False rumors and true belief: Memory processes underlying children’s errant reports of rumored events

Previous research has shown that overhearing an errant rumor—either from an adult or from peers—about an earlier experience can lead children to make detailed false reports. This study investigates the extent to which such accounts are driven by changes in children’s memory representations or merely social demands that encourage the reporting of rumored information. This was accomplished by (a) using a warning manipulation that eliminated social pressures to report an earlier heard rumor and (b) examining the qualitative characteristics of children’s false narratives of a rumored-but-nonexperienced event. Findings indicated that overheard rumors can induce sensory and contextual characteristics in memory that can lead children to develop genuine false beliefs in seeing rumored-but-nonexperienced occurrences. Such constructive tendencies were especially likely among 3- and 4-year-olds (relative to 5- and 6-year-olds) and when rumors were picked up from peers during natural social interactions (relative to when they were planted by an adult).     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Disconfirming Expectations: Incorrect Imprecise (vs. Precise) Estimates Increase Source Trustworthiness and Consumer Loyalty

Estimations that include numerical information are ubiquitous in our daily lives, for example, housing prices, calories, etc. In the present work, we investigate how the type of information used in an estimate, particularly its level of imprecision, influences evaluations of source trustworthiness after the target value of the estimate is revealed. Specifically, building upon prior work suggesting that (a) imprecise estimates are perceived to be less accurate than precise estimates and (b) performing below expectations results in negative source evaluations, we hypothesize that if the estimate is revealed to be incorrect, imprecise estimates (i.e., 400) elicit higher source trustworthiness than precise estimates (i.e., 417), even if the imprecise estimate is objectively more incorrect (i.e., target value: 570). In addition, we find that this effect also influences consumers’ loyalty toward the source of the estimate. Four studies and a single‐paper meta‐analysis offer triangulating evidence for this prediction and its underlying psychological mechanism. Overall, this work contributes to research on estimates, source evaluations, numerical information, and the influence of errors on consumer behavior.     

No deficits in nonverbal memory, metamemory and internal as well as external source memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

A large body of literature suggests that some symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) result from mnemonic dysfunctions. The present study tested various formulations of the memory deficit hypothesis considering important moderators, such as depression and response slowing. Thirty-two OCD patients and 32 healthy controls were presented verbal or nonverbal instructions for actions (e.g. simple gestures). These actions should either be performed or imagined. For recognition, previously presented as well as novel actions were displayed. Decisions had to be made whether an action was previously displayed (verbally vs. nonverbally) or not and whether an action was performed or imagined (internal source memory). Moreover, both judgments required confidence ratings. Groups did not differ in memory accuracy and metamemory for verbally presented material. Patients displayed some impairment for nonverbally presented material and imagined instructions, which, however, could be fully accounted for by response slowing and depressive symptoms. The study challenges the view that primary memory deficits underlie OCD or any of its subtypes. We claim that research should move forward from the mere study of objective impairment to the assessment of cognitive performance in conjunction with personality traits such as inflated responsibility.     

Compatibilism &; desert: critical comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">four views on free will</Emphasis>

In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist’s perspective a critical discussion of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors’ objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be resisted by contending that the agents in it are free and responsible. And I also argue against Vargas by challenging the sense in which his revisionist thesis differs from a position like Fischer’s and mine. I close by reflecting on the nature of desert. All seem to assume it is central to the debate, but what is it?     

Cognitive control of language production in bilinguals involves a partly independent process within the domain-general cognitive control network: evidence from task-switching and electrical brain activity

In highly proficient, early bilinguals, behavioural studies of the cost of switching language or task suggest qualitative differences between language control and domain-general cognitive control. By contrast, several neuroimaging studies have shown an overlap of the brain areas involved in language control and domain-general cognitive control. The current study measured both behavioural responses and event-related potentials (ERPs) from bilinguals who performed picture naming in single- or mixed-language contexts, as well as an alphanumeric categorisation task in single- or mixed-task context. Analysis of switch costs during the mixed-context conditions showed qualitative differences between language control and domain-general cognitive control. A 2 × 2 ANOVA of the ERPs, with domain (linguistic, alphanumeric) and context (single, mixed) as within-participant factors, revealed a significant interaction, which also suggests a partly independent language-control mechanism. Source estimations revealed the neural basis of this mechanism to be in bilateral frontal-temporal areas.     

Multiple endorsers and multiple endorsements: The influence of message repetition,source congruence and involvement on brand attitudes

This paper investigates the effects of source congruence on brand attitudes in two situations: multiple brand endorsements by one celebrity and multiple celebrity endorsers of one brand. Under low involvement conditions, brand attitudes become more negative as a celebrity endorses multiple brands and more favorable with multiple endorsers. In high involvement conditions, strong source congruence overrides the negative effect of multiple brands, and the positive effect of multiple endorsers is found only with strong congruence. We interpret these results as suggestive of a frequency knowledge cue that dominates under low involvement but is non-diagnostic in high involvement scenarios.     

Differential Decline of Verbal and Visuospatial Processing Speed Across the Adult Life Span

The present study compared the age-related decline in verbal and visuospatial processing speed in 131 participants aged 18 to 90 years. Participants performed four verbal and four visuospatial tasks. Age differences in processing speed were compared at the group and individual levels. For the group-level analyses, participants were divided into a young adult group and six older groups subdivided by decade. The mean verbal and visuospatial response times (RTs) for each group were regressed on the corresponding RTs of the young adult group. The slope of the visuospatial regression was greater than that for the verbal regression at all ages, and the difference between the visuospatial and verbal slopes increased with each decade. For the individual-level analyses, a verbal and a visuospatial processing-time coefficient (Hale & Jansen, 1994) was obtained for each individual, and these values were then regressed on age. Verbal processing time increased linearly by approximately 50% while visuospatial processing time increased exponentially by approximately 500% from 18 to 90 years. Taken together, the results at both the group and the individual level demonstrate that aging affects visuospatial processing to a much greater extent than verbal processing.     

Generation difficulty and memory for source

The role of the word predictability from sentence context for reality monitoring and external source monitoring was examined in two experiments. In a reality-monitoring task, discrimination of an internal source was better in the hard than in the easy condition. It is probable that extra cognitive operations engaged during word generation in the hard condition were effective cues for reality-monitoring judgements. In contrast, in an external source-monitoring task (recognition memory of item's colour), the hard condition resulted in worse source memory for generated words than did the easy condition. This result is consistent both with an item–context trade-off hypothesis and a processing hypothesis. Greater effort involved at the time of generation might limit resources available for encoding of an external source. It is also possible that for generated words, the hard condition promoted conceptual processing instead of perceptual processing; therefore the item's colour was not effectively encoded.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.