Shame and the virtual gaze: Supporting children's encounters in online worlds

As the virtual gaze of another becomes an increasingly prevalent feature in children's lives, this paper aims to explore some of the emotional complexities of the emerging physical/virtual landscape of children's experience. Based on an analysis of the emotion of shame, the paper explores the new challenges that children face both now and in the future in their virtual encounters and relations with others. It is argued that virtual spaces bring new dimensions to emotional experience, at times making it more difficult to realise the productive potential of shame. This is because the gaze or imagined gaze of another, as invoked through the experience of shame, occurs in conditions of uncertainty, has no boundaries and may arise at any time in the future. These insights are significant if we are to support children in building a capacity to restore the self and be resilient in these new spaces of social encounter.     

Offline: The possible effects of Internet-related behavior on work values,expectations, & behavior among Ultra-Orthodox millennials

ABSTRACT

This work examines differences in the work-related values, expectations, and behaviors between millennials who are significant users of technology and social media, and those who are not. We delineate the development of millennial behavior using a unique group of millennials, those in the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish (known as “Haredi”) community in Israel. Due to religious and community norms, many Haredi millennials were shielded from digital technology, and particularly the Internet and the various technologies associated with it, such as text messaging and social media. Those who were raised and remained in Haredi communities did not encounter the Internet with any regularity as children. Many as adults are still unfamiliar with social media. Thus, this community presents a unique natural experiment, comparing Haredi millennials who are immersed in social media with those who are not.     

Provision of step-level public goods with continuous contribution

Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco-operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show that the level of contribution depends on the provision threshold, and that it increases when contributions are not restricted to be all-or-none. We present, discuss, and competitively test two models for this class of social dilemmas, one postulating maximization of expected utility and the other yielding an equitable solution.     

Science and politics: Dangerous liaisons

In contrast to the opinion of numerous authors (e.g. R. Rudner, P. Kitcher, L. R. Graham, M. Dummett, N. Chomsky, R. Lewontin, etc.) it is argued here that the formation of opinion in science should be greatly insulated from political considerations. Special attention is devoted to the view that methodological standards for evaluation of scientific theories ought to vary according to the envisaged political uses of these theories.I wish to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for having supported the work on this paper.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

Effects of speaking upon the rate and variability of concurrent finger tapping in children

Tapping rate and variability were measured as 73 normal, right-handed children in Grades 1–4 engaged in speeded unimanual finger tapping with and without concurrent recitation. Speaking reduced the rate of tapping and increased its variability to a greater extent in younger children than in older children. Developmental changes in variability but not rate were attributable to a greater number of lengthy (>500 ms) pauses in the tapping of younger children. Speaking slowed the right hand more than the left, and the degree of this asymmetry was constant across grade levels. The right-hand effect for tapping rate was not attributable to lengthy pauses. In contrast, asymmetric increases in tapping variability occurred only among children in Grade 1 and only when lengthy pauses were included in the data. The results implicate three mechanisms of intertask interference: one involving capacity limitations, a second involving cross-talk between motor control mechanisms for speech and finger movement, respectively, and a third factor involving occasional diversion of attention from tapping to speaking. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to developmental changes in mental capacity.     

Measuring the activity of severely and profoundly mentally-handicapped adults in ordinary housing

Earlier work on the quality of care in settings for severely and profoundly mentally-handicapped adults raised the question whether any useful purpose is served by promoting the extensive use of simple recreational materials to occupy people. Data were collected by direct observation on the activity of 6 adults living in a staffed house organized to promote engagement in household activities. Observations were taken over 5 weekdays from 07.00 to 10.00 and 15.00 to 23.00hr. The results showed that Ss spent between 22 and 67% of available time in purposeful activity. Between 27 and 65% of purposeful activity was engagement in domestic or housework tasks. Even the most handicapped people spent more time engaged in housework than in leisure and recreational tasks. The implications of these data are commented on and measurement issues which arise in ordinary housing as opposed to institutional settings are discussed.     

Comments on Hughes and Sussman''s time-sharing study of cerebral laterality in language-disordered and normal children

M. Hughes and H. M. Sussman (1983, Brain and Language, 19, 48-64) suggest that the time-sharing paradigm "does not serve as an adequate behavioral index for language lateralization in children." The merits of this conclusion are considered and general interpretative issues regarding manual interference in dual-task/time-sharing studies are discussed.