The Simple Copy Task: Detecting Higher Order Visual Processing Deficits in Schizophrenia,Dementia, and Movement Disorder Groups

The Simple Copy Task (SCT) is a figure copying test with inherent appeal due to its short administration time, graded task difficulty, varied stimuli, and potential to eliminate floor effects. Despite this, there is a lack of data regarding its construct validity and diagnostic utility. The present study compared SCT performance of schizophrenia (n = 29), dementia (n = 64), and movement disorder (n = 12) groups with that of unmatched healthy control participants (n = 49). Movement disorder patients committed a high degree of misplacement errors, whereas dementia patients tended to omit items, add extraneous detail, and perseverate. The schizophrenia group was most similar to the dementia group in their performance on the SCT, committing primarily omission and perseveration errors. The SCT was most closely related to the Rey Complex Figure Task (r = 0.68, p < .01) and the Block Design Task (r = 0.62, p < .01). Age (r = ?0.14, p < .01) and education (r = 0.35, p < .01) effects were present; however, there was no impact of gender and handedness. Taken together, these findings provide support for the utility of the task and directions for clinical interpretation.     

Is there any evidence of historical slowing of reaction time? No,unless we compare apples and oranges

In this paper, we reconsider a tendency of historical slowing of simple reactions to visual stimuli declared by Woodley et al. (in press). We begin by reconstructing a pendulum similar to that used by Galton and question whether such an instrument could indeed be appropriate for purposes of RT measurement. Next, we screened the other studies used in Woodley's meta-analysis and note the important properties of these studies that make the RTs that they report incomparable to each other. We claim that there is no evidence of the trend of historical increase in RT after these differences between studies are taken into account. Overall, we conclude that any cross-study comparison of RTs is uninformative and cannot provide any evidence for speculating on the topic of historical change in intelligence.     

Expressivism,question substitution and evolutionary debunking

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: (a) raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and (b) supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected.     

HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (Refuting_R) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (Refuting_P). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense”unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller‐Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures.     

How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments

Evolutionary debunking arguments aim to undercut the epistemological status of our evaluative beliefs on the basis of the genesis of our belief‐forming tendencies. This paper addresses the issue whether responses to these arguments must be question‐begging. It argues for a pragmatic understanding of question‐beggingness, according to which whether an argument is question‐begging depends on the argumentative context. After laying out the debunking argument, the paper considers a variety of responses. It asks whether metaethical responses, such as Sharon Street’s response that relies on a version of antirealism, can avoid begging the question. It argues that so‐called ‘third‐factor’ responses, which rely on substantive evaluative views, are not question‐begging in all contexts. Similarly, it argues, my own ‘quasi‐tracking’ response is not question‐begging in all contexts. Finally, the paper asks whether responses to the debunking argument can avoid begging the question against someone who is convinced at the outset that the argument is sound.     

Large-Scale Modeling of Wordform Learning and Representation

The forms of words as they appear in text and speech are central to theories and models of lexical processing. Nonetheless, current methods for simulating their learning and representation fail to approach the scale and heterogeneity of real wordform lexicons. A connectionist architecture termed the sequence encoder is used to learn nearly 75,000 wordform representations through exposure to strings of stress-marked phonemes or letters. First, the mechanisms and efficacy of the sequence encoder are demonstrated and shown to overcome problems with traditional slot-based codes. Then, two large-scale simulations are reported that learned to represent lexicons of either phonological or orthographic wordforms. In doing so, the models learned the statistics of their lexicons as shown by better processing of well-formed pseudowords as opposed to ill-formed (scrambled) pseudowords, and by accounting for variance in well-formedness ratings. It is discussed how the sequence encoder may be integrated into broader models of lexical processing.     

Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses

Pascals wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the authorsgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such pascal argumentsis developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4).     

Relevance

Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation. Causal relevance consists in an item's ability to help produce an outcome in a situation. Epistemic relevance, a distinct concept, consists in the ability of a piece of information (or a speech act communicating or requesting a piece of information) to help achieve an epistemic goal in a situation. It has this ability when it can be ineliminably combined with other at least potentially accurate information to achieve the goal. The relevance of a conversational contribution, premiss relevance and conclusion relevance are species of epistemic relevance thus defined. The conception of premiss relevance which results provides a basis for determining when the various arguments ad called fallacies of relevance are indeed irrelevant. In particular, an ad verecundiam appeal is irrelevant if the authority cited lacks expertise in a cognitive domain to which the conclusion belongs, the authority does not exercise its expertise in coming to endorse the conclusion, or the conclusion does not belong to a cognitive domain; otherwise the ad verecundiam is relevant.     

Emergent simple discrimination established by indirect relation to differential consequences

Three experiments examined a discrimination training sequence that led to emergent simple discrimination in human subjects. The experiments differed primarily in their subject populations. Normally capable adults served in the first experiment, preschool children in the second, and mentally retarded adults in the third. In all experiments, subjects learned a simple simultaneous discrimination: When visual stimuli A1 and A2 were displayed together, reinforcers followed selections of A1, the S+, but not A2, the S-. The subjects also learned a conditional discrimination taught with an arbitrary visual-visual matching-to-sample procedure. Comparisons were two additional visual stimuli, B1 and B2, and samples were A1 and A2. Reinforcers followed selections of B1 in the presence of A1 and of B2 in the presence of A2. After the simple-discrimination and conditional-discrimination baselines had been acquired, B1 and B2 were displayed alone (without a sample) on probe trials. Subjects had never been taught explicitly how to respond to such displays. Nonetheless, they almost always selected B1, which was involved in a conditional relation with A1, the stimulus that served as S+ on the simple-discrimination trials. This outcome suggested the formation of stimulus classes during conditional-discrimination training. Through class formation, B1 and B2 had apparently acquired stimulus functions similar to those shown by A1 and A2 on simple-discrimination trials, thereby leading to emergent selections of B1 on the probes.     

Linked arguments and the validity requirement

In this paper I demonstrate that most textbook accounts of the linked/convergent distinction fail to conform to the widespread intuition that all valid arguments ought to be classified as linked arguments. I also show that standard textbook accounts of linkage and convergence cannot provide a satisfactory treatment of fallacies of irrelevance and, due to their general insensitivity to the epistemic context in which arguments are offered, must be supplemented by subjective accounts of linkage and convergence which appeal exclusively to authorial beliefs and intentions.Drafts of this paper were read at the Ontario Philosophical Society meeting held at Trent University in October 1990 and the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Chicago in April 1991. I thank Trudy Govier, Hans Hansen and an anonymous referee for helpful and encouraging comments on various drafts.