Children's eyewitness memory: Repeating post-event misinformation reduces the distinctiveness of a witnessed event

Children may incorporate misinformation into reports of witnessed events, particularly if the misinformation is repeated. One explanation is that the misinformation trace is strengthened by repetition. Alternatively, repeating misinformation may reduce the discriminability between event and misinformation sources, increasing interference between them. We tested trace strength and distinctiveness accounts by showing 5- and 6-year-olds an event and then presenting either the “same” or “varying” items of post-event misinformation across three iterations. Performance was compared to a baseline in which misinformation was presented once. Repeating the same misinformation increased suggestibility when misinformation was erroneously attributed to both event and misinformation sources, supporting a trace strength interpretation. However, suggestibility measured by attributing misinformation solely to the event, was lower when misinformation was presented repeatedly rather than once. In contrast, identification of the correct source of the event was less likely if the misinformation was repeated, whether the same or different across iterations. Thus a reduction in the distinctiveness of sources disrupted memory for the event source. Moreover, there was strong association between memory for the event and a measure of distinctiveness of sources, which takes into account both the number of confusable source and their apparent temporal spacing from the point of retrieval.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

Source and destination memory: Two sides of the same coin?

Whereas source memory involves remembering from whom you have heard something, destination memory involves remembering to whom you have told something. Despite its practical relevance, destination memory has been studied little. Recently, two reports suggested that generally destination memory should be poorer than source memory, and that it should be particularly difficult for older people. We tested these predictions by having young and older participants read sentences to two examiners (destination encoding) and listen to sentences read by two examiners (source encoding), under intentional (Experiment 1) or incidental encoding (Experiments 2 and 3). Only in Experiment 3 (in which cognitive demands during destination encoding were increased) was destination memory significantly poorer than source memory. In none of the experiments were older adults inferior to the young on destination or source memory. Destination- and source-memory scores were significantly correlated. Item memory was consistently superior for sentences that had been read out loud (during destination encoding) versus those that had been heard (during source encoding). Destination memory needs not always be poorer than source memory, appears not to be particularly impaired by normal ageing and may depend on similar processes to those supporting source memory.     

How focus at encoding affects children’s source monitoring

Retention of source information is enhanced by focus on speakers’ feelings about statements even though recognition is reduced for both adults and children. However, does any focus on another person lead to enhanced source monitoring, or is a particular kind of focus required? Does other-focus enhance source monitoring, or does self-focus detract from it? In Experiment 1, 4- and 6-year-olds watched two speakers make statements in a no-focus control or with focus directed on how they (or a speaker) felt about the statements or on perceptual features about themselves (or the speaker). Source monitoring decisions were enhanced by other-focus in both the perceptual and emotional conditions. However, the effect was larger for the emotional condition, and source monitoring exceeded no-focus controls only for this condition. Experiment 2 showed no effect of other-focus versus self-focus on source monitoring when questions were semantic.     

Effects of resource demanding processing on context memory for context-related versus context-unrelated items

In two experiments, context memory was compared between conditions of higher versus lower cognitive load. The ease of the item–context binding was manipulated using words whose meaning was preexperimentally related versus unrelated to context (colour). Experiment 1 showed that an item generation task may lead to a decrease in memory for font colour without enhancing item recognition. Experiment 2 used a dual-task paradigm, that is, participants performed a concurrent task during the study phase of the memory task. The divided-attention condition decreased both item and context memory. However, in both experiments, the influence of resource demanding conditions on context memory was apparent only when the item–context binding process was not facilitated by preexperimental associations.     

Source Handler telephone interactions with covert human intelligence sources: An exploration of question types and intelligence yield

Law Enforcement Agencies gather intelligence in order to prevent criminal activity and pursue criminals. In the context of human intelligence collection, intelligence elicitation relies heavily upon the deployment of appropriate evidence-based interviewing techniques (a topic rarely covered in the extant research literature). The present research gained unprecedented access to audio recorded telephone interactions (N = 105) between Source Handlers and Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) from England and Wales. The research explored the mean use of various question types per interaction and across all questions asked in the sample, as well as comparing the intelligence yield for appropriate and inappropriate questions. Source Handlers were found to utilise vastly more appropriate questions than inappropriate questions, though they rarely used open-ended questions. Across the total interactions, appropriate questions (by far) were associated with the gathering of much of the total intelligence yield. Implications for practise are discussed.     

Time course of effects of emotion on item memory and source memory for Chinese words

Although many studies have investigated the effect of emotion on memory, it is unclear whether the effect of emotion extends to all aspects of an event. In addition, it is poorly understood how effects of emotion on item memory and source memory change over time. This study examined the time course of effects of emotion on item memory and source memory. Participants learned intentionally a list of neutral, positive, and negative Chinese words, which were presented twice, and then took test of free recall, followed by recognition and source memory tests, at one of eight delayed points of time. The main findings are (within the time frame of 2 weeks): (1) Negative emotion enhances free recall, whereas there is only a trend that positive emotion enhances free recall. In addition, negative and positive emotions have different points of time at which their effects on free recall reach the greatest magnitude. (2) Negative emotion reduces recognition, whereas positive emotion has no effect on recognition. (3) Neither positive nor negative emotion has any effect on source memory. The above findings indicate that effect of emotion does not necessarily extend to all aspects of an event and that valence is a critical modulating factor in effect of emotion on item memory. Furthermore, emotion does not affect the time course of item memory and source memory, at least with a time frame of 2 weeks. This study has implications for establishing the theoretical model regarding the effect of emotion on memory.     

The relationship between theory of mind and episodic memory: evidence for the development of autonoetic consciousness

The study investigated a link between theory of mind and episodic memory involving autonoetic consciousness (). Eighty-nine Japanese 4- to 6-year-olds received two versions of a false belief task, a task of aspectuality or knowledge origins, and four memory tests. After controlling for age, most theory of mind abilities showed no interrelations, and own and other's belief understandings in deceptive appearance tasks were solely related to source memory, but not to free recall, temporal ordering, or working memory. Moreover, even when age and verbal intelligence were controlled, the association between representational change and source memory was highly significant in 6-year-olds but not in 4- and 5-year-olds. Results suggest that during development only a particular kind of theory of mind ability is integrated with episodic memory.     

The development of automatic associative processes and children’s false memories

We investigated children’s ability to generate associations and how automaticity of associative activation unfolds developmentally. Children generated associative responses using a single associate paradigm (Experiment 1) or a Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM)-like multiple associates paradigm (Experiment 2). The results indicated that children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates, and the automaticity with which they were generated, increased between 5, 7, and 11 years of age. These findings suggest that children’s domain-specific knowledge base and the associative connections among related concepts are present and continue to develop from a very early age. Moreover, there is an increase in how these concepts are automatically activated with age, something that results from domain-general developments in speed of processing. These changes are consistent with the neurodevelopmental literature and together may provide a more complete explanation of the development of memory illusions.