Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’     

Quantity representation in children and rhesus monkeys: linear versus logarithmic scales

The performances of 4- and 5-year-olds and rhesus monkeys were compared using a computerized task for quantity assessment. Participants first learned two quantity anchor values and then responded to intermediate values by classifying them as similar to either the large anchor or the small anchor. Of primary interest was an assessment of where the point of subjective equality (PSE) occurred for each species across four different sets of anchors to determine whether the PSE occurred at the arithmetic mean or the geometric mean. Both species produced PSEs that were closer to the geometric mean for three of four anchor sets. This indicates that monkeys and children access either a logarithmic scale for quantity representation or a linear scale that is subject to scalar variability, both of which are consistent with Weber's law and representation of quantity that takes the form of analog magnitudes.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

转移方式对基于劳动的物品所有权判断的影响

劳动在人们的所有权判断中起着重要作用。以往研究虽然考察了幼儿和成人基于劳动的所有权判断,但却忽视了原材料转移方式的作用,且大部分集中在西方国家。本研究以中国3～5岁的幼儿和成人为对象,考察了他们在拿和借两种转移方式下基于劳动的所有权判断。结果发现,4～5岁的幼儿及成人在两种转移方式下的所有权判断存在显著差异。相比于拿条件,他们在借条件下不太倾向于判断劳动者是新加工物品的所有者。4～5岁幼儿在拿条件下更倾向认为劳动者是新加工物品的所有者,而成人在两种条件下都倾向于支持原材料占有者是新加工物品的所有者。3岁幼儿在两种转移方式下的所有权判断不存在显著差异,且不支持任何一方。结果提示,转移方式会影响个体基于劳动的所有权判断,并且从4岁开始幼儿能够区分不同转移方式的作用。     

Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second‐order mental states1

Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first‐order or second‐order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7‐year‐olds responded considering only first‐order mental states, but the 9‐ and 11‐year‐olds also used second‐order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second‐order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years.     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

Note on the rationality of rule-based versus exemplar-based processing in human judgment

This paper reports a study of the relationship between rule- versus exemplar-based processing and criteria for rationality of judgment. Participants made probability judgments in a classification task devised by S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991). In the exemplar condition, the miscalibration was accounted for by stochastic components of the judgment with a format-dependence effect, implying simultaneous over- and underconfidence depending on the response scale. In the rule condition, there was an overconfidence bias not accounted for by the stochastic components of judgment. In both conditions the participants were additive on average and reasonably transitive, but the larger stochastic component in the exemplar condition produced somewhat larger absolute deviations. The results suggest that exemplar processes are unbiased but more perturbed by stochastic components, while rule-based processes may be more prone to bias.     

Reconstructing Distances among Objects from Their Discriminability

We describe a principled way of imposing a metric representing dissimilarities on any discrete set of stimuli (symbols, handwritings, consumer products, X-ray films, etc.), given the probabilities with which they are discriminated from each other by a perceiving system, such as an organism, person, group of experts, neuronal structure, technical device, or even an abstract computational algorithm. In this procedure one does not have to assume that discrimination probabilities are monotonically related to distances, or that the distances belong to a predefined class of metrics, such as Minkowski. Discrimination probabilities do not have to be symmetric, the probability of discriminating an object from itself need not be a constant, and discrimination probabilities are allowed to be 0’s and 1’s. The only requirement that has to be satisfied is Regular Minimality, a principle we consider the defining property of discrimination: for ordered stimulus pairs (a,b), b is least frequently discriminated from a if and only if a is least frequently discriminated from b. Regular Minimality generalizes one of the weak consequences of the assumption that discrimination probabilities are monotonically related to distances: the probability of discriminating a from a should be less than that of discriminating a from any other object. This special form of Regular Minimality also underlies such traditional analyses of discrimination probabilities as Multidimensional Scaling and Cluster Analysis. This research was supported by the NSF grant SES 0318010 (E.D.), Humboldt Research Award (E.D.), Humboldt Foundation grant DEU/1038348 (H.C. & E.D.), and DFG grant Co 94/5 (H.C.).     

Judgments of Grammaticality of Japanese Sentences Violating the Principle of Full Interpretation

Two experiments investigated the linguistic intuition of Japanese speakers in which they judged the grammaticality of sentences violating Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. Experiment 1 used bitransitive sentences, which included an extra argument that assumed a role of either subjective, dative, or objective on the one hand and that specified semantically a preceding argument or stood in par with it on the other. Findings showed that the speakers judged ungrammatical sentences involving a dative or an objective extra argument as more grammatical than those involving a subjective extra argument. Ungrammatical sentences with an extra specified argument were judged more grammatical than those with an extra par argument when the extra argument was objective. Experiment 2 used sentences that included a verbal noun (VN) comprising a noun followed by a verb, shita (did). Ungrammatical VN sentences contained two arguments given the same objective marker. These sentences were judged to be highly grammatical despite the violation of the principle. Findings suggest that speakers' actual knowledge of language is not fully consistent with the knowledge they are alleged by Chomsky to possess, including the principle of Full Interpretation.