Is there really an omission effect?

The omission effect, first described by Spranca and colleagues (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), has since been extensively studied and repeatedly confirmed (Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, & Greene, 2012). All else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a negative event than to passively allow that event to happen. In this paper, we provide new experimental data that challenges previous studies of the omission effect both methodologically and philosophically. We argue that previous studies have failed to control for the equivalence of rules that are violated by actions and omissions. Once equivalent norms are introduced, our results show that the omission effect is eliminated, even if the negative outcome of the behavior is foreseen and intended by the agent. We show that the omission effect does not constitute a basic, moral disposition but occurs exclusively in complex moral situations. Building on these empirical results, we cast doubt onto two influential explanations of the omission effect, the Causal Relevance Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis, and provide a novel explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, we discuss various ramifications of the interplay between our understanding of omissions and legal systems.     

Moral Evaluations of Lying for One's Own Group

This study investigated the development of moral judgments of blue lies, which occur when a speaker makes false statements to benefit a group of which he or she is a member. We investigated this issue in China, where there is substantial emphasis on the nature of children's associations with groups they belong to. Participants ranged in age from 9 to 17, and we asked them to evaluate lies that were told to benefit a team representing a speaker's class, school, or country. Judgments varied systematically as a function of age, with the 17‐year‐olds rating lying for any form of collective less negatively than did the younger age groups. In addition, across the age groups, children's affinity tended to shift from smaller groups to broader and more abstract collectives: 9‐ and 11‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's class, 13‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's school, and 17‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's country. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in sensory integration predict differences in time perception and individual levels of schizotypy

To interact functionally with our environment, our perception must locate events in time, including discerning whether sensory events are simultaneous. The Temporal Binding Window (TBW; the time window within which two stimuli tend to be integrated into one event) has been shown to relate to individual differences in perception, including schizotypy, but the relationship with subjective estimates of duration is unclear. We compare individual TBWs with individual differences in the filled duration illusion, exploiting differences in perception between empty and filled durations (the latter typically being perceived as longer). Schizotypy has been related to both these measures and is included to explore a potential link between these tasks and enduring perceptual differences. Results suggest that individuals with a narrower TBW make longer estimates for empty durations and demonstrate less variability in both conditions. Exploratory analysis of schizotypy data suggests a relationship with the TBW but is inconclusive regarding time perception.     

Lecturer fluency can impact students' judgments of learning and actual learning performance

The way in which information is presented can influence students' judgments of learning (JOLs). Carpenter, Wilford, Kornell, and Mullaney (2013) found that students reported higher JOLs after viewing a fluent lecturer (good speaker) versus a disfluent lecturer, whereas actual learning performance was unaffected by lecturer fluency. The current research sought to replicate Carpenter et al. (2013) and examine whether students could improve calibration of their JOLs if provided a second opportunity to do so over a different video. In three experiments, participants watched a video of a fluent or disfluent lecturer, made a JOL, completed a free-recall test, and then repeated this procedure with a second video. The fluent lecturer generally produced higher JOLs than the disfluent lecturer (for both videos) across all three experiments. However, fluency also had a positive impact on actual learning performance. These diverging results further illuminate the impact lecturer fluency can have on student learning.     

FOK判断与可接近信息之间的关系

通过三个实验,用语义联想集大小不同的中文单字词研究了靶项目联想集的大小与FOK判断等级和准确性的关系。实验一通过两种不同联想集大小的靶子,比较外显的、提取出的信息和内隐的、语义网络中固有的被激活信息量对FOK判断等级和FOK判断准确性是否有不同的影响。实验二和实验三通过不同的靶子呈现时间和学习遍数,比较不同的识记强度对不同大小联想集的靶子的FOK判断等级和FOK判断准确性的影响。实验结果表明：FOK判断等级随外显的、提取出的信息总量的增多而增高,随内隐的、语义网络中固有的被激活信息量的增多而降低。FOK判断准确性随靶子本身的激活强度的增强而增高,随内隐的、语义网络中固有的被激活信息的激活强度的增强而降低,FOK判断准确性取决于这两种激活强度的综合作用。     

The impact of physical load on duration estimation in sport

We investigated whether physical load has an influence on the accuracy of duration estimation of sporting activities presented in real time and slow motion. 86 participants were studied in two single sessions of 45 min each.Our results showed no general effects for physical load, when comparing physical load versus rest. However, we could replicate findings of past research (Schütz et al., 2021), showing that the duration of sports performance is estimated more accurately when presented in real time compared to slow motion. Further we found, that under physical load, participants perceiving the physical exercise as hard (RPE ≥15) estimated time significantly shorter and more accurately compared to participants perceiving the physical exercise as light or moderate (RPE <15).Thus, our results suggest that using slow motion may worsen the assessment of sports performance. Additionally, we could show that intense physical exertion contributes to reducing the overestimation of time.     

Time pressure and the application of decision rules: Choices and judgments among multiattribute alternatives

The effects of time pressure on decisions and judgments were studied and related to the use of different decision rules in a multiattribute decision task. The decision alternatives were students described by their high school grades in Swedish, Psychology and Natural Science. The subjects were asked to choose the student they thought would be most able to follow a university program and graduate as a school psychologist. On the basis of earlier findings using the same kind of decision task (Svenson et al., 1990) it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would prefer candidates having the maximum grade across all attributes to a greater extent than subjects under no time pressure. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would also focus more on the most important attribute and choose the alternatives being best on that attribute. The results supported these hypotheses.     

Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.