Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”     

Concept Creep: Psychology's Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology

Many of psychology's concepts have undergone semantic shifts in recent years. These conceptual changes follow a consistent trend. Concepts that refer to the negative aspects of human experience and behavior have expanded their meanings so that they now encompass a much broader range of phenomena than before. This expansion takes “horizontal” and “vertical” forms: concepts extend outward to capture qualitatively new phenomena and downward to capture quantitatively less extreme phenomena. The concepts of abuse, bullying, trauma, mental disorder, addiction, and prejudice are examined to illustrate these historical changes. In each case, the concept's boundary has stretched and its meaning has dilated. A variety of explanations for this pattern of “concept creep” are considered and its implications are explored. I contend that the expansion primarily reflects an ever-increasing sensitivity to harm, reflecting a liberal moral agenda. Its implications are ambivalent, however. Although conceptual change is inevitable and often well motivated, concept creep runs the risk of pathologizing everyday experience and encouraging a sense of virtuous but impotent victimhood.     

Powerful Qualities,Phenomenal Concepts,and the New Challenge to Physicalism

Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.     

Maimon’s Theory of Differentials As The Elements of Intuitions

Abstract

Maimon’s theory of the differential has proved to be a rather enigmatic aspect of his philosophy. By drawing upon mathematical developments that had occurred earlier in the century and that, by virtue of the arguments presented in the Essay and comments elsewhere in his writing, I suggest Maimon would have been aware of, what I propose to offer in this paper is a study of the differential and the role that it plays in the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790). In order to do so, this paper focuses upon Maimon’s criticism of the role played by mathematics in Kant’s philosophy, to which Maimon offers a Leibnizian solution based on the infinitesimal calculus. The main difficulties that Maimon has with Kant’s system, the second of which will be the focus of this paper, include the presumption of the existence of synthetic a priori judgments, i.e. the question quid facti, and the question of whether the fact of our use of a priori concepts in experience is justified, i.e. the question quid juris. Maimon deploys mathematics, specifically arithmetic, against Kant to show how it is possible to understand objects as having been constituted by the very relations between them, and he proposes an alternative solution to the question quid juris, which relies on the concept of the differential. However, despite these arguments, Maimon remains sceptical with respect to the question quid facti.     

Prospects in Ritual Studies

Michael B. Aune and Valerie DeMarinis, Religious and Social Ritual: Interdisciplinary Explorations. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996. vii+323 pp., $20.50 (hardback) ISBN 0 7914 2825 7, $19.95 (paperback) ISBN 0 7914 2826 7.

Grimes, Ronald L. Beginnings in Ritual Studies. Rev. ed. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1995, xxviii+299 pp., $21.95 (paperback) ISBN 1 5700 001 4.     

二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻

采用空间启动范式考察二语情绪概念理解中是否激活空间信息, 即是否存在空间隐喻。实验1探讨单通道二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻, 实验2则探讨跨通道二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻。实验1中让32名母语为汉语的汉-英双语者先看一个英文情绪词, 接着进行视觉空间位置判断, 最后再让被试判断之前呈现的情绪词是积极词还是消极词。实验2中40名母语为汉语的汉-英双语者完成跟实验1类似的任务, 不同之处为英文情绪词以听觉形式呈现。两个实验的结果表明, 跨语言和跨通道的情绪词的空间隐喻受到空间位置方向的影响。垂直位置方向上, 二语情绪词在单通道和跨通道中都表现出了空间隐喻; 水平位置方向上, 二语情绪词没有表现出空间隐喻。该结果说明了情绪概念的空间隐喻会受到个体经验的影响, 进一步支持了知觉符号理论。     

Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind

A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition‐based version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting functionalism.     

道德概念具身隐喻及其影响因素：来自元分析的证据

采用元分析技术探讨道德概念具身隐喻及其影响因素。通过文献检索和筛选, 共有65篇文献153个独立样本符合元分析标准( N = 8659)。元分析结果显示, 道德概念具身隐喻的始源域与目标域存在中等程度正相关(r = 0.34); 调节效应检验表明, 道德概念具身隐喻受文化背景和隐喻维度的影响, 但不受隐喻映射方向、研究范式和感觉通道的影响。以上研究结果表明, 道德概念具身隐喻具有心理现实性, 并且受文化背景和隐喻维度的调节, 具体而言, 东方文化背景下个体的道德概念具身隐喻更强, 道德概念与空间维度和大小维度的隐喻联结程度更高。     

Was it designed to do that? Children's focus on intended function in their conceptualization of artifacts

Do young children who seek the conceptual kind of an artifact weigh the plausibility that a current function constitutes the function intended by the object designer? Three- and four-year-olds were encouraged to question adults about novel artifacts. After inquiring about what an object was, some children were shown a function that plausibly accounted for the structural features of the object; others were shown a possible, but implausible function. Children given implausible functions were less satisfied with these responses than those given plausible functions, as shown by their more persistent attempts to ask follow-up questions about function. Accordingly, preschoolers appear to take into account matters of intentional design when assigning artifacts to conceptual kinds.     

The conceptualisation of the psychical in psychoanalysis

This article aims to clarify the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the psychical, which includes a discussion of the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The unconscious is conceived of as being on the border between the so-called 'ego's conscious intending' and a rudimentary body-ego experiencing. Phenomenological ideas on the essence of consciousness are used in order to help delineate the crucial differences between consciousness and the unconscious. Only consciousness is characterised by an awareness of itself, that is; self-consciousness. Furthermore, consciousness is characterised by an intentional, synthesising capacity, whereas the functioning of the unconscious, in its most radical form, is the opposite ofthe intentionality of consciousness. It is argued that the unconscious pre-supposes certain pre-sexual processes, in the form of a body-ego's formation of continuity, coherence and wholeness. The body-ego belongs to the sphere of consciousness/self-consciousness, even if self-consciousness is only given implicitly in the body-ego and not as a fully fledged ego cogito . Attention is drawn to neglected issues in psychoanalytic theorising, namely self-consciousness and the constitution of existence. The importance of this neglected area for the psychoanalytic process is illustrated with clinical examples.