Concept learning set‐size functions for Clark's nutcrackers

Same/Different abstract‐concept learning by Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) was tested with novel stimuli following learning of training set expansion (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, and 1024 picture items). The resulting set‐size function was compared to those from rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and pigeons (Columba livia). Nutcrackers showed partial concept learning following initial eight‐item set learning, unlike the other species (Magnotti, Katz, Wright, & Kelly, 2015). The mean function for the nutcrackers' novel‐stimulus transfer increased linearly as a function of the logarithm of training set size, which intersected its baseline function at the 128‐item set size. Thus, nutcrackers on average achieved full concept learning (i.e., transfer statistically equivalent to baseline performance) somewhere between set sizes of 64 to 128 items, similar to full concept learning by monkeys. Pigeons required a somewhat larger training set (256 items) for full concept learning, but results from other experiments (initial training and transfer with 32‐ and 64‐item set sizes) suggested carryover effects with smaller set sizes may have artificially prolonged the pigeon's full concept learning. We find it remarkable that these diverse species with very different neural architectures can fully learn this same/different abstract concept, and (at least under some conditions) do so with roughly similar sets sizes (64‐128 items) and numbers of training exemplars, despite initial concept learning advantages (nutcrackers), learning disadvantages (pigeons), or increasing baselines (monkeys).     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

权力概念加工对视觉空间注意定向的影响：一个ERP证据

概念表征是认知心理学研究的一个重要领域。具身认知理论认为, 在概念加工过程中, 个体会以具身模拟的形式对概念所暗含的空间方位信息进行理解。本研究采用事件相关电位技术, 考察抽象权力概念加工时的激活特点。实验首先要求被试对出现在屏幕中央的词进行权力高/低判断, 接着在屏幕的上方或者下方呈现一个字母(“m”或“n”), 要求被试对目标物进行按键反应。结果发现, 当权力词隐喻的空间特性与目标物出现的位置一致时诱发了一个更大的N1波幅, 不一致时诱发了一个更大的P3波幅。该结果提示, 抽象权力概念加工时会产生自动激活空间上-下意向图示, 对权力词的加工影响了随后字母位置的判断, 并将空间注意指向了与意向图示相一致的位置, 从时间加工进程看, 起始于早期的知觉识别并一直持续到晚期的高级认知加工阶段, 权力概念加工具有内隐性。     

The Science of Philosophy

If philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, is it thereby debarred from being a science? This article argues that it is not and that philosophy so conceived is a science. The argument takes the form of careful attention to the meaning of “science,” “experiment,” “empirical,” and related words. Philosophy is a formal science. This does not mean it is not part of the humanities. The role of observation in other kinds of science is investigated. There is more methodological homogeneity in the various sciences, including philosophy, than has been recognized, despite some clear differences. Seeing this helps restore philosophy to its rightful place in the academic firmament.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.     

Gorilla (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Gorilla gorilla gorilla</Emphasis>) and orangutan (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pongo abelii</Emphasis>) understanding of first- and second-order relations

Four orangutans and one gorilla matched images in a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task based on the relationship between items depicted in those images, thus demonstrating understanding of both first- and second-order relations. Subjects matched items on the basis of identity, color, or shape (first-order relations, experiment 1) or same shape, same color between items (second-order relations, experiment 2). Four of the five subjects performed above chance on the second-order relations DMTS task within the first block of five sessions. High levels of performance on this task did not result from reliance on perceptual feature matching and thus indicate the capability for abstract relational concepts in two species of great ape. Electronic Publication     

The role of language in acquiring object kind concepts in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 9-month-old infants could use the presence of labels to help them establish a representation of two distinct objects in a complex object individuation task. We found that the presence of two distinct labels facilitated object individuation, but the presence of one label for both objects, two distinct tones, two distinct sounds, or two distinct emotional expressions did not. These findings suggest that language may play an important role in the acquisition of sortal/object kind concepts in infancy: words may serve as "essence placeholders". Implications for the relationship between language and conceptual development are discussed.     

Natural concepts in a juvenile gorilla (gorilla gorilla gorilla) at three levels of abstraction

The extent to which nonhumans are able to form conceptual versus perceptual discriminations remains a matter of debate. Among the great apes, only chimpanzees have been tested for conceptual understanding, defined as the ability to form discriminations not based solely on simple perceptual features of stimuli, and to transfer this learning to novel stimuli. In the present investigation, a young captive female gorilla was trained at three levels of abstraction (concrete, intermediate, and abstract) involving sets of photographs representing natural categories (e.g., orangutans vs. humans, primates vs. nonprimate animals, animals vs. foods). Within each level of abstraction, when the gorilla had learned to discriminate positive from negative exemplars in one set of photographs, a novel set was introduced. Transfer was defined in terms of high accuracy during the first two sessions with the new stimuli. The gorilla acquired discriminations at all three levels of abstraction but showed unambiguous transfer only with the concrete and abstract stimulus sets. Detailed analyses of response patterns revealed little evidence of control by simple stimulus features. Acquisition and transfer involving abstract stimulus sets suggest a conceptual basis for gorilla categorization. The gorilla's relatively poor performance with intermediate-level discriminations parallels findings with pigeons, and suggests a need to reconsider the role of perceptual information in discriminations thought to indicate conceptual behavior in nonhumans.     

Self-Healing Forces and Concepts of Health and Disease. A Historical Discourse

The phenomenon of self-healing forces has again and again challenged doctors in the different historical periods of medical science. They relied on effects of self-healing forces in diagnosis and therapy. They also tried to explain these effects based on the current model of organism. The understanding of this phenomenon has always influenced the understanding of therapy and played a role in defining the concept of health and disease. In the 17th and 18th century the idea of self-healing force was interpreted as a phenomenon related to the organic forces, whereas in the 19th century the explanation was reduced to a materialistic mechanism. Nowadays the knowledge of heath-shock-proteins open the way of a new understanding of the organic defense mechanisms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

《易传》天论的哲学意义--兼论中国哲学有没有哲学概念

"天人关系"是中国哲学的基本问题,这一基本问题在<易传>中表现得比较典型.<易传>之"天"概念蕴涵自然、自然规律、义理、天帝、阳气等数重内涵,逻辑内涵混杂,外延不确定.中国哲学之"天"从未获得"纯粹的哲学形式",天不是一个纯粹哲学概念,只是一个前哲学概念.实际上,气、道、理等中国哲学主干概念具有同样的哲学性质.学术界有必要共同讨论一个问题中国有哲学概念如何可能?