Reality monitoring in anosognosia for hemiplegia

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a lack of awareness about paralysis following stroke. Recent explanations use a ‘forward model’ of movement to suggest that AHP patients fail to register discrepancies between internally- and externally-generated sensory information. We predicted that this failure would impair the ability to recall from memory whether information is internally- or externally-generated (i.e., reality monitor). Two experiments examined this prediction. Experiment 1 demonstrated that AHP patients exhibit a reality monitoring deficit for non-motor information (i.e., perceived vs. imagined drawings), whilst hemiplegic controls without anosognosia (nonAHP) perform like age-matched healthy volunteers (HVs). Experiment 2 explored if this deficit occurs when AHP patients discriminate performed, imagined, or observed movement. Results showed impaired reality monitoring for movements in AHP and nonAHP patients relative to HVs. Findings suggest that reality monitoring processes not directly related to movement, together with a failure to reality monitor movements, contribute to the pathogenesis of AHP.     

论文物的使用价值及其源泉

文物不同于现实物品,也不同于一般物品,文物是在时间的推移和空间的变迁中逐渐形成的。文物具有四种使用价值,即自然使用价值、审美使用价值、增值使用价值和信息使用价值,除自然使用价值之外,其余三种使用价值的发展变化都直接与时空条件有关,而与人的劳动、自然力的作用关系并不明确。因此,时空条件是文物使用价值的重要源泉。     

Fantasy proneness, mental imagery and reality monitoring

Individual differences in fantasy proneness and vividness of mental imagery have been suggested to be related to source memory confusions. To test this hypothesis, two groups scoring either high or low on a measure of fantasy proneness (selected from a group of 231 subjects) were compared on measures of self report vividness of mental imagery, objective imagery ability and reality monitoring performance. The two groups differed significantly on ratings of imagery vividness (p<0.01), but not on the imagery performance tasks, nor on reality monitoring performance. Our results indicate that, although fantasy proneness is associated with experiences of vivid mental imagery, it does not necessarily lead to reality monitoring errors.     

Persistence and accommodation in short‐term priming and other perceptual paradigms: temporal segregation through synaptic depression

Perceptual input changes constantly in an unpredictable fashion, often changing before our somewhat sluggish perceptual systems have adequately processed this input. This can give rise to source confusion—how do we know whether a given perceptual activation is due to the current input, or a previous input that had yet to be completely processed? We propose that activity‐dependent neural accommodation naturally limits this source confusion by suppressing items once they have been identified. We review behavioral paradigms from different literatures that measure the correlates of persistence and accommodation. Of the various accommodative mechanisms, we focus on synaptic depression, deriving a rate‐coded expression that can be used to produce accommodating dynamics in any neural network with real valued activation. We implement this expression in a hierarchical model of perception termed, “a neural mechanism for responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence” (nROUSE). This model can be viewed as a more detailed version of the more abstract ROUSE model of Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, and Ruys (2001), which produces accommodated levels of feature evidence through an optimal calculation. We apply nROUSE to three short‐term priming experiments that manipulated prime duration.     

The production of false recognition and the associated state of consciousness following encoding in a naturalistic context in aging

Using virtual reality, we implemented a naturalistic variant of the DRM paradigm in young and older adults to evaluate false recall and false recognition. We distinguished false recognition related to the highest semantic association (the critical lures), semantic similarity (i.e. items that belong to the same semantic category), and perceptual similarity (i.e. items that are similar, but not identical in terms of shape or color). The data revealed that younger adults recalled and recognized more correct elements than older adults did while the older adults intruded more critical items than younger adults. Both age groups produced false recognition related to the critical items, followed by perceptually and then semantically related items. False recognitions were highly recollective as they were mainly associated with a sense of remembering, even more so in older adults than in young adults. The decline of executive functions and working memory predicted age-related increases in false memories.     

Validation d’une échelle d’auto-efficacité émotionnelle à transmettre du feedback en contexte de feedback positif et de feedback correctif

Emotional self-efficacy (ESE) is a key construct to understand individual in emotionally charged situations, such as providing performance feedback. However, the existing scale opts for a general vision of the construct. This study therefore aims to validate a specific ESE scale to give feedback in contexts of positive (ESEF+) and corrective (ESEF−) feedback. The data (n = 311) were collected by online questionnaire from a convenience sample. The results of confirmatory factor analyzes show that the two constructs do not have the same structure. For the ESEF−, a seven-factor structure is corroborated, that is, the ESE to perceive, understand and manage one's emotions and those of others, as well as the ESE to use emotions. For the ESEF+, this same structure could not be confirmed. The implications are discussed.     

Distinctiveness models of memory and absolute identification: Evidence for local,not global,effects

Many models of memory assume that the probability of remembering an item is related to how distinctive that item is relative to all the other items in the set, with no distinction made between the contributions of near or far items. These “global” distinctiveness models do well in accounting for the ubiquitous serial position effects observed in numerous memory paradigms, including absolute identification. Here, we provide experimental confirmation of Bower's (1971) suggestion that, contrary to a fundamental prediction of global distinctiveness models, midseries items can be more discriminable than their immediate neighbours. We show that such data are consistent with a revised distinctiveness account in which the factor affecting discrimination performance is primarily the distinctiveness of an item relative to its close neighbours.     

Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences

Three studies examined how photos accompanying stories could contribute to people drawing inferences about outcomes from the stories and subsequently claiming that they had read what had actually only been inferred. Subjects read short stories designed to induce inferences about their conclusions (e.g., “Sabrina dropped the delicate vase” invites the inference that the vase broke) accompanied by a photo depicting the likely conclusion (the broken vase), a photo depicting a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase before it was dropped), or no photo. Results showed that seeing photographs consistent with inferred conclusions led people to falsely claim that they read those conclusions. Photo-boosted inferences were held with high confidence and were robust over time. Falsely recalled inferences were sometimes accompanied by false claims to have seen a photo depicting the inferred events when another photo or no photo had actually be seen. These findings support the source monitoring framework's prediction that people can mistakenly attribute their internally generated inferences about what occurred to externally derived sources when they have photographic “evidence” consistent with the inferred conclusions.