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101.
Popular press headlines frequently reveal unethical or illegal activity in business and sports. Given these parallel ethical lapses in business and sport, our study examines potential relationships between student sport involvement (active and passive) and ethical judgments regarding issues in sport and business. Our results, based on a sample of 202 undergraduates in an upper-division management class, indicate a significant negative relationship between high passive sport involvement and ethical judgments about sport issues as well as a consistent significant positive relationship between female gender and ethical judgments about sport and business issues. 相似文献
102.
By means of a relatively new eye-tracking method that allows for a test situation much closer to reality, we recorded and examined gaze time and fixation number within the cancellation and focus paradigm, a feature-matching model for preference judgments between two alternatives. In line with the cancellation and focus model we found that when subjects encountered the second option in each pair, shared features were canceled out and thus given less consideration whereas unique features were focused on more. We also investigated the role of feature attractiveness as a second important factor in preference judgments and found a U-shaped relationship between attractiveness and visual consideration intensity; that is, attractive and unattractive features received more attention than did those of intermediate attractiveness. Finally, we tested the ability of two models, Franklin’s rule and the WReSt (Weighted Recalled Stepwise Comparing) heuristic, to predict the preference ratings. 相似文献
103.
Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed. 相似文献
104.
STANLEY CAVELL 《Metaphilosophy》2008,39(1):51-61
Abstract: Writing in continuous gratitude to Gary Matthews's wonderful project of rescuing childhood from its disregard, not to say banishment, in professional philosophy, I relate here certain moments in his considerations of early childhood to moments in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which opens with a scene of childhood from Augustine's Confessions, and also to moments in later stages of childhood (as Matthews also significantly indicates) and, beyond that, to adolescent crises and to what I have called philosophy as “the education of grown‐ups.” I raise the issue of whether we are to see the “odd” questions of early childhood as proto‐science, which will eventually graduate into better science, or as proto‐philosophy, which will be continuously elaborated in philosophical investigation. This raises the question of whether philosophy is to be regarded, early or late, as inseparable from science or, as the later Wittgenstein urges, autonomous with respect to science's glamorous advances. 相似文献
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106.
跨文化的实证法学研究把文化心理学的理论突破和心理学的实证方法引入到对法学基本原理的研究之中。文化心理学研究中发现的东西方文化在价值定向、道德判断和思维方式等方面的差异能够给跨文化实证法学研究带来重要的启示。在对一些重要法律问题的认识上, 例如法律中的因果关系和责任的判定、合同形成以及纠纷调解等方面, 跨文化心理学研究已经发现了显著的跨文化差异, 这些差异可能会影响到不同文化背景的人对法的认识、法的建设以及法律的应用。我们认为跨文化的实证法学研究不仅可以为法学研究提供一条新的研究路径, 更主要的是还可以为中国法学研究的国际化和国际法律纠纷提供理论指导。 相似文献
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108.
Sem de Maagt 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(5):443-465
Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like. 相似文献
109.
Statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation. 相似文献
110.