influences evaluations of source trustworthiness after the target value of the estimate is revealed. Specifically, building upon prior work suggesting that (a) imprecise estimates are perceived to be less accurate than precise estimates and (b) performing below expectations results in negative source evaluations, we hypothesize that if the estimate is revealed to be incorrect, imprecise estimates (i.e., 400) elicit higher source trustworthiness than precise estimates (i.e., 417), even if the imprecise estimate is objectively more incorrect (i.e., target value: 570). In addition, we find that this effect also influences consumers’ loyalty toward the source of the estimate. Four studies and a single‐paper meta‐analysis offer triangulating evidence for this prediction and its underlying psychological mechanism. Overall, this work contributes to research on estimates, source evaluations, numerical information, and the influence of errors on consumer behavior.     

No deficits in nonverbal memory, metamemory and internal as well as external source memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

A large body of literature suggests that some symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) result from mnemonic dysfunctions. The present study tested various formulations of the memory deficit hypothesis considering important moderators, such as depression and response slowing. Thirty-two OCD patients and 32 healthy controls were presented verbal or nonverbal instructions for actions (e.g. simple gestures). These actions should either be performed or imagined. For recognition, previously presented as well as novel actions were displayed. Decisions had to be made whether an action was previously displayed (verbally vs. nonverbally) or not and whether an action was performed or imagined (internal source memory). Moreover, both judgments required confidence ratings. Groups did not differ in memory accuracy and metamemory for verbally presented material. Patients displayed some impairment for nonverbally presented material and imagined instructions, which, however, could be fully accounted for by response slowing and depressive symptoms. The study challenges the view that primary memory deficits underlie OCD or any of its subtypes. We claim that research should move forward from the mere study of objective impairment to the assessment of cognitive performance in conjunction with personality traits such as inflated responsibility.     

Compatibilism &; desert: critical comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">four views on free will</Emphasis>

In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist’s perspective a critical discussion of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors’ objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be resisted by contending that the agents in it are free and responsible. And I also argue against Vargas by challenging the sense in which his revisionist thesis differs from a position like Fischer’s and mine. I close by reflecting on the nature of desert. All seem to assume it is central to the debate, but what is it?     

Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.