The effects of modifying consummatory behavior on the topography of the autoshaped pecking response in pigeons

The autoshaped responses of two debeaked pigeons that had developed modified eating behavior were compared to the autoshaped responses of three control subjects that ate grain normally. The control subjects exhibited keylight responding that was judged normal by two independent raters. The debeaked subjects pecked the key and ate grain with both normal and modified responses. The results of this study demostrate that an autoshaping procedure using grain as an appetitive stimulus may be used to establish a response that is not biologically preorganized.     

A procedural theory of eye movements in doing arithmetic

A procedural theory of eye movement that accounts for main features of the stochastic behavior of eye-fixation durations and direction of movement of saccades in the process of solving arithmetic exercises of addition and subtraction is presented. The best-fitting distribution of fixation durations with a relatively simple theoretical justification consists of a mixture of an exponential distribution and the convolution of two exponential distributions. The eye movements themselves were found to approximate a random walk that fits rather closely in both adult and juvenile subjects the motion postulated by the normative algorithm ordinarily taught in schools. Certain structural features of addition and subtraction exercises, such as the number of columns, the presence or absence of a carry or a borrow, are well known to affect their difficulty. In this study, regressions on such structural variables were found to account for only a relatively small part of the variation in eye-fixation durations.     

Creating and criticizing theory

F. W. Vondracek, R. M. Lerner, and J. E. Schulenberg (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1983, 23, 179–202) criticize the vocational literature for failing to “follow acceptable scientific procedures for building a theory” and for failing to attend to important methodological and substantive developments. It is argued here that no single acceptable process for creating theory exists and three strategies useful for developing a theory are illustrated: immerse yourself in data, pick a specific set of results to explain, and try to resolve inconsistencies in the literature. Three criteria for evaluating theories and criticisms of them are discussed: comprehensiveness (content value), accuracy (truth value), and clarity (form). The paper by Vondracek et al. is examined from this perspective and is shown to lack the specificity, clarity, and accuracy necessary to be an effective guide to better vocational research or theory.     

The interaction between stimulus and reinforcer control on remembering.

In a symbolic matching-to-sample task, 6 pigeons obtained food by pecking a red side key when the brighter of two white lights had been presented on the center key and by pecking a green side key when the dimmer of two white lights had been presented on the center key. Across Part 1 and Parts 6 to 10, the delay between sample-stimulus presentation and the availability of the choice keys was varied between 0 s and 25 s. Across Parts 1 to 5, the delay between the emission of a correct choice and the delivery of a reinforcer was varied between 0 s and 30 s. Although increasing both types of delay decreased stimulus discriminability, lengthening the stimulus-choice delay produced a greater decrement in choice accuracy than did lengthening the choice-reinforcer delay. Additionally, the relative reinforcer rate for correct choice was varied across both types of delay. The sensitivity of behavior to the distribution of reinforcers decreased as discriminability decreased under both procedures. These data are consistent with the view, based on the generalized matching law, that sample stimuli and reinforcers interact in their control over remembering.     

Essential independence and likelihood-based ability estimation for polytomous items

A definition ofessential independence is proposed for sequences of polytomous items. For items satisfying the reasonable assumption that the expected amount of credit awarded increases with examinee ability, we develop a theory ofessential unidimensionality which closely parallels that of Stout. Essentially unidimensional item sequences can be shown to have a unique (up to change-of-scale) dominant underlying trait, which can be consistently estimated by a monotone transformation of the sum of the item scores. In more general polytomous-response latent trait models (with or without ordered responses), anM-estimator based upon maximum likelihood may be shown to be consistent for under essentially unidimensional violations of local independence and a variety of monotonicity/identifiability conditions. A rigorous proof of this fact is given, and the standard error of the estimator is explored. These results suggest that ability estimation methods that rely on the summation form of the log likelihood under local independence should generally be robust under essential independence, but standard errors may vary greatly from what is usually expected, depending on the degree of departure from local independence. An index of departure from local independence is also proposed.This work was supported in part by Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-87-K-0277 and National Science Foundation Grant NSF-DMS-88-02556. The author is grateful to William F. Stout for many helpful comments, and to an anonymous reviewer for raising the questions addressed in section 2. A preliminary version of section 6 appeared in the author's Ph.D. thesis.     

Humanizing education: Subjective and objective aspects

I propose that there are four standards to be met if a given educational enterprise is to be considered humane: (1) the practice to be mastered must be socially justified; (2) the disciplines pursued to master the practice must be appropriate to the practice; (3) the practice must be owned by the learner; and (4) this ownership must itself meet certain ethical requirements. The paper emphasizes the problem of ownership. It argues for a view of ownership that is communitarian. This view sees ownership as a function of identification or membership. People become committed to certain educational ends in virtue of the fact that they see themselves as members of a group and the ends as the ends of the group. It is central to this view that ownership of ends does not require full understanding or rational appraisal of such ends. I argue that a rational appraisal of ends is difficult when a novice seeks to appraise the ends of some practice both because the ends of the practice are internal to it in a way that makes grasping such ends difficult prior to mastery of the practice and because initiation into the practice will change the individual's standards of appraisal.     

What is educational theory and how to make it?

An analysis is provided detailing the conditions for the appropriate theoretical study of the object of educational science: pedagogy.     

HOW DID MORALITY EVOLVE?

Abstract. This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed.     

Thoughts and feelings and things: A new psychiatric epistemology

Epistemology — the study of knowledge — is a philosophical discipline with close ties to psychiatry. When epistemologists address specific questions about how knowledge is actually realized by human beings, their philosophy must be informed by empirical studies of the sort psychiatrists now take up in a variety of forms. As this paper describes, psychiatrists can likewise improve their understanding of human psychology through a deeper appreciation of philosophical analysis in epistemology.The aim of this article is to introduce a unifying framework within which the experience from different approaches to psychiatry — (1) the conceptual schemas of cognitive psychiatry, (2) the mental structures of psychoanalytic psychiatry, (3) the categorical forms of existential psychiatry, and (4) the neural pathways of biological psychiatry — can all be applied productively to the central question of epistemology. By establishing a broad understanding of the problem of knowledge, this new view of epistemology is developed within the idiom of each psychiatric approach. In addressing themselves to a unitary problem, these diverse psychiatric approaches are themselves revealed, not as competing points of view, but as complementary views of a single subject. The result is a new epistemology that can not only bring the insights of psychiatry to philosophy, but can also contribute to the care of patients when psychiatrists bring this broader view to their clinical work.     

A study of the foundations of ethical decision making of clinical medical ethicists

A study of clinical medical ethicists was conducted to determine the various philosophical positions they hold with respect to ethical decision making in medicine and their various positions' relationship to the subjective-objective controversy in value theory. The study consisted of analyzing and interpreting data gathered from questionnaires from 52 clinical medical ethicists at 28 major health care centers in the United States. The study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists tend to be objectivists in value theory, i.e., believe that value judgments are knowledge claims capable of being true or false and therefore expressions of moral requirements and normative imperatives emanating from an external value structure or moral order in the world. In addition, the study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists are consistent in the philosophical foundations of their ethical decision making, i.e., in decision making regarding values they tend not to hold beliefs which are incompatible with other beliefs they hold about values.